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   ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
                   Padres Descontentos: Spanish Imperial Policy, 
           Franciscan Decline, and the California Mission System, 
                                              1784-1805 
                                                      by 
  Jeremiah John Sladeck 
                                                     Doctor of Philosophy in History 
           University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
       Professor Stephen Aron, Chair 
 
So long has the shadow cast by Junípero Serra been that it has obscured the history of the 
California mission system as it developed after the founding father’s death in 1784. In both the 
scholarly and popular imagination, Father Serra has become the lasting symbol of the California 
missions. He acts as an escutcheon, shielding the eras that followed from careful scrutiny. The 
intense scholarly focus on Serra leaves the impression that he either led the Franciscans 
throughout their time in California or that nothing significant occurred after his passing.  
Shining a light on Serra’s shadow, my dissertation explores the world of California 
missions and missionaries, their Indian converts, and their secular rivals in the twenty years 
following Serra’s death. It exposes the chaos, conflicts, and cover-ups that characterized the 
California missions in the period from 1784 to 1805, the years in which the mantle of leadership 
was taken up by Fermín Francisco de Lasuén. Focusing on this era broadens our understanding 
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of the California mission system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the nature of 
Spanish colonialism.  
Another gap in scholarly understanding is the role imperial politics played shaping the 
missions. Too often, California is studied in isolation, treated as if it was the island it was 
presumed to be on early maps. Its connections to Spanish America and to Spain get lost. Yet 
anti-clerical policy enacted by the Spanish crown in the mid-eighteenth century had a profound 
impact on California, sending the Franciscans into a period of decline in both zeal and 
competency just as they became the vanguard of the California colonial project. Lasuén and his 
priests trained during that period and developed a different posture towards missionary life and 
the Indians they baptized. Gone was the desire to martyr themselves for the spiritual uplift of 
neophytes that marked Serra’s group, replaced by a deep cynicism born of their order’s decline. 
The order’s problems with Indigenous Californians under Serra metastasized during Lasuén’s 
presidency, as the missions became marked by disease, violence, and forced recruitment. After 
Lasuén’s death in 1803, his administration’s cynicism became the prevalent attitude of 
Franciscan leadership and much of the rank-and-file priests that followed, spurring increasing 
Indigenous resistance in the nineteenth century.  
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Introduction 
From its inception in 1769 to its formal end in 1834, the California mission system, a 
series of Franciscan missions founded by imperial Spain, produced a human catastrophe. Under 
the guise of spiritual uplift, missionaries sought to eradicate the cultures of Indigenous 
Californians. Although they did not succeed in this cultural erasure, missionization produced 
traumas that have endured to the present. As the vanguard of Spain’s invasion of California, 
Franciscan missionaries promised Indigenous Californians the spiritual benefits of Christian life 
along with the material benefits of European culture and technology. They delivered something 
else. In stark contrast to the image of bucolic tranquility perpetuated by late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century California civic boosters and the Catholic Church, mission life was hard and 
oftentimes proved fatal for California Indians. During the mission period, at least 66,100 
California Indians died in the system, nearly a quarter of the 300,000 souls living in the region 
before the Spanish invasion.1 Disease was the most common killer, with the missions 
increasingly becoming vectors over time, as cramped quarters and poor nutritional regimes 
allowed pathogens to spread.2 There were other lethal aspects of Spanish religious colonialism. 
Reckless Spanish soldiers, in the early years of the mission period, killed California Indians for 
 
1 For the information regarding number of deceased baptized California Indians, see Zephyrin Engelhardt, O.F.M., 
Missions and Missionaries Volume III: Upper California (San Francisco, 1912), 653; Precontact California Indian 
population estimates are highly contested, this dissertation employs estimates found in Sherburne F. Cook, The 
Population of the California Indians, 1769-1970 (Berkeley, 1976); For a summary of earlier estimates, see A. L. 
Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California (New York, 1976), 880-882. 
2 European pathogens hit California Indian populations before the 1769 invasion, but epidemics seem to have 
increased after 1800, see Robert H. Jackson, Indian Population Decline: The Missions of Northwestern New Spain, 
1687-1840 (Albuquerque, 1994), 85; Disease chronology is cited in Larson, Johnson, and Michaelsen, 
“Missionization among the Coastal Chumash of Central California,” American Anthropologist, 96. no. 2 (June, 
1994), 286; Robert H. Jackson, “The Population of the Santa Bárbara Channel Missions (Alta California), 1813-
1832” Journal of California and Great Basin Anthropology 12, No. 2 (1990): 271; Deana Dartt-Newton and Jon 
M. Erlandson “Little Choice for the Chumash: Colonialism, Cattle and Coercion in Mission Period California,” 
American Indian Quarterly 30, No. 3 (Summer–Autumn, 2006): 422. 
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trifling offenses and routinely sexually assaulted California Indian women.3 Baptized Indians 
also lost their lives in conflicts with other California Indians outside of the mission system who 
saw them as traitors.4 
Between 1769 and 1834, the California missions altered myriad Indigenous cultures and 
lifeways. Once Indigenous Californians received baptism, Franciscan missionaries expected 
them to renounce their old lives and become quasi-Europeans; quasi because the missionaries 
still considered them Indian savages, and no amount of acculturation ever ended that 
chauvinism.5 California Indian peoples’ attempts to retain their Indigenous customs were met 
with physical punishment that often became torture, particularly those the Franciscan 
missionaries found the most offensive. Engaging in their own religious traditions, leaving the 
missions to harvest traditional foods, or acting against Christian sexual mores all warranted, 
according to Franciscans in California, whippings, time in shackles or stocks, and at times 
withholding food.6 The Franciscans indefatigably punished “Indianness” for sixty-five years 
during the California mission period, always in the name of Christ and Spain. 
This dissertation argues that ambiguous and short-sighted Spanish policy decisions, most 
notably a return to the primacy of missionaries over civil authorities, created conditions for a 
human catastrophe. The second father president of the missions, Fermín Francisco de Lasuén 
 
3 Instances of this type are too numerous to recount here; for one episode in 1771 at Mission San Gabriel, see Kelly 
Lytle Hernández, City of Inmates: Conquest, Rebellion, and the Rise of Human Caging in Los Angeles, 1771–1965 
(Chapel Hill, 2017), 24-25. 
4 On April 29, 1795, Saclan Indians killed seven baptized Indians from Mission San Francisco while searching for 
Indians who had escaped that mission. For a description of events see chapter four of this dissertation; see also, 
Randall Milliken, A Time of Little Choice: The Disintegration of Tribal Culture in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
1769-1910 (Menlo Park, 1995), 139-141. 
5 In 1813, Secretary of the Department of Overseas Colonies, Don Ciriaco González Carvajal sent the California 
missionaries a questionnaire regarding the spiritual and cultural progress of California Indians in the mission 
system. Throughout the work the respondents make claims like the following: “We are uprooting some of these 
ideas in the neophytes, yet they always remain Indians,” see Maynard J. Geiger, O.F.M., As the Padres Saw Them: 
California Indian Life and Customs as Reported by the Franciscan Missionaries, 1813-1815, (Santa Bárbara, 
1976), 79. 
6 Zephyrin Engelhardt, Missions and Missionaries of California Volume II (San Francisco, 1912), 501. 
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accelerated and entrenched this process while performing his duties from 1785-1803. This 
argument sharply contrasts much of the prevailing literature regarding this period. Lasuén’s 
English language biographer and fellow Franciscan, Francis F. Guest, O.F.M. called Lasuén’s 
presidency “the most dynamic…of [the California mission system’s] development.”7 Mission 
scholars Rose Marie Beebe and Robert M. Senkewicz similarly called the 1790s the California 
mission system’s developmental stage, and the Catholic scholar Gerald J. Geary termed that 
decade the California mission’s “golden age.”8 Guest, Beebe, Senkewicz, and Geary made these 
assessments in light of the California mission system’s expansion during the 1790s. Indeed, 
Father President Lasuén founded nine new missions, baptized 16,100 California Indians, 
increased herds of cattle and horses by 45,000 head, increased flocks of sheep by 60,000 head, 
and increased agricultural output by 45,000 bushels.9 If the California mission system is viewed 
simply in quantitative metrics, the 1790s were a period of dynamic growth. 
However, the Franciscans’ stated goals went beyond numbers of missions, head of cattle 
and sheep, and high baptismal registers. The missionaries intended to transform California 
Indians into quasi-European subjects loyal to the Spanish crown and the Roman Catholic church. 
The cost, in terms of human life, was extreme. While Franciscans in California baptized 16,100 
Indians in the 1790s, 9,300 men, women, children, and elders died in the missions during that 
same period.10 Under the previous father president, Junípero Serra, death rates were substantially 
lower. From 1769 to 1784, Franciscans baptized 10,807 California Indians while 3,569 died. 
 
7 Francis F. Guest, O.F.M., Fermin Francisco de Lasuen: A Biography (Washington, D.C., 1973), xviii. 
8 Rose Marie Beebe, Robert M. Senkewicz, “Uncertainty on the Mission Frontier: Missionary Recruitment and 
Institutional Stability in Alta California in the 1790s,” in Francis in America: Essays on the Franciscan Family in 
North and South America, ed. John F. Schwaller (Washington, D.C., 2008), 298; Gerald J. Geary, The 
Secularization of the California Mission System, 1810-1846 (Washington, D.C., 1934), 52.  
9 Hubert Howe Bancroft, The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft Volume XVIII, History of California Volume 1 (San 
Francisco, 1886), 576-577. 
10 Ibid., 576-577. 
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Under Serra, an average of 0.65 deaths occurred per day. In the 1790s under Lasuén, 2.8 deaths 
occurred every day.11 That represents a 400 per cent increase in average deaths per day. 
Furthermore, in the 1790s, roughly 800 baptized California Indians permanently fled the 
missions.12 These numbers paint a grim picture of life within the mission complex. Numbers 
documenting loss of life and resistance to missionization imply that a story more important than 
crop yields and cattle herds must be told.  However, numbers alone do not explain the processes 
that caused a 400 per cent increase in average deaths per day. Policy decisions in California, 
Mexico, and Spain are at the root of these lethal spaces. Yet scholarly understanding of the 
Spanish political processes that produced skyrocketing death rates in the California missions 
remains dim. It is the goal of this dissertation to illuminate them. 
This illumination is necessary, particularly in the period after 1785, as Junípero Serra’s 
immense shadow has obscured the history of the California mission system following his death 
in 1784. In both the scholarly and popular imagination, Serra has become the lasting symbol of 
the California mission system. Serra acts as an escutcheon, shielding the eras that followed from 
careful scrutiny. The intense scholarly focus on Serra leaves the impression that he either led the 
Franciscans throughout their time in California or that nothing significant occurred after his 
passing. Shining a light on Serra’s shadow, this dissertation explores the world of California 
missions and missionaries, their Indigenous converts, and their secular rivals in the twenty years 
following Serra’s death. It exposes the chaos, conflicts, and cover-ups that characterized the 
California missions from 1784 to 1805 – the years in which Lasuén took up mantle of leadership. 
 
11 Franciscans recorded numbers of baptized Indians and their deaths in registers at each of the California missions. 
The records for the years 1785 to 1803 are translated and reprinted in Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 
Finbar Kenneally, trans. and ed., (Washington, D.C., 1965), 394-423. 
12 Bancroft, History of California, 1:576.  
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Focusing on this era broadens our understanding of the California mission system and the nature 
of Spanish colonialism throughout the Spanish-Indigenous borderlands.  
Spanish imperial politics and their connection to the California missions need a 
reassessment. Too often, California is studied in isolation, treated as if it were the island early 
cartographers presumed it to be on early maps, ignoring its connections to Spanish America and 
to Spain. Yet, the Spanish crown’s mid-eighteenth century anti-clerical policies had a profound 
influence on California, sending the Franciscans into a period of decline in both zeal and 
competency just as they became the vanguard of the California colonial project. Lasuén and the 
priests trained during that period developed a different posture towards missionary life and the 
California Indians they attempted to convert. The desire to martyr themselves for the spiritual 
uplift of baptized Indians that marked Serra’s group receded. In its place emerged a deep 
cynicism born of their order’s decline. The order’s problems with Indigenous Californians under 
Serra metastasized during Lasuén’s presidency, as the missions became marked by disease, 
violence, forced recruitment, and mass death. After Lasuén’s death in 1803, his administration’s 
ethos became the prevalent attitude of Franciscan leaders in California and much of the rank-
and-file priests that followed, spurring increasing Indigenous resistance in the nineteenth 
century.  
Since the end of the nineteenth century, when California mission history became a 
subject of historical inquiry, both scholars and the public have debated the California missions’ 
legacy. They debate whether the California mission system served as an example of a positive 
case of social engineering, or if the system was more akin to forced servitude. There are three 
scholarly camps, the mission defenders, the critical mission scholars, and those scholars taking a 
middle-ground approach. However, scholars are not the only force driving the perception of the 
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California mission system, as public and private interests also shape them in the minds of 
Californians and U.S. citizens. The earliest California historians, Alexander Forbes, Hubert 
Howe Bancroft, and Theodore Hittell all wrote about the mission in an even-handed manner but 
offered appropriate critique of the Franciscans.13 In the early twentieth century, Franciscan and 
Catholic scholars dominated the field and they responded to the previous generations’ work with 
a mission defense. These scholars typically praised Franciscans for toiling under difficult 
circumstances in California and for bringing Christianity and European technology to Indigenous 
Californians.14 Around the same time, early historians of the borderlands generally worked from 
the premise that the Franciscans raised California Indians out of barbarism and were therefore 
praiseworthy.15 In the first half of the twentieth century, this view of the California missions 
prevailed in the minds of the public at large, following decades of public relations campaigns 
promoting the missions as tourist destinations.16 Moreover, by the 1930s California business and 
civic leaders promoted an aggrandized and wholly fictious view of California’s pre-United 
States’ past now derisively known as the Spanish fantasy heritage.17 Between the Automobile 
Club of America’s adoption of the missions as California’s premier historical tourist destinations 
and festivals such as Santa Barbara’s “Old Spanish Days,” the image of the idyllic mission with 
 
13 Alexander Forbes, California: a History of Upper & Lower California: From Their First Discovery to the Present 
Time, Comprising an Account of the Climate, Soil, Natural Productions, Agriculture, Commerce, &; a Full View 
of the Missionary Establishments and Condition of the Free & Domesticated Indians (Baja California, 1839); 
Theodore Henry Hittell, History of California Volumes I-IV (San Francisco, 1898). 
14 Zephyrin Engelhardt, Missions and Missionaries of California Volumes I-III (Santa Barbara, 1929); George 
Wharton James, Francisco Palóu’s life and apostolic labors of the venerable father Junípero Serra: Founder of 
the Franciscan Missions in California (Pasadena, 1913); Maynard J. Geiger, The life and times of Fray Junípero 
Serra, O.F.M.; or, The man who never turned back, (1713-1784), a biography (Washington, D.C. 1959); Louis J. 
Luzbetak, “If Junípero Serra Were Alive: Missiological-Anthropological Theory Today,” The Americas 41 no.4 
(April, 1985), 512-519; Geary, Secularization of the California Mission System; Guest, Fermin Francisco de 
Lasuen. 
15 Herbert E. Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest (New Haven, 1921), 
278-279; Herbert E. Bolton, “The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies,” The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (October, 1917), 42-61.     
16 Mike Davis, City of Quartz (New York, 1990), 22. 
17 Carey McWilliams, North from Mexico: The Spanish-speaking people of the United States (New York, 1949).  
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kindly missionaries passing the Catholic doctrine to willing California Indians became 
foundational to California’s identity. Although much of this took place outside of the academy, 
this perception of the missions guided the hand of historians and educators for decades.18 
By the 1980s, a new generation of activists and historians offered a fresh perspective on 
the California missions and Indigenous Californians. There were, of course, those who came 
before, such as Helen Hunt Jackson’s work to illuminate the plight of the former mission Indians 
in the late eighteenth century and Manuel Servín’s call to consider California as part of the larger 
Spanish American world in the 1960s.19 In 1987, Rupert and Jeanette Costo punctuated decades 
of their activism arguing that Franciscans missionaries committed physical and cultural 
genocide.20 Their work prompted a sea change in the mission debate, facilitating a wave of 
highly critical scholarship that focused on the Indigenous experience in the missions and treated 
the California missions as social, political, and economic institutions, rather than mythological 
spaces.21 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars further developed the understanding of 
the Indigenous experience in the missions. Recent mission scholarship focuses on the 
circumstances and outcomes of California Indian responses to the European labor regimes and 
the social mores imposed upon them by the Franciscans, as well as the inter-Indigenous political 
dynamics within the missions themselves. New methodologies have incorporated Indigenous 
histories and perspectives and demonstrate that California Indians, through their labor and 
 
18 Michelle M. Lorimer, Resurrecting the Past: The California Mission Myth (Pechenga, 2016). 
19 Helen Hunt Jackson, A Call for Reform: The Southern California Indian Writings of Helen Hunt Jackson, eds. 
Valerie Sherer Mathes and Phil Brigandi, (Norman, 2015); Manuel P. Servín, “The Secularization of the 
California Missions: A Reappraisal,” Southern California Quarterly 47, no. 2, (June 1965); 133-149. 
20 Rupert Costo and Jeannette Henry Costo, The Missions of California: A Legacy of Genocide (San Francisco, 
1987). 
21 The New Latin American Mission History, Erick Langer and Robert H. Jackson, eds. (Lincoln, 1995) 
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participation in missions over decades, shaped individual missions into Indigenous spaces that 
reflected the particular culture, or cultures, of the groups at a given mission. Recent scholarship 
also shatters the notion of California Indian people as “pre-political,” revealing that California 
Indians deftly maneuvered through a shifting web of colonial politics. Included in this new wave 
of mission scholarship are explorations of the intimate and family lives of California Indian 
people both within and beyond the missions, articulating the distortions Spanish colonialism 
caused to the most personal aspects of daily life, and Indigenous strategies of adaptation and 
resistance to them.22 Though they deal with their own specific regions, themes, and timeframes, 
one through line that links these modern works is the primacy of both California Indian agency, 
and crucially, survival in the face of Spanish colonization. These scholars have shown that 
despite the increasing levels of disease, coercion, and cultural oppression, California Indians 
successfully retained their traditions and dignity.  
Another transformation in California mission scholarship over the last thirty years has 
been scholarly demonstrations of the missions’ multifaceted forms of violence. In these works, 
Franciscan missionaries failed to recognize - out of ignorance or single-minded determination to 
convert Indigenous peoples - the many ways in which their style of colonialism caused 
profoundly negative consequences for California Indians. These critical works describe how the 
Franciscan missionaries’ lack of understanding regarding the intensely diverse California Indian 
population led to massive demographic decline. These scholars argue that, at times, the 
 
22 Steven W. Hackel, Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial 
California (Chapel Hill, 2005); Sandos, Converting California; Lizbeth Haas, Saints and Citizens: Indigenous 
Histories of Colonial Missions and Mexican California, (Berkeley, 2014); Randall Milliken, Time of Little 
Choice; Erika Pérez, Colonial Intimacies: Interethnic Kinship, Sexuality, and Marriage in Southern California, 
1769-1885 (Norman, 2018); Chelsea K. Vaughn, “Locating Absence: The Forgotten Presence of Monjeríos in 
Alta California Missions,” Southern California Quarterly, 93, no. 2 (Summer 2011), 141-174; Albert L. Hurtado, 
“Sexuality in California’s Franciscan Missions: Cultural Perceptions and Sad Realities,” California History 71, 
no. 3, “Indians in California,” (Fall, 1992) 370-385; Albert L. Hurtado, Intimate Frontiers: Sex Gender and 
Culture in Old California (Albuquerque, 1999). 
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California mission system functioned more like a slave colony or an early system of mass 
incarceration than as an institution of religious instruction.23 These recent histories paint a grim 
picture of California mission life.  
This dissertation departs from those models in significant ways even as it is filtered 
through them. Indian agency and the destructive nature of the missions both have their place in 
this work and are highly influential to it, but neither are the primary object of investigation. The 
California mission system was a Spanish religious-political institution, supported by Spanish 
military governors and soldiers of mestizo ancestry. Spanish political will and old European 
dynastic rivalries created the system, as did European cultural chauvinism and religious 
extremism. While modern scholars correctly argue that California Indians resisted Spanish 
power, and that indigeneity helped to shape the California mission system, those are only part of 
the story. Had it been the whole story - if California Indian people had crafted the mission 
system - it likely would not have resulted in 2.8 deaths per day in the 1790s. Spanish politics and 
inter-institutional rivalries produced this lethal system. In the last thirty years, while scholarly 
understanding of the difficulties California Indian people faced and their responses and 
resistance to Spanish colonialism have deepened, our understanding of why the missions became 
such dangerous spaces remains incomplete. To gain that understanding, an investigation of 
Spanish colonial policy, Franciscans as a function of that policy, and the struggle for control of 
Alta California and its Indigenous population between Franciscan missionaries and civil-military 
leaders is paramount.  
 
23 Robert H. Jackson and Edward Castillo, Indians, Franciscans, and Spanish Colonization: The Impact of the 
Mission System on California Indians (Albuquerque, 1995), Robert H. Jackson, Indian Population Decline: The 
Missions of Northwestern New Spain, 1687-1840 (Albuquerque, 1994), 164, Benjamin Madley, “California's First 
Mass Incarceration System: Franciscan Missions, California Indians, and Penal Servitude, 1769-1836,” Pacific 
Historical Review 88 no. 1 (January, 2019), 14-47.; see also Elias Castillo, A Cross of Thorns: The Enslavement of 
California's Indians by the Spanish Missions (Fresno, 2017), Michelle M. Lorimer, Resurrecting the Past: The 
California Mission Myth (Temecula, 2016).  
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This dissertation analyzes the contradictory nature of Spanish colonial policy during the 
era of the Bourbon Reforms, offers close readings of Franciscans’ correspondence both to 
Spanish civil officials and between the missionaries, and focuses on father president Lasuén’s 
leadership in an era of increasing tumult and scandal. As previously noted, the status of 
missionaries in Spanish America in the second half of the eighteenth century waned as a result of 
the 1749 secularization decree and efforts to limit the numbers of new missionaries operating in 
the western hemisphere. Inspector General José de Gálvez’s decision to send Franciscan 
missionaries to California to lead the invasion represented a significant shift in direction that 
caused tension and enmity within the province throughout the entirety of the mission period.24 
That choice, along with geographic isolation, created a sense of autonomy in the Franciscans sent 
to California. Serra’s quest for total control over mission Indians and anti-reformist position 
appeared profoundly anachronistic to California’s first military governors, particularly Felipe de 
Neve, who knew of other situations on the northern border where missionaries did not wield such 
power.25 Although many volumes recount Serra and Neve’s battles, there exists a paucity of 
analysis regarding Lasuén and his important feuds with governors Pedro Fages and Diego de 
Borica. These conflicts are key aspects of this dissertation and to fully appreciate them requires a 
fresh, deep reading of familiar sources.  
The most crucial intervention this dissertation offers to the preexisting California mission 
literature is a close reading of many key documents from Lasuén’s presidency. Franciscans were 
writers, especially the second father president. Lasuén wrote letters to governors, soldiers, 
 
24 David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven 1992), 242. 
25 For more on the feud between Serra and Neve see, Edwin A. Beilharz, Felipe de Neve: First Governor of 
California, 45-66; Steven W. Hackel, Junípero Serra: California’s Founding Father (New York, 2013), 197, 211-
218, 225, 226; Rose Marie Beebe and Robert M. Senkewicz, Junípero Serra: California, Indians, and the 
Transformation of a Missionary (Norman, 2015), 21-22, 27, 348, 352-353, 358-360; Sandos, Converting 
California, 69-78.  
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viceroys, his missionaries, and his superiors at the Franciscan apostolic College of San Fernando 
in Mexico City. He crafted reports detailing mission herds and agricultural output, he penned 
defenses of his missionaries when accused of scandal, and withering critiques of civil authority. 
Lasuén and the Franciscans left behind thousands of pages of documents detailing their methods, 
philosophies, fears, prejudices, hopes, and goals. They wrote because the isolation of colonial 
California compelled them to communicate with each other and with the outside world. They 
wrote because the bureaucratic nature of the Spanish empire demanded it. These documents offer 
insights into the collective mental space that the Franciscans occupied between 1784 and 1805. 
Many of the documents employed in this dissertation have been cited in existing scholarship. 
However, this dissertation builds a new framework using old materials.  
Methodological and theoretical currents have shifted in history in the last thirty years. A 
reexamination of these documents filtered through those changes is in order. For example, two of 
the documents receiving intense scrutiny in this dissertation act as bookends to Lasuén’s 
presidency. The first are the transcripts of Lasuén’s investigation of murder charges made against 
Fray Tomás de la Peña at Mission Santa Clara de Asís in 1785. After weeks of investigation in 
California, and years of languishing in a bureaucratic quagmire in Mexico City, jurists 
exonerated de la Peña. A reevaluation of those transcripts does not prove de la Peña’s guilt, nor 
confirm his innocence. Yet, it reveals the lengths to which Lasuén went in attempting to maintain 
the good name of the missionaries, a refrain he often repeated, regardless of the damage done to 
his relationships with California Indians, governors, soldiers, and younger Franciscans. The 
second is a near chapter-length analysis of arguably the most important document Lasuén or any 
other California missionary produced. From 1795 through 1797, a protracted crisis unfurled at 
Mission San Francisco de Asís, resulting in mass defections, forced labor, withholding of food 
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from baptized Indians, and their severe physical abuse. Due to this crisis and an increase in 
Franciscans themselves criticizing management of the missions, the viceroy in Mexico City 
compelled Lasuén to write a defense of the California mission system. Some historians have 
heralded Lasuén’s defense, called the Refutation of Charges, as the most important document he 
ever produced, as it delineates dozens of facets of mission life.26 Lasuén’s Refutation remains 
crucially important, but for a wholly different set of reasons. When read through the lens of 
recent scholarship, Lasuén’s refutation becomes a Rosetta Stone of sorts, allowing for the 
translation of the Franciscan rhetoric of spiritual and cultural uplift of their Indian wards into the 
cold, bitter resentment many Franciscans felt about their place in the world and the California 
Indian people they were meant to transform.  
The Spanish military governors and soldiers stationed in the remote province are the 
second facet of late-eighteenth century California that deserves reconsideration. These historical 
actors pose a moral dilemma for scholars, largely due to their contradictory and counterintuitive 
attitudes and actions. As this dissertation will detail, California’s Spanish governors were both 
Indian fighters who violently enforced Spanish colonial desires throughout the northern reaches 
of New Spain, and administrators who sought to maintain stability, as they feared a general 
uprising would wipe out the Spanish enterprise in California. They may have sought to reform 
the mission system, but they were colonial agents who also sought the transformation of 
California Indians into quasi-Europeans. For example, Neve, whose time as governor ended as 
Lasuén came to the presidency, often appeared sympathetic to Indians both within and outside 
the bounds of the missions. He compared their existence in the missions to “vassalage” and 
“slavery.”27 In 1782, Neve brokered deals with Chumash leaders to maintain their autonomy and 
 
26 Bancroft, History of California, 1:589; Guest, Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 218-248. 
27 Beilharz, Felipe de Neve, 51, 52. 
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to keep Franciscans from proselytizing in their towns.28 Despite this, Neve also envisioned a 
second chain of missions in California’s interior, a series that would be fourteen to twenty 
leagues east of preexisting missions.29 Pedro Fages, the governor who followed Neve, is a far 
more challenging figure. Fages too worked to constrain the worst aspects of the Franciscan 
missions. He contested the severity of missionary discipline and Franciscans’ desire to take 
soldiers into California Indian villages to proselytize. Fages worked with Ohlone leaders to 
provide better working conditions at Spanish construction sites around the San Francisco Bay. 
Fages also brought a young Quechan girl back to Monterey from the Colorado River as his 
concubine. He denied the accusation, yet had his wife held prisoner at Mission San Carmel until 
she recanted her claim that she found him on top of the girl.30 Diego de Borica became governor 
in 1795 as the crisis at Mission San Francisco began. His correspondence shows the crisis 
emotionally affected him, which drove him to hold the Franciscans accountable for the terrible 
circumstances. However, in the aftermath of the crisis at Mission San Francisco, Borica also 
presided over the largest armed conflict between Spanish troops and California Indian people 
during the eighteenth century, when his men went to the East Bay to recapture escaped baptized 
Indians.  
The rank-and-file Spanish troops stationed at California’s presidios and working as 
mission guards, like their governors, were both foes and allies of Indigenous Californians. In the 
earliest years of the Spanish occupation, some soldiers raped Indian women and, in some cases, 
murdered the men who sought to protect or avenge them. However, by the mid-1790s, after 
Neve, and to a lesser degree, Fages, took steps to root out violence against Indigenous 
 
28 Haas, Saints and Citizens, 16; Maynard Geiger, Mission Santa Barbara, 1782-1965 (Santa Barbara, 1965), 10. 
29 Beilharz, Felipe de Neve, 94. 
30 Bancroft, History of California, 1:391-392. 
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Californians among the soldiery, baptized Indians sometimes looked to Spanish soldiers for 
protection against missionaries. This dissertation does not seek to redeem the Spanish military in 
California. Yet understanding both the contradictions and changes in officers and soldiers is 
crucial to understanding the trajectory of the mission system and the human catastrophe endured 
by California Indian people. The soldiers’ motivation may have stemmed for the desire to avoid 
large-scale confrontations with Indigenous Californians rather than humanitarianism, but their 
efforts to stop missionaries from abusing baptized Indians were legitimate. 
A third facet of this period that requires a fresh investigation and close reading is Lasuén 
himself. Despite his presidency being heralded as a golden age or a dynamic period of the 
California mission system, little scholarship exists on Lasuén. In his nineteenth century history 
of California, Bancroft remarked that Lasuén performed his duties as father president “to the 
satisfaction of all classes, [he was] loved and respected by all friars, officers, soldiers, settlers, 
and neophytes.”31 In more recent work, Serra, or the turbulent era of Mexican independence and 
its effect of the mission system and California Indians after 1824, typically eclipse Lasuén. When 
Lasuén does appear in scholarship, it is usually a brief entry, often a single quotation, and very 
rarely as a fully fleshed out individual or policy maker.32  
To find an English-language secondary source dedicated to Lasuén and his presidency, 
one must return to fellow Franciscan and historian Francis F. Guest’s 1973 biography. Guest is 
effusive in his praise, as might be expected. In Guest’s telling, Lasuén emerges as a sensitive 
man of peace, a quiet administrator who sought consensus among the Franciscans and with 
California’s civil-military leaders.33 Guest argued that when Lasuén took the mantle of father 
 
31 Bancroft, History of California, 1:578. 
32 For examples see, Hackel, Children of Coyote, 84,85, 88-89, Haas, Saints and Citizens, 24, 26-27 
33 Guest, Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 345.  
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president, he “corrected one of Serra’s mistakes: he established and successfully maintained a 
policy of peaceful cooperation with the military governors of California.”34 In fact, after Guest 
coyly hesitates to argue that Lasuén was a more effective leader than Serra in his introduction, he 
comes close to saying exactly that in his conclusion. Guest muses openly throughout Lasuén’s 
biography that things might have been different in California if Lasuén had been the first father 
president.35 Guest admitted that Serra was made of stronger stuff than Lasuén, but suggested that 
Lasuén’s pliability was not a weakness, but one of his great strengths. Guest took Lasuén’s views 
on California Indian people, something that will be analyzed extensively throughout this 
dissertation, at face value. Guest argued that because Lasuén spent nearly forty years of his life 
working among American Indians in the Sierra Gorda region of Mexico, Baja, and Alta 
California, “his judgment on the presence of quiet, peace, and happiness among the Indians at the 
missions must be accepted.”36 However, Guest is an unreliable biographer. He also wrote an 
extensive piece about violence in the California missions and Indigenous Californian’s responses 
to it. He argued that because Franciscans described the whippings they administered to baptized 
California Indians as azotes in Spanish, a word that can mean both “blows” and “spankings,” 
they were similar to the light spankings that a father would give his misbehaving children.37 It is 
difficult to imagine an argument stranger than Guest’s - that the Franciscans and their Indian 
agents gave adult Indian men and women light spankings when they transgressed Franciscan 
values, and this was the discipline that held the system together. Guest’s portrayal of Lasuén as 
 
34 Guest, Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 354. 
35 Ibid., 346, 351,  
36 Ibid., 287. 
37 Francis F. Guest O.F.M, “An Inquiry into the Role of the Discipline in California Mission Life,” Southern 
California Quarterly 71, no. 1 (Spring, 1989), 34. 
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both a quiet administrator who sought consensus and an expert on California Indians has stood 
for decades. 
This dissertation makes a different argument regarding Lasuén’s place in California 
mission history. While it is true that the Spanish government’s ambiguous and shifting colonial 
policy made administering the religious colony of California difficult at best, based on his words 
and record, Lasuén was the wrong man for the job at a time when the missions were rotting from 
the inside out. Unlike Bancroft and Guest’s characterizations, this dissertation argues that Lasuén 
bullied, intimidated, obstructed, engaged in cover-ups, invented imaginary conspiracies, lied to 
his superiors, labeled his enemies insane, despised California Indian people, and life in the 
remote province. A close reading of his correspondence reveals a deeply frustrated, bitter man at 
odds with the physical space he occupied and desperate to try to save the reputation of the 
Franciscans in California. Rather than facing the reality that the order decayed from deep 
systemic issues, Lasuén invented conspiracies and engaged in character assassinations of anyone 
who attempted reform or complained about the missions or missionaries. He created a culture in 
which his loyal rank-and-file missionaries took on his prejudices and vilified the younger 
generation of missionaries while fighting bitterly with soldiers and governors. The California 
mission system facilitated a human catastrophe. However, as this dissertation argues, Lasuén’s 
inability to lead the Franciscans in California through a series of crises intensified and 
accelerated the system’s most disastrous qualities, making the missions more dangerous to 
California Indian people after his presidency.  
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter one serves as a prehistory and begins in late 1777. It details the state of Spanish 
colonialism in California during shifts in Franciscan and military leadership. Lasuén’s early 
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period as a troubled missionary foreshadowed much of his time as father president. Returning 
governor Pedro Fages dealt with his soldiers’ brutal repression of a planned Kumeyaay revolt 
near Mission San Diego de Alcalá, the type of retributive violence former governor Felipe de 
Neve tried to curtail. Lasuén’s early years in California were filled with despair and the desire to 
return to Mexico, which serves as historical foreshadowing of how a younger generation of 
Franciscan felt about life in the colony. It concludes with the attempted Tongva revolt at Mission 
San Gabriel Arcángel in 1785. While the attack demonstrated the destructive nature of Spanish 
colonialism on traditional lifeways, inter-tribal alliances and rivalries, and social mechanisms, it 
also revealed the scant understanding the Franciscan missionaries had of the peoples they 
attempted to convert.   
Chapter two begins with charges that a missionary at Santa Clara, Tomas de la Peña, 
murdered a baptized Indian. Although investigators in Mexico City eventually exonerated de la 
Peña, his extra-legal “trial” in California raises fundamental questions regarding Lasuén’s 
leadership and set the template for his reactions to future scandals. A close reading of Lasuén’s 
turn as both defense counsel and judge reveal his single-minded dedication to protecting 
Franciscans in California at all costs. The second half of the chapter analyzes Fages’ code of 
conduct for the military and colonists’ dealings with Tongva Indians in Los Angeles. Fages’ 
code reacted to a massacre of Spaniards on the Colorado river and the attempted Tongva uprising 
against Mission San Gabriel. Fages pursued a flawed attempt to stabilize relations between 
Spanish colonists, soldiers, and Tongva Indians. His decree curtailed Tongva freedom of 
movement and choice while also protecting them from the depredations of Spanish colonizers. 
Chapter three focuses on the major shifts occurring throughout California at the start of 
the 1790s. Mexico City ruled in favor of the Franciscans in their struggle with the civil 
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governors, which prompted expansion of the mission system, particularly around the Santa 
Barbara Channel and San Francisco Bay. The expansion put pressure on both the Ohlone peoples 
living there and on Franciscans. The earliest moments of expansion offered new opportunities for 
peaceful relations between Indigenous peoples and colonizers, as Fages used new construction 
projects to facilitate peace with people around the bay. However, this moment was brief. As a 
new generation of missionaries soon came to California and balked at the system of 
missionization they encountered. Their Franciscan peers styled them temporalistas or padres 
descontentos for their rejection of the missionary management of the wealth the missions 
generated. Many of these new priests became disgruntled and a prolonged period of inter-
missionary strife began. Moreover, Fages retired, ushering in a four-year period of Franciscan 
autonomy in California.  
Chapter four begins in late 1794 and details the disastrous consequences of Franciscan 
autonomy, expansion, and infighting that culminated in the Mission San Francisco crisis. Two of 
the temporalistas managed that mission with almost no oversight. As the combined forces of 
drought and disease caused major fluctuations in the mission population, the priests deployed 
squads of mission Indians to kidnap and return baptized Indians who fled San Francisco. The 
massacre of one squad in the East Bay led to a state of near warfare between East Bay Miwoks 
and the Spanish. It also prompted the new governor, Diego de Borica, to open a full investigation 
into San Francisco with the aid of new priest who broke ranks to confirm that forced labor, 
starvation, and physical abuse were the norm there. Lasuén responded by branding the man 
insane and exiling him to Mexico. 
The final chapter focuses on the fallout from the Mission San Francisco disaster. A 
second Franciscan whistleblower emerged in the aftermath, charging his Franciscan brothers 
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with a host of transgressions. When Lasuén exiled a second allegedly insane missionary to 
Mexico, viceroy Miguel José Azanza y Alegría demanded an inquiry. Lasuén wrote a lengthy 
defense of the system that remains one of the clearest views into the Franciscan mindset in 
California. The process of crafting that defense revealed the depths of Lasuén’s propensity for 
covering up Franciscan scandals and abuses and casts serious doubts on the manner in which he 
managed and developed the mission system during his tenure.  
Peeling away layers of mythology and assumption, this dissertation offers a critical 
reinterpretation of the California mission system and its second father president, Fermín 
Francisco de Lasuén. The period of its inquiry, 1784 to 1803, proved turbulent for California 
Indians, Franciscan missionaries, and the Spanish military. Understudied by previous 
scholarship, this dissertation offers a different view of Spanish religious colonialism in 
California. First, it demonstrates that inchoate Spanish imperial policy in the time of the Bourbon 
Reforms set the stage for an ungovernable province. Neither California’s military governors nor 
Franciscan leadership understood the chain of command, leading to decades of animosity. 
Second, it reveals how Franciscan missionaries ceaselessly pursued their vision of transforming 
Indigenous Californians into quasi-Europeans, even as the consequences of that pursuit became 
more violent and more destructive to California Indians, their cultures, and their environment. As 
the first generation of missionaries gave way to the second, internal conflicts over the 
fundamental nature of religious conversion and management of this missions became the norm. 
Despite the fissures developing between the missionaries in California, Lasuén rejected any 
notion of reform or rehabilitation of the Franciscans or their missions. This rejection led not only 
to deteriorating conditions for baptized Indians, but ironically, for the Franciscans themselves. 
Mission scholarship has, in the last thirty years, provided new understandings of Indigenous 
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Californian’s experience within the Franciscan missions, and their resistance to Spanish 
colonialism. This dissertation demonstrates how Spain’s lack of a coherent vision to control a 
distant land, inhabited by sovereign, diverse peoples for millennia, led to shocking levels of 
cultural and physical destruction for Indigenous Californians.   
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Spanish Insecurities in Indigenous California, 1777-1786 
On Sunday, August 29, 1784, the small Spanish population of Monterey, California - 
along with several hundred baptized Ohlone Indians - gathered for the funeral of the founder and 
first father president of the California mission system, Fray Junípero Serra. The seventy-one-
year-old Serra had died the previous day in his bed at Mission San Carlos Borromeo de Carmelo. 
According to Serra’s friend and biographer, Fray Francisco Palóu, some 600 people of all ages 
came together to pay their last respects, a massive crowd for the time, when only 200 Spanish 
souls lived in Monterey.38 Some Franciscans from more distant missions, like Fray Buenaventura 
Sitjar, received word of Serra’s impending death late and arrived only on the morning of the 
service. One notable absence emerged among the throng of attendees. Pedro Fages, the governor 
of the province and a known thorn in Serra’s side, was not present. The lieutenant inspector of 
Las Californias attended in Fages’ stead.  Throughout the day, a Spanish ship in Monterey Bay 
fired its cannon every half hour, with a cannon at the presidio responding in kind. These sounds 
in concert with the toiling of the mission bells, “melted everyone’s heart,” according to Palóu.39 
The spectacle represented the importance that Serra held for many Catholic Spaniards in 
California. 
Serra’s death and the search for his replacement opened a new era for the Spanish 
colonial project in California. Serra was the only leader the Franciscans knew in their fifteen 
years in the remote province. The order’s most pressing concern was finding the appropriate man 
to take his place. Over the coming months, the College of San Fernando in Mexico City, the 
Franciscan institution that acted as a headquarters for the Alta California missions and supplied 
 
38 Bancroft, History of California, 1:267. 
39 Palóu quoted in George Wharton James, Francisco Palóu’s life and apostolic labors of the venerable father 
Junípero Serra: Founder of the Franciscan Missions in California (Pasadena, 1913), 275-276. 
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their missionaries, chose Fermín Francisco de Lasuén as Serra’s successor. Lasuén was twenty-
three years Serra’s junior and this shift in age foreshadowed changes that were looming for the 
order.40 Serra’s generation of missionaries neared retirement and some, like Fray Juan Crespí, 
who had come with Serra to California in 1769, had already passed. A new generation of 
missionaries would arrive in California over the next decade, and, as new generations often do, 
developed their own ideas and discontents as they proselytized on the remote western shore of 
North America. Although Lasuén would struggle with the young missionaries’ values and 
philosophies, he could share in their discontent. As a younger man, Lasuén too found deep 
dissatisfaction with life on the spiritual frontier and often pleaded to return to Mexico City. 
Instead, he became the leader of the Franciscans in California.  
Pedro Fages also knew dissatisfaction with life in California, though his emerged from 
his dealings with Franciscans and California Indians, rather than the ennui suffered on the edges 
of the Spanish empire. Fages was also a veteran of Spain’s colonization effort in California, 
coming to the region with the initial invasion of 1769. After taking the governorship in 1782, 
Fages inherited the fallout from his predecessor Felipe de Neve’s feuding with Junípero Serra. 
Both sides of the Spanish colonial project – the military and the missionaries – blamed the other 
for the struggles they endured as they worked to convert California Indians into quasi-Europeans. 
After Serra’s death, Fages sent a list of five complaints to his superiors in Mexico City, detailing 
the ways in which the Franciscans obstructed their own so-called spiritual conquest and sought 
autonomous control of the colony. Fages had experienced the aftermath of a serious Indigenous 
uprising, the 1781 Quechan attack on Spanish outposts on the Colorado River along the border of 
 
40 Maynard Geiger, Franciscan Missionaries in Hispanic California, 1769-1848 (San Marino, 1969), 136, 239. 
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what is now California and Arizona, and crafted policies to minimize tensions between 
California Indians and Spaniards.  
Of all the groups in the region in 1784, California Indians inherited the most problems 
and discontent. Over the previous fifteen years, Spanish invaders had claimed pockets of land 
along California’s coast and founded ten missions. California Indian responses to Spanish 
encroachment on their lands and religious conversion were as varied as their many nations. The 
Chumash, living in a large swath of territory from what is now Malibu to San Luis Obispo, were 
often eager to show the strange newcomers their populous towns and wealth.41 The Ohlone, 
living in an area from what is now Monterey Bay to the San Francisco Bay east hills greeted the 
Spanish with a mixture of curiosity and caution in the earliest days of contact. Two groups that 
faced the most consistent, early pressure from the Spanish invasion were the Tongva, who call 
what is now the Los Angeles basin home, and the Kumeyaay, who live on both sides of what is 
now the United States’ border with Mexico near San Diego, were wary from the start. Both 
groups harried the original invasion force as Spaniards claimed land in the south and made their 
way north searching for Monterey Bay. In 1784, at the time of Serra’s death, the California 
missions had not made great progress in winning over the region’s Indigenous peoples. Perhaps 
300,000 people resided in California before the founding of Mission San Diego in 1769.42 About 
5,000 California Indians lived in the system during its first fifteen years. By 1784, of the more 
than 7,500 Indians baptized at the missions, around 2,000 had already perished.43 Apart from the 
 
41 Pedro Fages, A historical, political, and natural description of California by Pedro Fages, solider of Spain 
(Dutifully made for the Viceroy in the year 1775) Herbert Ingram Priestley, trans., (Berkeley, 1937), 7.  
42 Sherburne F. Cook, The Population of the California Indians, 1769-1970 (Berkeley, 1976), 43.  
43 Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, The Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén Volume II, Kenneally, Finbar, O.F.M. 
trans. and ed. (Washington, D.C., 1965), 394.  
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small number of California Indians investigating the newcomers, others had already began 
resisting Spanish colonialism. One of the first to do so were the Kumeyaay. 
The Kumeyaay Indians 
The first people the Spanish met in the land they would eventually call Alta California 
were the Ipai and Tipai people, collectively known as Kumeyaay. Archeologists continue to 
debate when the modern Kumeyaay emerged and whether they are related to the La Jolla culture 
group that lived in the same region about 8,000 years ago.44 One theory posits that the Kumeyaay 
are a Yuman group that travelled west and settled their territory about 1,000-2,000 years ago. 
Another that their ancestors lived on the coast, then travelled east to the desert, only to return to 
the coast centuries later.45 Like many Indigenous Californian peoples, they were a confederation 
of tribal bands bound together through kinship, culture, trade, and language. Two sub-groups 
constitute the Kumeyaay people, the northern Ipai, and the southern Tipai. Together their 
territory, at the eve of the Spanish invasion, spanned from modern San Diego County in the 
north, east to the Colorado River in Sonora, and to Ensenada in the south.46 The Kumeyaay lived 
a semi-nomadic lifestyle, building settlements but alternating between them during summers and 
winters.47 They were agriculturists, stargazers, and traders.48  
For the Kumeyaay people, creating communities was a process of balancing family or 
clan interests against those of the larger band. Their clan groups, or shiimull, intersected with 
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territorial band structures to weave a tapestry of connections, which engendered stability and 
prosperity. Each band could have contained more than a dozen shiimull affiliations. A somewhat 
egalitarian political system emerged from this structure, embracing the balance between multiple 
families and the larger band. While a shiimull had no official leadership, the band selected a 
leader, or Kwaaypaay, usually a man, who was the only member of a particular family in that 
band. This ensured that an influential shiimull could not dominate a band.49  
Aside from leadership positions, there were many roles available in Kumeyaay society 
for women and men. Some Kumeyaay worked to assist the Kwaaypaay as messengers. The role 
of a carrier or runner, transporting information quickly over long distances, was a position of 
great importance, as was the Kwaaypaay’s Speaker, who acted as the liaison between the people 
and their leader. Women were responsible for their band’s and family’s physical and spiritual 
wellbeing, often serving as shamans, herbalists, midwives, and healers. Men, too, were shamans, 
though their other jobs typically focused on the physical world. They were sky watchers, flora 
and fauna experts, and religious specialists who managed ritual and ceremonial life.50 Both men 
and women worked to maintain a stable food supply, with men hunting small to mid-size game, 
while women and girls collected and processed a variety of seeds and plants.51  
Despite Spanish claims to the contrary, some Kumeyaay were dedicated planters. Though 
they were not agriculturalists in the European sense and cultivated foods were never their 
primary source of subsistence, Tipai people grew corn, beans, and melons along with tobacco in 
what is now known as the Imperial Valley.52 There is also evidence that the Kumeyaay may have 
 
49 Florence Shipek, “Kumeyaay Socio-Political Structure,” Journal of California and Great Basin Anthropology 4, 
no. 2 (Winter 1982), 297.  
50 Shipek, “Kuuchamaa, the Kumeyaay Sacred Mountain,” 72. 
51 Information on spiritual roles from Shipek, “Kumeyaay Socio-Political Structure,” 298-299; information about 
food gathering from Luomala, “Tipai-Ipai,” 600.  
52 Ibid.  
 
 
26 
 
grown grapes and wheat. Wheat was a non-native plant probably obtained through trade with 
their Quechan neighbors, in the years before the Spanish invasion.53 However, the Kumeyaay 
also transplanted plants, for sustenance or medicinal purposes, from their natural ranges to 
gardens in Kumeyaay villages. Additionally, they employed some flora as a natural defense 
system for those villages. One town, that the Spanish called Los Chollas, was surrounded by 
cacti. At least one other village reportedly used cactus and thorny bushes to keep aggressors at 
bay.54  
 By 1785, California Indians already began to violently resist Spanish encroachment. The 
Kumeyaay people around Mission San Diego attacked it twice in sixteen years. In August 1769, 
Kumeyaay raiders burned the fledgling mission, taking clothing and bedsheets. Tensions 
simmered around the mission as the Franciscans became more entrenched. Increased Spanish 
strength forced the Kumeyaay to wait for an opportune moment to strike. It came in the fall of 
1775. On October 19, soldiers from San Diego’s presidio marched north to assist with the 
establishment of Mission San Juan Capistrano. Four men stayed behind to guard both presidio 
and mission. On November 4, the Kumeyaay exploited the meager defenses and stormed 
Mission San Diego. Kumeyaay warriors, numbering at least 600, sacked the mission, reduced it 
to cinders, and killed Fray Luis Jayme and a blacksmith.55 Two years later, to the north, the 
Acjachemen people living near Mission San Juan Capistrano clashed with Spanish soldiers at 
their village of Alocuachomi, avenging some soldiers’ sexual violence against women there.56 
The following year, three Acjachemen villages again threatened a strike in response to soldiers’ 
 
53 Carrico, Strangers in a Stolen Land, 21.  
54 Ibid., 12.  
55 Bancroft, History of California 1:249-252. 
56 Ibid., 314. 
 
 
27 
 
continued sexual aggression against women. This time the Acjachemen also claimed the Spanish 
were devils who used drought to destroy their food supply.57  
Fifteen years into Spain’s colonial invasion, California Indians in the south had staged 
several assaults against the newcomers. These planted the seeds for larger and more frequent 
uprisings against Spanish colonialism. For their parts, Franciscan missionaries and Spanish 
military officers accused each other of stoking Indigenous enmity. It was one of many aspects of 
administering the province that prompted enmity between them.  
The Struggles between Church and State 
The issues Indigenous Californians, Spanish soldiers, and Franciscan missionaries faced 
did not originate with Serra’s passing in 1784. Of these issues, the military’s and missionaries’ 
contest for control of Spanish California profoundly shaped the contours of the mission system. 
Most of that conflict stemmed from the inability of Mexico City or the crown to shape a coherent 
colonial policy throughout New Spain. Since the middle of the eighteenth century, the military 
had once again become the prominent institution in most of New Spain, with the exception of 
Alta California. This exception was at the root of the human catastrophe caused by Spanish 
colonization. Acting alone, the military governors would not likely have created a utopian colony 
free of disease and violence. The problems of Spanish colonies the military controlled, such as 
Texas and New Mexico, would likely have occurred in California.58 Yet an institutional 
infrastructure with a clear chain of command would have reduced the Franciscan belief that they 
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were in total control of the colony, along with their resistance to reform and the military 
governor’s authority.  
Upon his arrival in Baja California in 1767, Las Californias’ first military governor, 
Gaspar de Portolá, immediately constrained the authority of Franciscans who took over the 
Jesuits’ now-vacated missions, as the crown had expelled them from New Spain that year. Two 
factors drove Portolá’s decision. The first was the precedent established by the crown’s 
secularization policy, in effect since 1749, which whittled away the mendicant orders’ numbers 
and influence while transferring their missions to secular clergy. For nearly three decades, 
Spanish policy had reordered the administrative structure on its northern border, with the 
mendicant orders waning, and the military regaining its preeminent position.59 The second was 
the crown’s Inspector General José de Gálvez’s prosecution of the Jesuit expulsion from the 
Spanish empire in 1767. Gálvez offered no mercy to the Jesuits and their supporters, violently 
suppressing dissent from both Spanish and Indigenous quarters. His actions represented a total 
repudiation of the order. Though the crown exiled the Jesuits, it was not prepared to secularize 
all of their missions in New Spain and tapped the Franciscans from the College of San Fernando 
in Mexico City to manage them. In December, 1767, When Portolá and his men reached Baja 
California to secure the Jesuit establishments and prepare the Franciscans for the transition, the 
governor gave Spanish officers control of the mission temporalities, or the wealth and 
agricultural products produced at the missions, rather than allowing the Franciscans to manage 
their new missions as tradition dictated. Leadership at the college balked at what they perceived 
to be a power play and considered refusing the transfer. In a short period, Gálvez found Portolá’s 
appointees to be poor administrators, so the Franciscans quickly regained their customary role as 
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managers of mission products and finances. While Portolá’s experiment quickly failed, it 
foreshadowed the contours of the remainder of the mission period in Alta California: a military 
governor acted in what he considered accordance with the crown’s missionary policy, then was 
overruled by a superior with broader goals who capitalized on the ambiguity of those same 
policies in order to forward their agenda.60  
The relations between Franciscan missionaries and the Spanish soldiers had never been 
strong in California. As early as 1771, Fages reported to his superiors in Mexico that the 
Franciscans, at Serra’s behest, were too reliant on the lash, and punishment in general, in their 
conversion efforts. Serra resented Fages’ “meddling” and tried to outmaneuver him.61 Serra 
travelled to Mexico to lobby on behalf of the Franciscans’ rights to punish baptized Indians. In 
1773, the Office of the Exchequer in Mexico delivered Serra’s victory. They determined that 
“the missionaries were to have the right to manage the mission Indians as a father would manage 
his family.”62 That crucial administrative decision prompted decades of fighting between the 
military and Franciscans for control of the province. It also inhibited secular authorities’ abilities 
to curb Franciscan excesses.  
One of the biggest divides between church and state in the 1770s was Mexico City’s 
desire to establish missions in the Santa Barbara channel region of California, home to the 
Chumash Indians. The establishment and location of the third mission among the Chumash 
people caused much friction between Serra and Governor Neve. Since 1769 and the first land 
expeditions from San Diego to Monterey, the Chumash had fascinated Spanish colonizers such 
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as Fages, Crespí, and Palóu. Serra lobbied for three missions in the Santa Barbara region in 1777, 
as there were as yet no missions between San Gabriel and San Luis Obispo de Tolosa. There 
were several reasons for the delay. The first was the lack of sufficiently trained ministers at the 
College of San Fernando to staff three new missions.63 The second was the college’s anger that 
Quechan Indians killed four ministers in an uprising in the New Mexico province in 1781.64 The 
third was the order’s frustrations with Neve’s reglamento. Despite the delays from the Quechan 
attack and other Spanish military troubles along New Spain’s northern borderlands, Neve 
privileged building mutual accommodation between the Spanish military and the powerful 
Chumash chief Yanonali who ruled the area around the proposed site.  
The Chumash Indians 
  In 1769, the Chumash were a populous, commercial people with a currency-based, 
diversified economy, who had occupied the region for millennia. The modern Chumash 
inhabited their lands, an area stretching from modern Malibu, north to San Luis Obispo, inland to 
Mt. Pinos, and west to the northern Channel Islands, since at least 6000 years before the birth of 
Christ.65 Although the Chumash were neither linguistically nor politically homogenous, they 
were not an amalgamation of various tribes.66 They forged separate identities based on their 
geography, but were bound together by the Hokum language family and shared economic, 
political, religious, and familial lifeways.67 The Chumash managed the varying landscapes within 
their territories with such success that relatively large towns, some with as many as 600 people, 
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were not uncommon.68 In total as many as 20,000 Chumash people lived in this region before the 
Spanish invasion. The Chumash organized a mixed economy, relying on trade in goods and 
currency, combined with a reciprocity-redistribution model. Their prodigious output of shell-
bead currency drove a dynamic system of trade within their own federations and with other 
Indians throughout the modern North American Southwest.  
The organization and scope of the Chumash economy was the center around which much 
of their social world and day-to-day life revolved. Their society stratified along economic lines 
and a woman or man’s prestige in their town or within the larger inter-village alliance depended 
on their participation in, or management of, wealth generation.69 Plentiful food supplies and 
storage systems allowed specialized jobs to emerge. In larger towns, like the economic and 
political center Syuxtun, there were basket weavers, net makers, tobacconists, astrologers, and 
morticians.70 People in the town of Mishopshno built the tomols, or sea-faring canoes, essential 
to Chumash life.71 The tomols generated significant wealth and power for their owners, as they 
were employed for fishing, freight hauling, and ferrying people between the Channel Islands and 
the mainland. Those islands were perhaps the most important Chumash economic zone, yet 
ironically produced workers of low status. Specialists there churned out millions of beads 
primarily from olivella biplicata shells to use as currency both locally and hundreds of miles 
away from the Pacific coast.72 The island Chumash needed food shipped in from the mainland to 
keep this crucial aspect of their economy viable.73 Chumash society created these economic 
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dependencies, fostering a hierarchical system based on a person’s ability to produce wealth and 
facilitate commercial exchange.  
On the eve of the Spanish invasion, the Chumash were a formidable nation. They 
controlled a large costal region, and through both the individual power of some leaders and the 
political, social, and kinship networks Chumash people formed, they developed a dynamic, 
thriving society. Political and economic concerns were a daily reality for Chumash leadership 
and the general populace, but these challenges were met and their world remained relatively 
stable and prosperous for over 400 years before the arrival of Franciscan missionaries.74 In fact, 
when the Spanish arrived in 1769, they recorded that despite a language barrier, they had the 
distinct impression that Chumash leaders were proudly demonstrating their wealth and power to 
them.75  
Despite Serra and the Franciscans’ hunger for missions in the Santa Barbara channel 
zone, Neve took a cautious position on expansion. He did not want to antagonize the Chumash 
and harbored doubts regarding the effectiveness of missions. However, the crown still considered 
them the chief means of conquest in California, so Neve worked within those parameters, even 
as he worried about the tenor of Chumash-Franciscan relations. On July 3, 1777, while preparing 
for the proposed missions, he advised the Commandant General of the Interior Provinces, 
Teodoro de Croix, that the Channel Island region alone required three missions and a presidio.76 
Croix accepted the basis of Neve’s plan, which eventually resulted in the construction of 
missions San Buenaventura in 1782, Santa Barbara in 1786, and La Purísima Concepción in 
1787, as well as a presidio at Santa Barbara in 1782. Neve still considered diplomacy with the 
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Chumash a priority and increasing the Franciscan presence in their midst remained a source of 
concern for him.77 He set out to undermine the missionaries’ control in order to stabilize relations 
with the Chumash around Santa Barbara, while also demonstrating the benefits of accepting the 
crown’s friendship.  
As Neve worked his plan for Santa Barbara and the Chumash, a failed uprising in 1778 
centered on the Kumeyaay village of Pamó, north of Mission San Diego proved instructive for 
him. The Kumeyaay plan demonstrated the coordinated efforts already emerging among separate 
bands of Kumeyaay against the Spanish. The people of Pamó, along with three other groups, 
stockpiled bows, arrows, and clubs. Word of the planned uprising reached Juan Francisco 
Ortega, the commander of the San Diego presidio. Ortega ordered the leader at Pamó, Aaaran, to 
destroy their arms. Aaaran instead challenged the Spanish to a battle. Nine soldiers travelled to 
the village and caught the coalition unawares. The fighting ended quickly, and the Spanish 
captured four Kumeyaay captains, Aachil, Aalcuirin, Aaaran, and Taguagui along with eighty 
bows and 1,500 arrows. Ortega unilaterally decided to execute all four men, without consulting 
Neve. Ortega’s proclamation read: “Deeming it useful to the service of God, the king, and the 
public weal, I sentence them to a violent death by two musket shots.”78 When a young Fray 
Lasuén attempted to check the commander Ortega replied, “you will cooperate for the good of 
their souls in the understanding that if they do not accept the salutary waters of holy baptism they 
die on Saturday morning; and if they do – they die all the same.”79 Though Neve overruled 
Ortega, the decree illustrated the tense and often violent situation in California around Serra’s 
death, as well as the need for Neve to control the officers under his command. 
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Following the trouble near San Diego, Neve imposed several regulations on both the 
Franciscans and soldiers intended to maintain friendly relationships with the Chumash. Neve 
started with the roughly 205 soldiers stationed in the presidios and as mission guards.80 Because 
Spanish soldiers threatened the colony’s stability in the early period of Spanish occupation more 
than missionaries, Neve needed his troops to show restraint and discipline. Therefore, soldiers 
were not to enter Chumash towns unless a missionary requested an escort. Even officers required 
a permit to enter Chumash villages. Neve also moved to maintain Chumash autonomy. 
Therefore, baptized Chumash from Yanonali’s towns could continue living in their homes after 
receiving baptism. Chumash economic activities and social lives remained untouched under 
Neve’s plan. The mission served only as religious sites where people could come and go as they 
pleased.81 Neve further promised Yanonali that he would retain his autonomy, and that his 
people could freely choose or reject baptism. The chief agreed to loan the Spanish some of his 
men to construct the presidio at Santa Barbara in exchange for access to their trade goods, such 
as string, needles, and other manufactured items.82 Spanish acknowledgment and confirmation of 
Chumash power and autonomy in the region solidified this arrangement. Without that 
recognition, Spanish encroachment into the area may have necessitated warfare, something Neve 
hoped to avoid. 
Aside from Neve’s concerns, his reformist reglamento for California further delayed 
expansion into the Santa Barbara channel area. Approved by the Royal Government in 1781, 
Governor Neve’s ambitious legal code generated strife between church and state in the colony. 
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Viceroy Croix tasked Neve with reorganizing California’s presidios, but the governor went much 
further.83 He wrote a new reglamento for the province. Serra had overseen most of the previous 
reglamento, a document quite favorable to the Franciscans.84 While founding pueblos occupied 
Neve’s vision for California’s future, he engineered a plan including the missionaries but 
dramatically diminishing their autonomy, which aligned with Spanish policy at the time. For 
Neve, California’s Indians were not the Franciscans’ spiritual pupils. Rather, they were victims 
of a carceral paternalism that bound them to the missions and reduced them to the status of 
dependents. Neve sought to change their circumstances. His reglamento represented the stiffest 
political challenge to Franciscan autonomy since Mission San Diego’s founding in 1769.   
Neve’s reglamento included a wide range of reforms designed to reduce Franciscan 
control over baptized California Indians, which he argued condemned them to a miserable 
servitude.85 “The unhappy treatment which [the Franciscans] give the Indians,” he wrote in 1781, 
“renders the Indian’s fate worse than slaves.”86 He argued that the Franciscans were more 
interested in autonomy than creating Spanish subjects. They aimed to be “sovereign in their 
control over the Indians and the Indian’s wealth,” he explained, “without recognizing any other 
authority than that of their own religious superiors.”87 Neve crafted a policy designed to break 
Franciscan power and force better treatment of baptized California Indians. The order would 
establish new missions in the Santa Barbara channel, but Neve would choose the sites. The 
reglamento also constrained future mission development by limiting both the amount of funding 
they received and the number of missionaries at each mission to a single priest.88 Neve restricted 
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the missionaries’ activities to religious instruction only, forbidding them from managing mission 
temporalities, as Portolá had done in Baja California in 1767.89  
Aside from constraining missionary power, Neve also offered an alternative route to 
Spanish-Indigenous co-existence in California. Despite his colonialist desire to see Indigenous 
Californians transformed into imperial subjects, he believed meaningful participation in Spanish 
society provided a better path to this goal than missionization. This philosophy undergirded 
Neve’s plan to build towns that would serve as alternative cultural contact points between the 
Spaniards and Indigenous Californians. Additionally, he thought treating California Indians as 
something approximating equal partners ensured Spanish longevity in California. In 1782, the 
powerful Chumash chief Yanonali ruled as many as fourteen towns and controlled a sizable labor 
pool. Neve respected the chief’s power, which could easily wipe out the Spanish presence around 
Santa Barbara. If Yanonali’s people helped the Spanish construct their new presidio and 
missions, Neve agreed that the Spanish would cease interference with his authority and stop 
Franciscan evangelization in his towns.90 Neve’s policies continued to offer Indigenous interests 
a place in California’s development. However, Neve’s reglamento engendered fierce opposition 
from Franciscans, damaging relations between church and state in Spanish California.  
The most pressing cause for delaying a new mission in Chumash territory was the 
Quechan attack on Spanish colonial outposts on the Colorado River, near what is now the 
California-Arizona border. The bloody and total rebuke of Spanish colonialism took place in 
1781 as Neve pondered the antidote to Chumash strength. A year before the uprising, Croix 
ordered two colonial outposts, Purísima Concepción and San Pedro y San Pablo de Bicuner, to 
be established at the confluence of the Colorado and Gila Rivers. Like Neve on the Santa 
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Barbara Channel, and Portolá in Baja California, Croix acted within the paradigm of the Bourbon 
Reforms, which reduced missionary influence throughout New Spain. As a result, these outposts 
were a new concept. Rather than constructing missions with a presidio and town nearby, Spanish 
planners combined all three elements in one space. Croix allowed for only four Franciscans 
among the colonists and stipulated that the order could not found a mission, nor could they 
induce the Quechans to work for them.91 Even with these policies in place, the Quechans at the 
Yuma Crossing quickly determined that the Spanish presence dangerously altered their way of 
life. Colonists bound for California stopped at the two towns, led by the veteran soldier, and 
friend of Lasuén, Captain Fernando Rivera y Moncada.92 Under his watch, Spanish livestock 
roamed beyond arranged pasturage, angering the Quechans. The colonists also made 
unsustainable demands for land and food. They treated the Quechans as inferiors, and frequently 
behaved violently towards them. The soldiers’ behavior created significant tensions. Franciscan 
evangelization added to those tensions.93  
When the Quechans struck, they targeted the Franciscans as the symbol of colonization. 
During mass on June 17, 1781, Quechan warriors attacked the missionaries and killed the priests 
with clubs.94 The warriors then turned to the remaining colonists. The fighting lasted three days. 
When it ended, the two outposts lay in ruins with one hundred Spanish men dead. The Quechans 
largely spared women and children. Both Neve and Fages received orders to hunt and capture the 
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leaders of the attack but were unsuccessful.95 After returning to California from the failed 
punitive expedition, Fages began his term as governor, as Neve returned to Mexico following his 
promotion to Commander General of the Internal Provinces.96  
The outgoing governor penned a letter debriefing Fages on the situation in California. His 
correspondence demonstrated the lessons he learned from Spanish invaders pushing Indigenous 
people too hard. The survival of the yet-to-be established mission at Santa Barbara and the 
fledgling pueblo of Los Angeles gnawed at Neve. Chumash numbers and the Spanish perception 
that they were a quarrelsome people made peaceful relations Neve’s top priority. Neve reminded 
Fages that Yanonali once demonstrated hostility, but had become friendly, even helpful, as the 
result of gift giving and concessions. Attempting to forcefully pacify the Chumash or any 
powerful nation in California would make them “aware of our weakness and small numbers,” 
Neve reminded Fages.97 Neve then shifted to the protection of the towns in California, like San 
José and Los Angeles. “It is most essential that special watchfulness be maintained with respect 
to the pueblo of…Los Angeles,” he reminded Fages.98 Its location gave the town material 
advantages with access to water and productive land, but Neve worried that without proper 
leadership Los Angeles would not develop. The pueblo existed surrounded entirely by Tongva 
people who had bristled at its presence since its establishment. Neve impressed upon Fages that 
the future of Spain in California depended on success in Santa Barbara and Los Angeles. Neve’s 
warnings and the failure among the Quechans informed Fages’ policy decisions throughout his 
term as governor.99 
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Neve also warned Fages about the missionaries’ unwillingness to cooperate with civil 
administrators and their desire to use the Spanish military for their own ends. Neve explained 
that Serra and the rank-and-file missionaries refused to deliver the annual reports on the 
missions, meant to inform both the governor and Mexico City of the missions’ populations and 
the growth or decline of animal herds and crops. Neve envisioned a time when California could 
become self-sufficient and no longer rely on supplies from Mexico. Any surplus food could 
serve as diplomatic gifts to Indigenous Californians during times of increased tensions. For the 
outgoing governor, the Franciscans’ reluctance to share information was another sign of their 
propensity for secrecy and autonomy. Neve also shared his exasperation with the missionaries’ 
short-sighted use of punishment. Franciscans punished baptized California Indians for minor 
offenses, which prompted them to flee the missions. The priests expected the military to 
recapture escapees. This caused friction between California Indians and soldiers that Neve 
considered dangerous and avoidable. Neve admonished Fages to limit the number of excursions 
into California Indian villages and advised him to send baptized California Indians to go after 
runaways with gifts and kindness.100 Neve’s advice prepared his protégé to establish Mission 
Santa Barbara. Stalling the new mission’s founding to build alliances with Chumash leaders 
could not last forever, but Neve provided a positive foundation.  
In 1782, Fages became governor, but Neve’s quick departure to manage the deteriorating 
situation in the east left Fages with two problems.101 First, Neve had split the powers of the 
governor and gave Nicolás Soler, the provincial inspector and physician, control over military 
forces in California, while handing the administrative duties to Fages.102 This produced 
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squabbles over jurisdiction and official powers leading to differing agendas for the province’s 
development. The second problem Neve left for Fages was extreme bitterness between 
government officials and Franciscans in California. As governor, Fages continued to challenge 
Franciscans on matters large and small. He consistently derided Serra’s defiant attitude towards 
Spanish officials. “Fr. Serra's opposition to all governmental measures has already been 
declared,” Fages wrote in March of 1783, “not only in words but with works and in writing.”103 
Later that year he announced that Serra “tramples upon the measures of the government and 
bears himself with much despotiquez and total indifference.”104 Serra’s refusal to pay postage for 
their letters to their college in Mexico City incensed the governor.105 Central to Fages’ attack was 
an increasing series of accusations that Serra and the Franciscans were cruel towards baptized 
California Indians. In 1783 he wrote two separate letters highlighting Serra’s severity with 
California Indians, and Mission San Carmelo’s missionaries’ propensity for shackles and forced 
labor.106 Serra’s death and Lasuén’s ascension to father president had little impact on Fages’ 
distrust of the missionaries. Indeed, his relationship with the Franciscans only deteriorated 
further after their change in leadership.  
The confrontations over Neve’s reglamento, the sites for the planned Santa Barbara 
Channel missions, and the 1781 Quechan uprising on the Colorado River had profound 
implications for the relationship between Spanish soldiers and missionaries in California. 
Franciscans had used obstructionism successfully when Portolá placed his men in charge of 
mission temporalities in Baja California in 1767. They employed it again in the mid-1780s to 
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fight Neve’s reglamento, resisting Mexico City’s desire for more missions in the Santa Barbara 
Channel as long as the offensive legal code remained in effect. Before the 1781 Quechan 
uprising, Chumash strength concerned Neve, as did their ability to wipe out the Spanish presence 
around Santa Barbara. After the uprising, he and Fages both pivoted towards accommodationist 
positions. They envisioned a Spanish California where the Indian population had enough of a 
place at the table that they would not revolt against their transformation into quasi-Europeans. 
There were good reasons for the military governors to take this position. The Spanish presence 
remained fragile in California after little more than a decade of colonization. In 1780 the Spanish 
population amounted to 500 souls, compared to the hundreds of thousands of California Indians 
in the province. Moreover, there were only 155 soldiers stationed there.107 Correctly or not, Neve 
and Fages both saw the Franciscans in California as arrogant and stubborn. They both feared 
their potential to bring the colony to ruin. Fages’ relationship with the new father president, Fray 
Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, became critically important to the Spanish future in California.  
The Second Father President  
Lasuén was born in Vitoria, in the Basque region of Northern Spain, in 1736. He entered 
the Franciscan order as a novice at their monastery in Vitoria at fourteen. In 1759, he answered 
the call of a Franciscan recruiter, Fray Gaspar Gómez, who travelled to Spain from the College 
of San Fernando in Mexico City, hoping to add to the dwindling numbers there. Lasuén 
embarked for the Americas that year and never returned to his homeland.108 In 1763, Lasuén 
travelled with Serra to the Sierra Gorda region of northern Mexico and served at Mission San 
Borja for five years. In 1768, he ventured to Baja California when José de Gálvez chose the 
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Franciscans to administer the missions vacated after the Jesuit expulsion.109 Still following in 
Serra’s wake in 1773, Lasuén arrived in Alta California with Palóu and a group of 
Franciscans.110 After a decade in the north of New Spain, Lasuén yearned for a return to Mexico 
City and the College of San Fernando. Instead, his mission work kept him on the northwestern 
fringe of Spain’s imperial claims in North America.  
Like many of the Franciscans he would eventually lead, Lasuén quickly cooled towards 
life in Alta California. His correspondence with superiors at the College of San Fernando 
suggested he despised his frontier circumstances. In April, 1774 Lasuén confided to the father 
guardian of the college, Fray Francisco Pangua, that his transfer to Alta California had “robbed 
me of the pleasure” of returning to Mexico City.111 Arriving at Mission San Gabriel, just east of 
what is now Los Angeles, Lasuén held the false impression that the mission had a surplus of 
ministers, rendering him superfluous. The long-time California missionary and friend of Serra’s, 
Palóu, refused Lasuén’s request for early retirement, as the Franciscans faced pressure from an 
impatient Mexico City to establish two new missions in California.112  
Lasuén’s quality of life added to his dim view of California. He sent multiple letters to 
the college requesting new clothes, reporting that his habit had worn down to “the stage of 
indecency.”113 Worse news came as the two still-theoretical missions were in the planning 
stages. Lasuén learned that neither of the two priests scheduled to administer them, Palóu and 
Fray José Murguía, wanted him as a partner. “It is clear that the only talent I have (it’s the plain 
truth) is to act as a supernumerary, and that the other ministers do not want me,” he confided to 
 
109 Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, The Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén Volume I, Kenneally, Finbar, O.F.M. 
trans. and ed. (Washington, D.C., 1965), 37.  
110 Guest, Fermin Francisco De Lasuen, 61. 
111 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 1:37.  
112 Ibid., 37. 
113 Ibid., 38.  
 
 
43 
 
Pangua.114 As a supernumerary, Lasuén was the third missionary at any establishment, leaving 
little meaningful work for him. While the months turned to years, Lasuén’s frustration turned to 
despair. The college would not recall a missionary of Lasuén’s experience and tenure, 
particularly when the order’s paucity of ministers failed to slow the crown’s desire to consolidate 
their control over California. Although the need for six more missionaries seemed innocuous, it 
strained the resources for the thinly staffed College of San Fernando. The college repeatedly 
denied the requests of missionaries for retirement, as they had Lasuén’s.  
Lasuen’s response to his early days in Alta California is instructive for three reasons. 
First, it casts doubt on the once-popular notion that Franciscans in California were selfless 
aesthetics, toiling for the glory of God with Christian patience and love. Second, Lasuén’s was 
not a unique case. Many Franciscans in Alta California, both those reaching retirement age and 
those coming from New Spain to replace them, found service in the remote colony distasteful. It 
was a lonely place, far removed from the monastic, academic life at the college in Mexico City. 
Many missionaries despised the California Indian people they met and rued their placement 
among nomadic hunter gatherers, rather than the more “civilized” Indigenous peoples of 
Mesoamerica.115 Finally, Lasuén’s personal feelings regarding his inability to leave Alta 
California informed both his attitudes when the College of San Fernando promoted him to father 
president of the missions and his manner of handling missionaries who expressed similar distaste 
towards serving on the imperial frontier. Managing missionary frustrations with life in California 
consumed much of Lasuén’s attention and energy as father president.  
“My hopes have been frustrated,” Lasuén wrote to Fray Pangua from Monterey in 1775, 
“The things I foresaw as reasons for not coming to these missions and later for not staying here, 
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have come to pass.”116 He often felt that this situation should give him the flexibility to choose 
his assignment, if he could not retire. One such opportunity arose when his good friend Rivera y 
Moncada asked Lasuén to join him at Mission San Luis Obispo that year. Serra rejected his 
request and sent him back to San Gabriel “a place for which I have the greatest aversion,” 
Lasuén told Pangua.117 Moreover, even as the understaffed order prepared to establish two new 
missions near the San Francisco Bay, the brooding Lasuén received no new assignment. His 
malaise increased when he realized that neither his inability to peaceably live with other 
missionaries nor his lack of a permanent position at a mission would hasten his return to Mexico 
City. “What grieves me is that they did not recognize my uselessness at a time when I was doing 
my utmost to return to the college,” he wrote.118 Lasuén’s response to Serra during their meeting 
regarding his request for transfer revealed much about the burgeoning Franciscan mindset in 
California. “I then drew attention to my own limitations as compared with so many other 
Fathers,” he admitted, “all of whom are available; and each and all of those who volunteered for 
this kind of work were more fitted for it than I.”119 Lasuén’s remarks remain illustrative. 
Lasuén’s comments demonstrated that not all missionaries trained at the College of San 
Fernando were up to the burden of work in California. In his distaste for California, as will be 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation, he was hardly alone. 
After a 1775 uprising by Kumeyaay Indians on Mission San Diego, which left Fray Luis 
Jamie and a blacksmith dead, Lasuén renewed his quest to retire. During the ensuing chaos, 
Lasuén wrote: “Everything will have to suffer considerable delay. Consequently, I am applying 
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to the Reverend Father Guardian for permission to return to the college.”120 The longer his 
superiors rebuffed his efforts, the darker Lasuén’s moods became. “I assure you that from the 
day I arrived in Monterey up to the present,” he revealed to Pangua, “I have suffered more than 
in all the other years I have devoted to the missions.”121 Lasuén flatly admitted to his superiors 
that he felt unqualified and unappreciated: “I would not withdraw from this undertaking did I not 
foresee, from the failure of my superiors to appoint me, that I am unsuitable for this kind of 
work.”122 He continued, “I think you can deduce from this that a mission incurs a liability under 
the present administration if it becomes known that I am the founder or administrator of 
it…What is there I can look forward to but more time wasted, over and above the two years that I 
have already spent without employment?”123 When his protestations failed to move Pangua or 
Serra, Lasuén lashed out: “the assignments given to me since (against my will) I have left the 
college have not, as a rule, brought me any pleasure, satisfaction, or peace of soul, save what 
obedience affords.”124 He made one last petition from San Diego in 1776, begging, “I humbly 
beg Your Reverence and the Reverend Fathers of the council that you grant me permission to 
retire to the college.”125 Once more, they denied his request. Finally, after a half-decade of 
requesting, beseeching, and cajoling, Lasuén accepted his position. Although he did everything 
possible to convince the council at the College of San Fernando of his ineptitude and despair, the 
lack of suitable replacements sealed his fate.  
Lasuén’s colleagues, particularly those of Serra’s generation, did not understand his 
desperation and self-depreciation. In January 1780, Fray Rafael Verger, a veteran missionary, 
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wrote to Lasuén regarding his defeatist outlook. His letter demonstrated why the Franciscans 
chose Lasuén as Serra’s successor five years later. “I feel in my soul the affliction and hardships 
of Your Reverence,” Verger wrote, “but, my friend, the consolation for it all must be that you are 
toiling for the glory of the lord and for the welfare of souls.”126 “Great undertakings,” he 
reminded his doubting colleague, “have always encountered great contradictions. What we have 
in those missions is of ample magnitude, and therefore I do not wonder at your anxieties; but, my 
friend, you must not imagine that we here fail to do what we can.”127 Verger sought to repair his 
friend’s flagging confidence. “Your Reverence is very important in that service; even though 
your modesty will smile somewhat, it is necessary to tell you,” he counseled Lasuén. “Your 
Reverence has more experience, more deliberation in thought, etc., and so you will sacrifice 
yourself for the lord.”128 Verger’s support, along with repeated refusals from the college, 
produced a shift in Lasuén. At Mission San Diego in 1780, he finally conceded: “I humbly 
submit, dear Father, and (Thanks be to God) I am determined to silence forever any urge to seek 
a different assignment.”129 Although he made peace with the college’s decision, Lasuén later 
found himself inundated with letters from his peers expressing similar feelings and arguments 
during his term as father president.  
Even after his acceptance of life in California, Lasuén’s ascendancy to father president 
was by no means foreordained. When Serra died, many of his presumptive heirs also neared the 
end of their time in California and on earth. Perhaps the most obvious candidate, Fray Juan 
Crespí, died a few months before Serra. Serra’s long-time friend and advisor, Palóu, another 
obvious candidate, took the post briefly, but an illness dictated that he could only fill the position 
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on an interim basis.130 By 1784, fifteen years after Franciscans established the first California 
mission at San Diego, many of the original missionaries were nearing retirement.  Further 
complicating matters, about two weeks before his death, Serra, still working to convert 
California’s indigenous people to Roman Catholicism, received word from his superiors at the 
College of San Fernando in Mexico City that they could not send more missionaries to 
California. There were simply not enough men.131 Many of the Franciscans at the college had 
recently retired. Moreover, the Spanish crown’s 1749 secularization decree, and the policies that 
followed it, constrained the missionary orders, and diminished their power and numbers in New 
Spain.132 Those policies’ efficacy now threatened the very existence of Alta California missions.  
In the six months after Serra’s death, the College of San Fernando had not found a new 
father president for California. A recent spate of deaths of elderly Franciscans at the college 
confounded matters further. On October 27, 1783, less than a year before his own death, Serra 
wrote to Lasuén about their woes: “Serious it is that five more of our friars at the college died in 
little more than a month!” “And the trip to Spain has yet to be made for getting more 
missionaries,” he continued, “and our Commissary is dead.”133 On November 5, he wrote Lasuén 
again in even worse spirits: “We must also offer to each other what consolation we can in the 
heavy blow we have experienced by losing, in death, so many of our friends in the religious 
life.”134 With the loss of five missionaries at once, and with no relief from Spain, the future of 
the California missions balanced precariously. In January 1785, the new father guardian at the 
College of San Fernando, Fray Juan Sancho, nominated Lasuén to succeed Serra. The father 
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guardian informed Lasuén that they selected him “in view of the qualities of knowledge, piety, 
and prudence that combine in you.”135 On February 7, almost by default, the council chose 
Fermín Francisco de Lasuén as Alta California’s second father president.136  
Lasuén and Fages  
Lasuén first needed to manage the aftermath of Serra’s feud with Fages over Neve’s 
regulations for the missions. In his last years, Serra steadfastly opposed Neve’s reforms. 
Thinking a new father president might be more pliable than the intractable Serra, Fages sought to 
create leverage for himself. In September 1785, while Palóu served as interim president, Fages 
drew up a list of complaints against the missionaries in California. He forwarded it to the 
viceroy, Martín de Mayorga, who received the document in January 1786. Five of Fages’ 
complaints were indicative of long term, systemic conflicts between the Franciscans and civil 
authorities in California. Fages’ first complaint was that the missionaries in San Francisco 
refused to perform Mass for the soldiers in the presidio for nearly three years.137 Second, the 
priests refused to recognize the governor’s authority over the management of mission 
temporalities. Fages’ third complaint charged that prices for foodstuffs at the missions were often 
higher than those the king approved. Fourth, the missionaries were delinquent in reporting 
inventories and population statistics to the government, as required by law. Finally, some 
Franciscans returned to Mexico via the seaport at San Blas without permission.138 Mayorga 
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forwarded the document to Fray Sancho at the college with the command that the Franciscans 
must follow the law.139 
Fray Sancho requested that Palóu refute Fages’ claims in writing. Palóu argued that 
Neve’s regulations were not published until September of 1784, were not observed by Fages, 
and, most important, were not followed because California missionaries found Serra’s previous 
regulations, ratified by the former viceroy Antonio María de Bucareli y Ursúa in 1772, more 
favorable. Palóu argued that Neve’s regulations did not compel the missionaries to perform 
Mass, and because Neve wanted only one padre at each mission, they could not leave Mission 
San Francisco to perform Mass at the presidio. Besides, Palóu reasoned, the presidio’s close 
proximity meant that if soldiers wanted to hear Mass, they could do so at the mission. Palóu then 
claimed that the mission temporalities were the products of California Indian labor, and therefore 
the civil authorities had no jurisdiction over them. Palóu also argued that he never saw evidence 
that the king fixed the price of foodstuffs grown at the missions, and that it should be the father 
president who decided rates. Finally, he informed Mexico City that missionaries did not require 
permission from the governor to return to the college, they only needed notification that the 
College of San Fernando approved their retirement.140  
While Mexico City deliberated on the matter, Lasuén and Fages continued their debate. 
Fages wrote Lasuén on November 8, 1785 to notify him about the complaints to the viceroy. The 
governor’s anger centered on Fray Tomás de la Peña, a veteran in California, and one of the 
founders of Mission Santa Clara. De la Peña was born in Spain and came to Mexico as a 
Franciscan in 1770. His first assignment was in Baja California a year later, working at 
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Comondú Mission. He arrived at Mission San Diego in 1772 and moved between San Luis 
Obispo and San Carmelo as a supernumerary until 1774.141 De la Peña’s greatest achievement as 
a missionary in California was holding the inaugural mass at the founding of Mission Santa 
Clara on January 12, 1777.142 De la Peña had a fiery personality, and the results of his notorious 
temper eventually revealed Lasuén’s habit of secrecy and obfuscation, which marked his tenure 
as president of the California missions.   
According to Fages, de la Peña refused “to send the corn that was requested by the 
Presidio of Santa Barbara if he was not paid more than the original price set by the Royal tariff.” 
Fages also simmered over missionaries selling soldiers inferior grain. “You do not choose it from 
the leftover [mission] seed,” the governor charged, “but from the shipments from San Blas, 
which is of inferior quality, this is not in the spirit of the tariff, which has been sanctioned by the 
King’s authority.”143 On November 22, Lasuén responded to the governor about prices. Lasuén’s 
argument proved curious considering Palou’s claims. “I share deeply in the displeasure in which 
Father Tomás de la Peña occasioned your lordship when he declined to supply corn at the price 
fixed by law,” Lasuén wrote. He conceded that he “already knew…in this province Your 
Lordship alone has the power to enforce prices set by law, or to vary them as time and 
circumstance demand.”144 Here, Lasuén directly contradicted Palou’s claim that the father 
president alone had authority to set and change prices on mission goods. Lasuén found de la 
Peña at fault and told Fages that he “sent Father Peña appropriate admonitions for his future 
guidance, and that I am placing on him the obligation of seeking my approval and permission in 
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regard to matters of that nature.”145 Despite Lasuén’s conciliatory tone, conflicts between the 
leaders were only beginning. The rift would soon widen into a gulf. 
On December 7, 1785, just a month after his encounter with de la Peña over corn prices, 
Fages aired his grievances in a long, emotionally charged letter to Fray Pedro Cambón, Palóu’s 
partner at Mission San Francisco. After his years in Alta California battling with Serra, Palóu, 
and now Lasuén, Fages feared the reputation he forged while governor, which positioned him as 
an opponent of the Franciscans. “I only want to do my duty,” he wrote to Cambón. It was that 
impulse “that the ignorant masses call ‘persecuting the friars,’” Fages claimed.146 The governor 
believed that the missionaries did not respect him and complained to Cambón that Palóu, once a 
friend to Fages, had become moody and cold with him. When he experienced trouble with 
Franciscans at Mission Santa Clara over livestock, Fages wrote that “afterwards I went to the 
mission several times and with surprise, I experienced several slights” that included Fray Matias 
Noriega stamping his feet loudly on the ground and shouting.147 Fages bitterly complained that 
Father Caballero at Mission San Luis Obispo sent letters on ragged, uncut paper and lacked 
proper etiquette. Cambón, too sent them “without ‘my good Lord,’ without ‘kissing your hand,’ 
and with an impertinent tone.” Fages admitted “that I ashamedly keep [these letters] for an 
opportune occasion.”148 He closed his screed with uncharacteristic introspection. “It is not in my 
character to do what the ignorant masses qualify as persecution,” he mused, particularly to the 
missionaries who “I venerate with all my heart.” Fages told Cambón he had the “determination 
not to give up…[on] the path that guides me. In walking that path I do not know how I could be 
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ashamed, because my conscience justifies me.”149 Fages needed that determination as his 
relationship with the Franciscans deteriorated. 
Fages’ troubles with de la Peña and Lasuén continued in early 1786. De la Peña again 
defied Fages when he refused to produce Mission Santa Clara’s inventories. The missionary 
failed to give the reports to Lieutenant Diego Gonzales, because the solider did not request them 
“in the appropriate terms.”150 Lasuén understood that de la Peña caused friction at a time when 
tensions were already running high. In April, Lasuén mollified the governor over corn prices. “I 
advised the Revered Fathers from Santa Clara to San Luis [Obispo] that they were under 
obligation to help [the presidios],” Lasuén wrote, “even to the point at which they could help no 
further.”151 The presidios’ need put Lasuén in a bind. If the missions sold provisions to the 
presidios, some might not have enough food for baptized California Indians. This necessitated 
Indian people returning to their homes for food. Lasuén argued that his policy harmed the 
spiritual conquest. He warned the governor “not only would we be opposing the pious wishes of 
the King, but we would be introducing a base form of tyranny,” by allowing newly baptized 
California Indians such autonomy.152 For his part, de la Peña informed the baptized Indians at 
Santa Clara that the soldiers were starving and that the missions needed to help them. When 
given the choice, they reportedly agreed to return to their rancherias to find food. De la Peña 
contended that this path led to the mission’s ruin, telling Lasuén, “if the Presidio of San 
Francisco does not obtain help from some other source it will be impossible to maintain it until 
the wheat harvest.”153 Yet, on May 12, Lasuén assured Fages that de la Peña now “is so resolute 
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in helping that no one could ask more of him.”154 Fages allowed Franciscans to raise prices on 
provisions sold to the presidios, and though some missionaries grumbled over empty stores, the 
corn controversy subsided, while Fages’ complaints against the missionaries languished in 
Mexico City.155  
Imperial Spain’s lack of a cohesive policy for governing California created the problems 
that led to Fages’ five complaints against the Franciscans and the dispute over food prices. No 
formal chain of command determined who held ultimate authority in Spanish California. Lasuén, 
like Serra before him, believed that the Office of the Exchequer’s 1773 ruling, which gave them 
the exclusive right to manage baptized California Indians, was clear. Fages, like Neve before 
him, argued that despite that ruling, the Franciscans in California were not qualified to manage 
and develop a colony. Fages also experienced the aftermath of the Quechan uprising on the 
Colorado River and understood Spain’s fragility in California. For the governor, the items in his 
five complaints along with Franciscan stubbornness and duplicity over food prices indicated that 
the missionaries wanted full autonomy in California. As Lasuén’s presidency was in its earliest 
stages, problems arose with the Tongva people around Mission San Gabriel and the pueblo of 
Los Angeles that would confirm his anxieties.  
The Tongva and Nicolás José and Toypurina’s Rebellion  
During the summer of 1785, a situation representing the sum of Neve and Fages’ fears 
fomented around Mission San Gabriel, which the Spanish established deep in Tovaangar, the 
territory of the Tongva Indians. Fourteen years of Spanish incursion into their lands along with 
violence against their people and their way of life pushed some Tongva, both baptized and non-
baptized, to the breaking point. Only four years after Quechans destroyed Spanish outposts on 
 
154 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 1:106.  
155 Ibid., 108.  
 
 
54 
 
the Colorado River, Fages understood Spain’s tenuous position in California.156 The desire for 
security and stability in California was nearly an obsession for Neve that he passed on to Fages. 
Security must be his top priority. Spanish soldiers, well-known for their own abuses against 
California Indian people, needed to fall in line. Spanish soldiers had a bad reputation among the 
Tongva after raping women and killing men in the first years after Mission San Gabriel’s 
founding. While Neve had focused much of his attention on creating stable relations with the 
Chumash, potential disaster loomed for the California missions in 1785, not with the Chumash, 
but with the Tongva as its potential authors. 
In 1771, the Franciscans founded Mission San Gabriel in Tovaangar, which spread from 
Topanga Creek in the west, to the Santa Ana Mountains in the east, and included all of modern 
Los Angeles.157 The Tongva occupied that region for over 4,000 years before the Spanish 
invaded their lands.158 Nearly one hundred Tongva villages dotted the area, with populations 
ranging from fifty to one hundred in each. They spoke a Cupan language, of the Takic family, 
which comes from the Uto-Aztecan language stock. According to early Spanish reports of the 
Tongva people, they rivaled the Chumash in craftsmanship of steatite tools, ritual objects, shell-
bead currency, and in splendor. Tattooing, sometimes from the face to the sternum, was not 
uncommon for women or men. Women and children also wore accessories made of seasonal 
flowers. Although Franciscans often portrayed California Indian people as wretchedly poor and 
dirty, the Tongva were obsessed with cleanliness. Most Tongva people bathed every day. Their 
trade, too, was thriving and widespread. They engaged with the Serranos to the north and used 
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Cahuilla and Mojave agents to facilitate trade with groups as far east as the Pueblos in New 
Mexico. On the eve of the Spanish invasion, the Tongva were a dynamic group living in a 
manner that had sustained them for nearly six centuries.159 
 The Tongva were also a martially focused people, who valued masculinity, courage, and 
victory. A nearly constant state of hostility existed between the Tongva of the coastal plain and 
those living further inland. Much of the enmity stemmed from controlling coastal resources 
including fishing, steatite, and shells for making currency. Tongva warriors wore armor made of 
reads and carried war clubs, swords, and bows. Aside from controlling resources and trade, 
Tongva groups warred with each other for culturally specific causes, such as a chief failing to 
return gifts given during ceremonies, acts of sorcery, and kidnapping women. Engaging in war 
with another group prompted a meeting of a Tongva war council, sometimes consisting of 
several villages, depending on the coalition formed by the belligerents. A consensus was 
necessary as the all members of a given Tongva town helped prepare for conflict. Elders, 
women, and children all had a role to play if violent conflict erupted. Tongva war chiefs 
privileged the secret attack over all other tactical concerns, and always sought a swift, decisive 
strike to win the day. When tensions arose between allied groups who sought an alternative to 
violence, they employed a ritualistic form of combat. The two parties fought through song and 
dance, with each group singing vulgar songs about their rivals while dancing and stomping their 
feet.160 While martial prowess played an important role in Tongva society, there were pathways 
to avoid armed conflict and draw disparate lineages together. 
 Tongva people used inter- and intratribal marriages to forge alliances with other 
Indigenous people around Southern California. Although Tongva generally did not marry outside 
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of their social rank, coupling with partners from disparate villages and lineages was not only 
common but mandatory for elites. Furthermore, for those villages on the Tongva borders, 
marriage to other groups, such as the Chumash, Cahuilla, Serrano, or Payómkawichum, called 
Luiseño by the Spanish, occurred regularly.161 Marriage knitted people together for both the 
Tongva and Spaniards, yet how those similarities manifested once Spain invaded their land 
remains unclear. These unions also confirmed the importance of women in creating political 
stability and demonstrated why Tongva women initially resisted Spanish men’s sexual advances. 
The first incidences of sexual contact between Spanish soldiers and Tongva women were violent, 
causing hostility between the two groups. Tongva women raped by Spanish men put themselves 
through a purification process and pregnancies were either aborted, or the children “strangled 
and buried” according to one report.162  
 The first years after Mission San Gabriel’s 1771 founding produced more discord than 
harmony. Like so many early encounters between Spanish invaders and Indigenous peoples 
throughout the Americas, the Tongva were impressed by Spanish technology and control of 
horses, and thought they were perhaps deities or spirits. Spanish avarice and violence quickly 
disabused them of that notion.163 After searching Tovaangar for two years for an appropriate spot 
for a mission, a large contingent of soldiers, animals, and two priests prepared to cross the Rio 
Hondo. The Tongva responded by sending a large war party to confront the invaders. According 
to the Spanish version of the story, the warriors had the Spanish party pinned down, until one of 
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the priests, Fray Cambón, produced a religious icon that transfixed the Tongva war party and 
cooled tensions. The détente did not last long.164 
 Within months of San Gabriel’s establishment, the Spanish soldiers and priests’ violent 
behavior revealed their status as invaders. When soldiers at the mission limited the numbers of 
Tongva traders allowed near the mission, the traders responded by storming the stockade around 
San Gabriel. The loud report of Spanish muskets held them off. A soldier raped the wife of a 
Tongva leader, prompting a retaliatory attack on the mission. Again, the warriors had the 
Spanish in a perilous position until a soldier managed to kill a Tongva leader, prompting their 
retreat. The soldiers beheaded the man’s corpse and displayed his severed head, further enraging 
the Tongva. They launched several more attacks during the following weeks, but Spanish 
reinforcements held them off.165 The priests also employed violence as a means of social control 
and forced religious conversion. Tongva people tell a story of an unnamed priest leading a group 
of soldiers and servants, who “tied and whipped every man, woman and child in the [village], 
and drove part of them back” to the mission.166 This use of force resulted in low numbers of 
baptisms at San Gabriel during the first decade of its existence, and Tongva people moving to 
avoid the Spaniards.167 
In the summer of 1785, as the Franciscans transitioned from Serra to Lasuén, a situation 
ripe with the possibility of violence brewed in Mission San Gabriel. A group of Tongva plotted 
an attack against the Franciscans to halt the physical and cultural damage brought by 
colonization. On the night of October 25, 1785, Spanish soldiers arrested twenty-one Tongva 
people just as the attack began, thwarting their plan. Two of the Tongva leaders’ stories 
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illustrated the growing realization for some California Indians that coexistence with the invaders 
was impossible. One of the leaders, Nicolás José, was a trusted Christian convert who lived at 
the mission for nearly a decade. The other, Toypurina, was a twenty-five-year-old female 
shaman from the nearby village of Japchivit. Though their planned uprising failed, the two, along 
with their compatriots, demonstrated the strong connections that could still exist between 
baptized and non-baptized California Indian peoples. Nicolás José and Toypurina fused their 
experience gained from living and working with the Spanish with the idea of cultural 
revitalization, that a return to traditional practices and lifeways could defeat the occupying 
Spaniards to inspire an uprising.  
 Nicolás José started his relationship with the Franciscans as a quick convert to 
Christianity, and over time earned their trust. On September 27, 1774, just three years after San 
Gabriel’s founding, he was baptized at the relatively older age of twenty-six.168 His baptism was 
only the eighty-seventh recorded at that mission during the first three years. Franciscans found 
converting adult California Indians difficult and often baptized children in hopes that their older 
relatives would follow suit. An adult male’s conversion represented a victory for the order and 
created Nicolás José’s opportunities for advancement within the mission. His Christian marriage 
to the Tongva woman Augustina María later that year seemingly solidified his commitment to 
the new faith. Nicolás José accepted the power and prestige that came with currying Franciscan 
favor. He was among the first Indigenous Alta Californians to act as a marriage witness for the 
missionaries. He served in this role both at the mission and in nearby Tongva villages, 
demonstrating his ability to walk in two worlds. Earning the respect of non-Christian Indians and 
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the missionaries, Nicolás José became involved in more religious roles, acting as godfather for 
newborn Tongva children, and for the child of a Baja California Indian who came with the 
founders of San Gabriel in 1771. Nicolás José thus found a space in which he could dictate the 
shape of his life in the new world colonialism created.169 
 Nicolás José’s rise culminated in 1778 when he became San Gabriel’s first Indian 
alcalde, a position of authority created by Neve and resented by Franciscan leaders. Neve created 
the position of alcalde, a secular Indian leader at each mission, to act as a liaison between 
recently baptized California Indians and Spanish civil administrators. Theoretically, alcaldes 
would report troubles or abuses directly to the governor without a Franciscan interlocutor. Serra 
bitterly opposed this reform. He fought against its implementation, arguing that California Indian 
people lacked the sophistication to manage their own affairs.170 When he could not stop it, Serra 
made sure the most friendly and pliable baptized Indians earned the position. Thus, the 
missionaries at San Gabriel appointing alcalde Nicolás José demonstrated his value to them, and 
their confidence in his dedication to Christianity.  
 After becoming alcalde, Nicolás José’s comfort with existing in two worlds became 
troubling for the missionaries. On January 7, 1780, Serra wrote a long letter to Neve, citing the 
many problems he had with the position of alcalde at the missions. Much of Serra’s ire came 
from Neve’s ban on Franciscans punishing the alcaldes. Neve ordered that only the corporal at a 
presidio had the authority to punish an alcalde, and only after they informed the governor. Serra 
jealously guarded the Franciscans’ right to punish all recently baptized regardless of station. He 
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was particularly incensed about the behavior of Nicolás José.171 Serra accused him of “supplying 
women to as many soldiers as asked for them.”172 The corporal of the guard chastised Nicolás 
José, though it is unclear if he remained alcalde after his punishment.173   
Nicolás José’s willingness to facilitate relationships between Tongva women and Spanish 
soldiers demonstrated his propensity for cross-cultural coalition building, and his confidence in 
his own position in the Spanish and Tongva spheres. Indeed, his behavior indicated that he 
blended cultural traits common to many Indigenous Californians with his responsibilities as a 
marriage witness and godparent in the mission. Though Serra made Nicolás José’s activities 
appear unseemly, there is no proof of anything nefarious in these liaisons. Before the Spanish 
invasion, Tongva used inter-tribal marriage to build alliances and soothe tensions over water and 
hunting rights, as well as slights between groups. Intermarriage was routinely included in 
political exchanges between tribes.174 Instead of engaging in lewd acts, as Serra claimed without 
evidence, Nicolás José behaved as an Indigenous Californian power broker would. He brought 
groups closer together to ease the tensions brewing between them.  
 Nicolás José turned against the Franciscans because of their sharp rebuke, and also as a 
result of the personal and cultural loss he experienced. In 1783, his first wife, Agustina María, 
died of unknown causes. His son, Cosmé María died before reaching his second birthday. He 
remarried, but his second wife, María Candelaria, died eight months after their nuptials. Their 
deaths were not isolated misfortunes. Rather they were a part of a larger trend, as Mission San 
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Gabriel became increasingly lethal in the 1780s. By the time of the Tongva uprising, 
approximately 30 per cent of the baptized adults from Nicolás José’s village had perished.175 
Spanish colonialism inflicted cultural losses as well. In 1782, Governor Fages outlawed Tongva 
tribal dances and rituals such as their annual Mourning Ceremony.176 As the decade progressed, 
the benefits of parlaying his position to accrue political capital and station could not outweigh 
the costs of Spanish colonialism. Nicolás José’s solution, as was his way, was building a 
coalition. 
 He recruited Toypurina, a twenty-five-year-old woman living outside Mission San 
Gabriel, whose prophetic wisdom had already earned the respect of her peers. Like Nicolás José, 
Toypurina recognized the deleterious effects of the mission and sought to destroy it. She later 
explained, through an interpreter, that she felt “angry with the priests and all the others at the 
mission, because they were living on their [Tongva] land.”177 Her convictions and strong 
reputation made her a natural choice as a recruiter. She had good connections to neighboring 
Tongva leaders, as her brother led the village of Japchivit. She reached out to another chief, 
Temejasaquichí, from nearby Juvit, to turn some baptized Tongva people against the 
Franciscans.178 Toypurina’s value to the planned rebellion went beyond being a recruiter. As a 
Tongva spiritual leader, she also commanded the respect of local warriors. When Temejasaquichí 
attempted to turn the mission Indians to their cause, he urged the baptized Tongva to believe in 
Toypurina rather than the Franciscans. Moreover, on the night of the attack, she would be there 
not to fight, but to increase the morale of the combatants.179  
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 As with many anti-mission uprisings, Nicolás José and Toypurina’s insurrection failed 
before it began. The mission guards received word before the attack and were prepared to quash 
it. Spanish soldiers captured all twenty-one Tongva without any fatalities. Seventeen members of 
the force were warriors, including six converts from the mission that Temejasaquichí persuaded 
to join the cause. Spanish soldiers captured a fourth leader, Aliyivit, though he remarked that he 
only came along to test his warriors’ bravery.180 Governor Fages ordered the rank-and-file 
warriors to receive fifteen to twenty-five lashes depending on their past as anti-mission agitators. 
Fages declared they were to be whipped in public, as a demonstration of the powerlessness of 
“their practices against we who are Catholic.”181 All were eventually released. Fages tried the 
leaders and found them guilty of plotting against the mission. After two years of imprisonment 
while awaiting their final sentence, Fages exiled Nicolás José and Toypurina to distant Northern 
California missions, San Francisco, and Carmel, respectively. Temejasaquichí and Aliyivit 
regained their freedom after two years, as Spanish officials were content with their time served. 
The Spanish sentencing demonstrated restraint, especially when compared to the Pamó people’s 
planned attack on Mission San Diego in 1778, when Juan Francisco Ortega attempted to execute 
the uprising’s leaders. 
Nicolás José’s aborted uprising demonstrated that profound problems existed in the 
Franciscan administration of California. His turn against the Franciscans, which appeared to be 
as complete as it was sudden, showed the fragility of conversion. More importantly, it revealed 
how little Franciscans understood the people they struggled to convert. Nicolás José by all 
measures had been a Franciscan success story. Yet he had no trouble plotting to kill the Spanish 
at San Gabriel and perhaps even the baptized Indians who opposed his force. Nicolás José’s turn 
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defied the Franciscans’ nearly ubiquitous claims that baptized California Indians were happy in 
the missions. Nevertheless, Lasuén repeated this claim throughout his tenure.  
In winter 1786, despite almost a decade’s delay owing to Neve’s machinations and the 
Franciscans bitter responses to them, Lasuén’s first mass ushered in a new era for the Chumash 
around Mission Santa Barbara and the Spanish colonial project in California. On New Year’s 
Eve, Lasuén recorded the first three baptisms conducted at the new mission. One was a twenty-
two-year-old man named Catayu from Guainonase; the second was called Siocre from 
Sisabanonase, who was fifteen years old; and the last was a twelve-year-old boy, named 
Mumiyaut from the village of Janaya.182 As the New Year dawned, the mission’s construction 
began, built by Yanonali’s people. While the construction of the mission in the Santa Barbara 
Channel region that Serra so desired before his death represented a great victory for the 
Franciscans, it became an added source of concern for Fages. He presided over an expanding 
colonial field, which brought more people and territory into New Spain and presumably held off 
the advances of imperial rivals like Russia and Britain, as was the original intent for Spain’s 
northward thrust. However, for the aging soldier, the expansion also brought new tensions as 
soldiers, missionaries, and now colonists encroached further into Indigenous spaces. He knew 
the sort of trouble that portended.  
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Maintaining the Good Name of the Missionaries, 1786-1790 
 On May 2, 1786, just over a year into his term as father president of the California 
missions, Fermín Francisco de Lasuén received a shocking letter from Mission Santa Clara. One 
of the priests there, Fray Diego de Noboa, informed Lasuén that governor Pedro Fages ordered 
an investigation into a possible murder at Santa Clara. Despite the efforts of Fages and his 
predecessor Felipe de Neve to minimize violence in California, murders still occurred. However, 
this charge was unlike any other in the short history of the colony. The suspect in this case was 
one of the founders of Mission Santa Clara, Fray Tomás de la Peña - the same insubordinate 
missionary who fought with Fages over food prices weeks before the unprecedented allegation. 
Lasuén, still finding his footing as father president, now faced grave circumstances.  
 The de la Peña affair served as an inflection point for the Franciscans in California and 
particularly for Lasuén’s presidency. Just as Fages and Neve fretted over the possibility of 
California Indians overwhelming the thin belt of Spanish control in the region, Lasuén worried 
what the tarnished reputation of a single missionary, and by proxy the entire order, would do to 
its position both in California and in Mexico City. As he demonstrated throughout the length of 
his tenure, Lasuén cared most about protecting the order’s reputation. Indeed, maintaining the 
good name of the missionaries was a hallmark of his administrative ethos. During the de la Peña 
investigation, Lasuén served as defense counsel and judge, while believing not only that the 
missionary was innocent but that he was also the victim of a vast conspiracy. Lasuén intimidated 
witnesses, relied on hearsay, never questioned Fages’ key witness, and obfuscated facts of the 
case to the point of a cover-up. Mexico City eventually accepted his version of events and 
exonerated de la Peña. There are many aspects of the de la Peña affair that remain elusive, even 
today. One is whether or not Lasuén brought a propensity for cover-ups and conspiratorial 
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thinking to this case, or if his desire to protect his missionaries intensified to such a degree that 
the ends justified his means. 
 The case also served as an early window into Lasuén’s attitudes towards California 
Indian people and their basic humanity. Throughout his investigation and response to the charges 
against de la Peña, Lasuén accepted everything Noboa told him about the Ohlone Indian accusers 
at Mission Santa Clara while failing to interview several of them himself. He repeatedly stated 
that Indians always gave answers they thought the Spanish soldiers wanted to hear. Similarly, for 
Lasuén, Indians hated missionaries’ teaching so much that they looked for opportunities to lash 
out at Franciscans. As the de la Peña affair demonstrated, Lasuén constructed his own versions 
of “Indianness” as needed. At this time, the image of the lying, naïve Indian suited his purpose. It 
mattered not if his image bore any resemblance to reality. He understood that the civil authorities 
in Mexico City that would review de la Peña’s case were wont to believe Lasuén’s analysis of 
so-called “heathen” Indians, particularly because imperial Spain had few options for occupying 
and controlling California. Imperial Spain needed the Franciscans to successfully transform 
California Indians into quasi-Europeans. They did not have sufficient numbers of troops to take 
and hold California. Additionally, the Quechan uprising in 1781 permanently closed the overland 
route from Mexico to California, making settler colonialism impossible. Once Inspector General 
José de Gálvez decided to take California in 1768, the Franciscans were the only hope for 
holding the remote province. When Lasuén reported that Fages’ Ohlone witnesses lied about de 
la Peña, civil authorities in Mexico were satisfied with his findings. 
The Ohlone Indians and Fray Tomás de la Peña 
In 1777, the Spanish founded Mission Santa Clara in the territory of the Tamyen peoples, 
one of the language families that makes up the wider Ohlone culture group of northern 
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California. Ohlone people typify the seemingly paradoxical interplay of California Indigenous 
peoples’ diversity, autonomy, and interconnectedness. Language and culture connected over fifty 
distinct, politically autonomous bands, who created permanent settlements throughout the larger 
Northern California coastal area. Their intense autonomy led to political and social patterns that 
were not typical of their neighbors along the west coast. Ohlone speakers migrated into the area 
roughly a thousand years before Columbus reached the Caribbean. Over that millennia, the 
Ohlone became experts at processing the plant food sources in their various ecological zones. 
Their methods extracted such high levels of nutritional value from vegetable matter that unlike 
most other California Indians, the Ohlone diet prized plant-based foods over animal protein.183 
Food and plant processing was central to Ohlone life. Indeed, it shaped their economic and social 
worlds.  
The Ohlone lived in relatively small groups, which allowed them to govern on a village-
by-village basis, eschewing regional governance. Moreover, the Tamyen, Awaswas, Chalon, 
Chochenyo, Karkin, and Rumsen spoke distinct Ohlone dialects, and these linguistic connections 
were often the basis upon which larger groups coalesced.184 There were nearly fifty small tribes 
living in their territory at the time of the Spanish invasion.185 Within this structure, Ohlone 
households consisted of large family units, sometimes numbering as many as fifteen people. 
Sororal polygynous marriages partially explain large household size, as multiple wives and their 
children often lived together.186  
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Ohlone towns were an important cog in a network of milling activity. Processing plants 
into food was crucial for all Ohlone groups, and the economic geography created to facilitate it 
ordered Ohlone society. The focal points of the village-processing center complex were the many 
bedrock milling stations in Ohlone territories. The Ohlone were not unique in their use of milling 
outposts, yet their importance helped shaped regional lifeways. In some areas, such as the 
southeastern portion of the San Francisco Bay, a milling station’s location became the center of 
gravity for Ohlone seasonal camps and villages. During winter months, some Ohlone people 
lived in a permanent location, generally a village large enough to house 200 people. In the 
spring, many left to form smaller, dispersed base camps for collecting plants that were ready for 
processing at the milling stations. A triangular flow of raw materials went from basecamp to 
milling stations, and then from the mills back to the winter village. In the fall, this network 
expanded to include the hillsides around the bay to harvest and process acorns. The number of 
individual milling bowls at the various stations in the southeastern portion of the bay suggests 
that this was a family or tribal activity, rather than a regionally controlled small industry, which 
maintained autonomous, decentralized Ohlone life.187  
Ohlone people interacted amongst themselves and neighboring tribes through trade, 
intermarriage, and conflict. Their partners included Sierra Miwok, Plains Miwok and the Yokuts, 
who received Ohlone milled goods, mussels, abalone, and salt, amongst other items, for tools 
and materials such as bows, obsidian, tobacco, and pigments.188 As in much of Indigenous 
California, Ohlone people married to solidify bonds between families and tribes to stabilize trade 
and territorial rights.189 However, for some Ohlone groups intermarriage also provided a source 
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of conflict, as female captives, whether already married or not, were a primary goal for inter-
village raiders. Salinan warriors, for example, would burn their enemies’ village (another tactic 
common throughout California), loot their valuables, and seize female captives.190 Wife stealing, 
along with infractions of territorial rights were the main sources of conflict for Ohlone 
peoples.191 
The Franciscans established Mission Santa Clara on January 12, 1777, causing immediate 
tensions over Spanish-owned animals encroaching into Indigenous spaces. Conflict characterized 
the first weeks and months after the founding, which engendered Tamyen resistance against the 
Spanish invaders. To resist Spanish encroachment, Tamyen raiders chose the foreign animals the 
Spanish brought into their lands. An attack on some mules ignited Spanish anger and provided an 
opportunity for a demonstration of force. The mission guards reported the incident to the presidio 
at San Francisco who dispatched reinforcements to the new mission. After locating the village 
where the raiders stored and cooked the mule’s meat, they attacked at daybreak and fighting 
ensued. In the aftermath, Spanish forces killed three men and took an unknown number back to 
the mission and flogged them. Despite the soldiers’ violent retribution, raiding continued 
throughout the mission’s first years.192 
Franciscans, like Fray de la Peña, also engaged in dubious evangelical practices during 
the first months of Santa Clara’s founding. Throughout their time in the Americas, critics, 
usually from other mendicant orders, accused Franciscans of inflating baptismal numbers by 
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baptizing California Indians without the religious training to understand the ritual.193 In June, 
1777, an epidemic cut through the communities surrounding the mission and it hit one- and two-
year-old children the hardest. De la Peña used the opportunity to prey on Ohlone parents’ fears 
and suggested baptism for sick children. In just three weeks, the missionaries baptized fifty-four 
children, ranging from less than a year to ten-years-old.194 It is unclear if any of the children or 
parents understood what the baptism portended for their future. De la Peña’s tactics were not 
new, as baptizing young children to attract older relatives was a tactic Franciscans used 
throughout their time in the Americas.195 It often served as a flashpoint of conflict between 
Franciscans and Indigenous communities.  
In late spring, 1786, dark rumors began to circulate around Mission Santa Clara. De la 
Peña, the missionary who irked governor Fages and Spanish soldiers over food prices, reportedly 
murdered two baptized California Indians. Despite the many accusations of cruelty against 
Franciscan missionaries in California, a formal murder charge was unprecedented. The de la 
Peña affair became a tangled web of inconsistency, cover-up, accusations of calumny and 
conspiracy, and witnesses contradicting their own testimony on both sides of the case. The entire 
process lasted nearly a decade before a court in Mexico City declared de la Peña innocent in 
1795.196 Fages himself even came to believe that de la Peña, though certainly violent towards 
Indians, did not commit murder.197 Although the truth of the affair is lost to time, it remains 
illustrative of the Franciscan disposition towards Indians and of Lasuén’s tendencies as father 
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president. The affair shared characteristics with many conflicts between civil authorities and the 
Franciscans in Alta California. A provincial governor found fault in missionary behavior, gained 
some momentum in curbing their power, only to have a powerful (and often shrill) defense 
accepted by the order’s allies in Mexico City.198 
While historians have deployed the de la Peña affair in larger histories of the California 
mission system, due to the ambiguous nature of the case, along with the threats of torture and the 
sloppiness of investigations on both Fages and Lasuén’s sides, it has rarely been interrogated on 
its own terms.199 Shining a light on the trial illuminates Lasuén’s leadership in his first brush 
with a crisis. Under his direction of the case, inconsistencies and obfuscation emerged from the 
documentary record. Many of Lasuén’s witnesses made contradictory claims and engaged in 
behavior that pointed to a cover-up. Lasuén served as both defense attorney and judge, and many 
of his conclusions in both roles were illogical and self-serving. He conducted a trial that in the 
modern vernacular would be termed a sham. Lasuén consistently led witnesses with his 
questioning, while repeatedly accusing Fages and his investigators of the same behaviors. 
Moreover, as the self-appointed judge, Lasuén believed in de la Peña’s innocence and 
demonstrated little interest in contradictory evidence. Lasuén’s trial may have arrived at the 
proper conclusion, although his process had little to do with that outcome.  
On March 12, Governor Fages put the Spanish military officer Diego Gonzales in 
command of a secret investigation. He ordered Gonzales to go to Mission Santa Clara and use 
 
198 As previously mentioned, this pattern existed during difficulties between Serra and Fages in 1771, for the 
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discretion and diligence to determine whether or not de la Peña had beaten four local men to 
death.200 Three Indians, Plácido Ortiz and Anecleto Valdez, both from Baja California, and 
Antonio, a local man, accused the missionary of killing four baptized Indians at that mission in a 
single year.201 The governor found two of the accusations credible and promptly launched an 
inquest. Fages wrote long-form instructions to Gonzales for handling the investigation. The 
governor understood that a murder charge made against a missionary would meet opposition, not 
only from the Franciscans, but also from the so-called ignorant masses that termed him the 
“persecutor of the Friars.”202 The five complaints regarding Franciscan management of 
California Fages sent to the viceroy in 1785 had so far gone nowhere. Fages did not want the 
viceroy or the Audiencia, or the royal court in New Spain, to think he took every available 
opportunity to accuse the missionaries of misconduct. He knew the utmost care must be taken to 
discover what happened at Mission Santa Clara. 
Fages needed at least two Indian men to testify that they saw de la Peña kill two men, but 
he also knew that Indian testimony was not credible to most Spanish jurists. Fages demanded 
some level of literacy in the witnesses because they must sign their names, or at least their mark, 
on their testimony’s transcript. Gonzales also needed to find a persona de razón, or a person of 
European descent, to interpret for the witnesses.203 The interpreter must understand the gravity of 
their role, so Fages commanded Gonzales to “make him aware of the consequences he may incur 
if he fails the sacred oath.”204 Corporal Gabriel Antonio Peralta, a guard at Mission Santa Clara, 
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initiated the proceedings and examined the two witnesses. Fages wanted Peralta to “ask them if 
they know that Father Peña gave the blows that killed their countrymen.”205 If they confirmed it, 
the interrogators should seek out other witnesses “and if…others knew it, examine them and all 
those who have knowledge of the fact, seeking to make it clear…that the Indians died, and carry 
this out with prudence.”206 Fages instructed Gonzales to threaten the Ohlone witnesses to ensure 
their honesty: “As to the Indians, make them understand through the interpreter the punishments 
they will suffer it they lie.” He continued, “and if they disagree on something…if it all comes 
from a lie, warn them that the culprits will be imprisoned, and that they undermined…the 
process.”207 Fages believed this heavy-handed approach would secure honest testimony.  
On April 23, 1786, in the middle of the row over corn prices, Fages wrote to Diego 
Gonzales to “warn him quietly that Ensign Hermenegildo Sal was going to make an inquiry 
about the two Indians who it is said were killed by Fray Peña.”208 Ensign Sal’s cover was to 
pretend to investigate the missionary’s adherence to pricing regulations.209 Given the timeline of 
these events, it is possible that Fages used the issue as a cover to investigate de la Peña’s 
reputation for an explosive temper.  
The Indian informants’ testimony painted a picture of de la Peña as a man prone to 
intense violence in response to trivial events. Reportedly, de la Peña often beat baptized 
California Indians until they bled. Minor mistakes or general carelessness triggered abuse from 
the missionary. In one incident, the witnesses said de la Peña broke an old man’s neck because 
he wore a blanket instead of his shirt. Some witnesses claimed de la Peña beat an old man to 
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death who was ill and could not work.210 Plácido testified that a fourteen-year-old boy, Sixto 
Antonio, regularly irrigated the fields at Santa Clara. De la Peña checked on the boy’s progress 
and found he had flooded a portion of the field. Plácido said the missionary became enraged, 
ripped a hoe out of Sixto’s hand and “struck him with some blows that were mortal.”211 Fray 
Diego de Noboa, according to witnesses, gathered up Sixto and cared for him, but the boy died 
after a few days. Fages had what he needed to move forward, multiple witness confirming de la 
Peña had killed two men, an old man, and a teenager. How Fages’ threats of torture affected 
these witnesses is unknown. On May 11, after Spanish soldiers collected statements, Fages 
proceeded with the case, as he believed that de la Peña chastised Indians with “his own hands,” 
rather than using a whip, or an Indian proxy, and had killed one or perhaps two of them.212  
On May 2, 1786 Lasuén received a shocking letter from Noboa, de la Peña’s partner at 
Santa Clara. “In the beginning of January,” Noboa confessed to Lasuén, “I heard a rumor that 
Father Tomás de la Peña had been accused or denounced to the lieutenant at San Francisco of 
having killed an Indian irrigation worker with blows of a stick.”213 Lasuén was not yet named 
father president at that time, although that did not seem to be the cause of Noboa’s silence. “As 
the knowledge, information, and experience I have of his way of life, are proofs to me that he is 
innocent,” Noboa explained, “I did not regard the report as worthy of attention.”214 However, 
others did. Lasuén now discovered that “this rumor…was made the object of a very solemn 
investigation.”215 Anticipating Lasuén’s distress, Noboa presented the story as baseless. He 
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assured Lasuén that the charges were “so vague and improbable as to be worthy only of 
contempt.”216 Noboa thought he knew the source of the accusation.  
According to Noboa, Plácido, Fages’ chief witness, spread false rumors about de la Peña 
out of malice. Plácido earned the missionaries’ and soldiers’ trust enough that he carried keys to 
the mission’s storehouse and granaries. Though Noboa gave no specific reason, he told Lasuén 
that Plácido “had given proof that he could not be trusted, he was required to give up the 
keys.”217 Noboa also informed Lasuén that the men who testified for Fages were Plácido’s 
friends or indebted to him, and therefore gave false testimony. Noboa assured Lasuén that in the 
nearly two years he had been at Mission Santa Clara, he had never seen de la Peña strike anyone 
with a hoe or a stick, “and that when he chastises the Indians he uses the same moderation with 
which parents generally chastise their own children.”218 It is important to note two key omissions 
in  Noboa’s letter that, if included, would have legitimized his declaration of de la Peña’s 
innocence. First, despite qualifying the affair as “so false and so mischievous,” Noboa never 
countered the claims that Sixto was mortally wounded or that he tended to Sixto’s head 
wounds.219 Second, neither Noboa nor de la Peña recorded Sixto’s cause of death, leaving it a 
mystery.220 Noboa’s failure to include these key pieces of information gave credence to Fages’ 
investigation. 
Lasuén now confronted the greatest scandal the missionaries yet faced in California. To 
make matters worse, the Spanish military, the Franciscans’ constant adversary, brought the 
situation to light. As a younger man, Lasuén maintained friendly relations with the military side 
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of the Spanish colonial project, as his best friend for a time was Fernando Rivera y Moncada, a 
veteran of Spain’s California invasion, who died in the Quechan uprising in 1781.221 The two 
men had a bitter falling out after Lasuén disapproved of Rivera’s shifting opinion of the 
missionaries.222 That experience, coupled with Serra’s feuding with Rivera y Moncada, Neve, 
and Fages, changed his attitude towards the military to match Serra’s. Though they may have 
harbored the same opinions regarding the military’s meddling in mission affairs, Lasuén did not 
have Serra’s experience or habit of confrontation. Yet, Lasuén had learned some methods from 
Serra, namely that secrecy, misdirection, and obfuscation were the best means of dealing with 
Spanish governors.223 Lasuén’s use of these methods, along with his sharp mind and rhetorical 
skills, cemented them as hallmarks of his presidency.  
On May 26, 1786, twenty-five days after receiving Noboa’s first letter, Lasuén began 
investigating the charges against de la Peña. He titled the record of the trial “Judicial 
Proceedings.” Lasuén was no jurist and had little respect for impartiality, as his methodology 
throughout the proceedings demonstrated. Because he never heard the charges from Fages or 
anyone other than Noboa, Lasuén refused to believe one of his missionaries killed anyone. “I had 
to presume, and did presume,” Lasuén recorded, “that the father presumed was entirely 
innocent.”224 Lasuén, acting as both defense counsel and judge, began with the supposition that 
the accusation was fraudulent. Lasuén argued that the conflict over corn prices concluded 
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favorably for de la Peña, and the missionary had convinced Lasuén that he had been justified in 
his actions. In Lasuén’s logic, the man who protected the Indians at Santa Clara through price 
manipulation could not murder any of them. He kept the proceedings quiet while working to 
prove de la Peña’s innocence. In fact, Lasuén wrote that he only enacted the investigation 
because word of it had gotten out. “Fearing that intemperate language of this nature would give 
rise to some charge, suspicion, or question which my immediate or other superior could direct 
me as President of these Missions,” he declared, “I determined to take action.”225 Saving himself 
and the mission from a loss of prestige concerned Lasuén more than discovering the truth.  
The next day, Lasuén’ began his examination of Fray Noboa. Noboa claimed he barely 
knew Sixto’s name, but that he had been with him when he died. “Between the sixteenth and the 
nineteenth of July (to the best of my belief) of the year 1784,” Noboa testified, “the Indian 
named fell sick of a malignant fever of which there was an epidemic at this mission…On the 
twenty-eighth of the same month… he died of it, as did several others.”226 Had there been 
someone else present to cross-examine Noboa, they might have asked what else in his testimony 
was to the best of his belief. However, with no cross-examiner present, Lasuén continued. He 
pressed Noboa on Plácido’s contention that the padre tended to Sixto’s wounds. “Did you on that 
occasion take this Indian…to the house for the purpose of attending a wound or blow given to 
him by Father Fray Tomás?” Lasuén asked. Noboa replied simply, “No.”227 Again, a cross-
examiner might have asked why Noboa did not state that fact in the letter he wrote to Lasuén 
twenty-five days before. Why did Noboa not consider that fact, which would have discredited the 
charges against de la Peña immediately, worthy of inclusion in his letter? Why did it only come 
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up a month later, after the father president arrived at the mission? The answers to these unasked 
questions are now forever unknowable.  
Lasuén next turned to a story regarding de la Peña’s violent temper. “What do you know 
of another incident, reported to me by various sources,” Lasuén inquired, “of an injured or 
broken ear which Father Tomás caused to a boy?” Noboa responded that de la Peña had pulled 
the ear of a young Indian boy name Bernábe “because he was playing or making noise in the 
church.” He continued, “and as the boy had a pimple or a scab on his ear, it began to bleed a 
little.” Noboa had been unconcerned with the incident because Fages apparently witnessed the 
attack and did nothing at the time. Regardless, “the ear was not injured or broken, as I am 
convinced, if I had a mind to call him and examine it,” he concluded. Noboa’s testimony 
suggested that Bernábe still lived at or near the mission, and yet neither he nor Lasuén thought to 
investigate further. Noboa’s conjecture satisfied Lasuén.228  
Next, Lasuén interrogated Noboa about Plácido losing his keyholding privileges, which 
the missionary believed to be at the heart of the false charges. First, Lasuén asked about 
Plácido’s relationship with the other Indian men who had provided testimony to Gonzales back 
in April. In the original May 2 letter, Noboa intimated that all of the men were Plácido’s friends 
or were indebted to him in some way. When Lasuén pressed him, Noboa said “Within the 
previous two months, he had frequently been seen playing with these Indians, although 
previously he had never been seen with them; he had sought their companionship and friendship; 
and he gave them whatever gifts he could.” He also affirmed that these new relationships 
emerged after the missionaries stripped Plácido of the storeroom keys. No timetable was given. It 
is impossible to confirm the length of time between Plácido losing his privileges and Sixto’s 
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death, a fact of some importance. Particularly if Plácido approached a group of little-known men 
and convinced them to falsely accuse a Franciscan of murder. Lasuén did not find these facts 
worth gathering.  
Before concluding the interview, Lasuén asked Noboa to explain how the charges against 
de la Peña related to Plácido’s lost keyholding duties. The missionary did not reveal why Plácido 
lost them, only that afterward Noboa saw him “look spitefully at Fray Tomás.” Plácido’s 
relationship with de la Peña also dramatically changed, as he no longer spoke to the missionary, 
according to Noboa. On another occasion, de la Peña admonished Arellano, a soldier, for striking 
an Indian. Noboa testified that Plácido took the soldier’s side “and falsely accused the Indian.” 
Then, Noboa included admitted hearsay, informing Lasuén that “the man named Arellano 
threatened (so he had been told) that he would draw up one or two charges in writing against 
Father Fray Tomás, and it would seem that it was from then on that Plácido began to fabricate 
these falsehoods.”229 Noboa claimed that a soldier’s off-hand remark inspired Plácido to 
fabricate false charges and then to recruit men he did not know to frame de la Peña. Noboa 
concluded his testimony by reiterating de la Peña’s fitness to serve at the mission.  
Noboa’s testimony and handling of serious charges were riddled with conjecture, 
inconsistencies, and time gaps. In his original letter, he told Lasuén that he first heard the rumor 
that de la Peña killed two men in January of 1786 but failed to report it. The Franciscans in 
California had a history of charges that they physically abused Indians. Fages and Neve both 
challenged them on the practice and took their concerns to civil authorities. Yet no one had ever 
before accused a California missionary of murder. Even in a culture that devalued Indigenous 
lives, a Franciscan killing one, or perhaps two, Indians was an act of major consequence. Yet 
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Noboa sat on the information, when he could have testified in January that he never cared for an 
Indian with mortal wounds. Moreover, Fages, Gonzales, Sal, and the others conducted their 
investigation at and around Mission Santa Clara through late March and April, and still Lasuén 
remained unaware. Only after the military’s investigation neared conclusion did Noboa finally 
contact his superior yet failed to provide the singular piece of evidence - that he never tended to a 
mortally wounded Sixto - that could thwart the investigation. He did not deny that he tended to 
Sixto’s wounds until May 27, 1786. Noboa and de la Peña had enough time to concoct a cover-
up, even if the clock started when Gonzales first began investigating in mid-March. One can 
credibly wonder whether or not Lasuén had to explain to Noboa that a denial regarding Sixto’s 
wounds was a crucial piece of evidence. There were enough issues with Noboa and his testimony 
to reasonably doubt his credibility. Yet, he was Lasuén’s key witness as the inquiry unfolded.  
Lasuén now waited to see which direction the de la Peña affair took. He had not heard 
anything from Fages, Gonzales, or anyone else investigating the case by May 28. Though 
Noboa’s testimony “firmly supports my opinion that there has been neither fault nor excess on 
the part of Father Fray Tomás de la Peña,” Lasuén surmised, because there were “some very 
peculiar circumstances, which I continue to uncover in our case, for me the conclusion is that it 
is necessary to take every possible precaution in order to attain the objectives laid down at the 
beginning of the inquiry.”230 One such circumstance occurred when Fages and Gonzales, weeks 
earlier, brought six Indian men into custody during the April investigation and released three of 
them. No one at Santa Clara knew exactly why this happened, but it solidified Lasuén’s belief in 
de la Peña’s innocence. Why continue to hold the three of them unless they gave false 
testimony? Lasuén believed he had discovered the key to protect the Franciscans’ reputation.  
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On May 30, Lasuén interviewed the first Indian witness who could corroborate Noboa’s 
claim that Sixto died of an illness. Lasuén recorded the testimony and the instructions given to 
Silverio, Noboa’s witness. Silverio “[had] been warned of the obligation to tell the truth 
regarding what he knew and would be asked and [had] been warned too regarding the 
punishments which he could incur for the contrary.”231 Though Lasuén did not enumerate those 
punishments, Silverio was likely aware of the whip, stocks, and irons he might face if the 
Franciscans decided he lied to them. Fearful of being tortured, Silverio responded to Lasuén’s 
queries with terse one sentence answers. He was Sixto’s uncle by blood. He was with the boy 
when he died. Sixto’s death was caused by “a headache.” When asked if Sixto suffered “from 
something besides a headache,” Silverio reiterated that there was “nothing more.” Lasuén 
remained unsatisfied and asked more pointedly, “Did not the sick man say that some other part 
of the body caused pain?” Silverio acknowledged that Sixto “also said his stomach pained him.” 
Lasuén repeated the question in another way, “Did he not complain that he felt pain in some 
other part?” Silverio answered, “Only in the head and stomach.” Silverio also remarked that his 
nephew said, “I have now caught the disease.” Lasuen asked a final question: “Did some die?” 
“Many died,” Silverio responded.232 Silverio affirmed his testimony with a mark and the 
missionaries allowed him to leave.  
 Silverio’s testimony is difficult to navigate. On one hand, he confirmed Noboa’s 
argument that Sixto died of an illness. He answered Lasuén’s questions simply, without 
embellishment or obfuscating phrases. On the other hand, he testified under the direct threat of 
torture. Silverio’s fear may have increased due to de la Peña’s reputation for being quick 
tempered, and the solemnity of the proceedings. Testimony given under these circumstances is 
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questionable in its veracity.233 Coupling the threat of torture with Lasuén’s leading questions, 
such as “Did he suffer from something besides a headache?” raised doubt regarding the truth of 
Silverio’s testimony. The transcript reads as though the missionaries prepared Silverio in 
advance and that he needed to be reminded what to say.  
 Immediately after Silverio gave his testimony, Lasuén brought in another Indian witness, 
a fifteen-year-old boy named Diego. Like Silverio, Diego was “a cousin or blood relative” of 
Sixto. His interrogators warned him that he faced punishment for giving false testimony, yet 
Lasuén noted that Diego knew Spanish and was better informed than the previous witness. “Are 
you a relative of the deceased Sixto?” Lasuén asked. “Yes, I am his brother-in-law,” Diego 
responded. Lasuén continued, “Where were you when Sixto died?” “I was here,” the boy 
answered. Lasuén followed with the key question, “Do you know what caused his death?” Diego 
testified that “Father Fray Tomás struck him.” Diego confirmed that de la Peña struck Sixto with 
a hoe and some rocks. “Did you see this?” Lasuén asked the boy. “Yes, I saw it,” he responded. 
Lasuén challenged Diego’s assertion: “How could you see it from that distance? Does not the 
entire orchard with its enclosure of high trees with thick foliage come in between?” Diego had no 
response. Lasuén circled Diego with questions, knowing the boy neared breaking. Finally, upon 
asking Diego once more how he could have seen the incident, the boy responded, “I did not see 
it, but Plácido said he saw it.” Lasuén told Diego that lying offended the Christian god, and that 
the must be honest. Fray Cambón, still acting as witness, reminded Diego that he spoke to the 
father president, and that Lasuén would punish any of the missionaries that had done wrong. 
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Once again, Diego responded, “I did not see it; Plácido told me I saw it.”234 Having what they 
needed, the missionaries read the transcript back to Diego and sent him away.  
 Like Silverio’s, Diego’s examination presents a tangle of inconsistencies and was 
clouded by the threat of torture.  The boy retracted his statement that he saw de la Peña beating 
Sixto with a hoe and rocks. He then repeatedly stated that Plácido told him what he saw. It is 
impossible to know Diego’s emotional state during his interrogation. He was alone in a room 
with two unfamiliar Franciscans who threatened him with physical punishment if he lied. 
Lasuén, as the defense counsel, aggressively pursued the outcome he desired, and he got it when 
a terrified witness recanted his earlier testimony.  
 By May 31, without questioning Plácido, Lasuén believed the case was closed. “After 
having conducted a sufficient number of judicial proceedings according to the best form which I 
knew, and could, and thought necessary to attain the objectives expressed and to arrive at a 
judgement,” he concluded, “I now give as my judgment that I find no cause and no reason for 
correcting, reprehending or summoning to judgment the Reverend Father Fray Tomás de la 
Peña.” Although he conducted a “sufficient number” of examinations, Lasuén came to this 
judgment without questioning the key witness for the accusers, or the man accused. He only 
spoke to three men. Regarding Plácido, Lasuén wrote that Fages’ chief witness was “a mean 
fellow of disreputable conduct, antagonistic to the Fathers, and acceptable to those who 
persecute them.” Lasuén believed his judgment of Plácido though he only ever heard about these 
qualities secondhand. Moreover, he again asserted that he only engaged in these proceedings to 
achieve his predetermined outcome: that de la Peña be pronounced wholly innocent. Without 
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ever contacting Fages or his superiors at the college, Lasuén declared he had reached the truth of 
the matter.235  
 Despite his confidence that de la Peña required no reprimand, he summoned the 
missionary to remind him of his duties and to inspire him to carry on with the spiritual conquest. 
Lasuén recorded his words: 
I pointed out to him that perhaps by giving an ear pulling, a punch, a rap 
on the head, or a slap with the hand, it would be possible to give, now or 
in the future, an occasion or an excuse for similar false charges, being, as 
we are, especially in appointments such as these, the center for 
observation for all men, and not all of them look on us with kindly eyes. 
And so, he should refrain from such action, even though such punishment 
is commonly given by the most indulgent fathers to their own sons.236 
 
Lasuén’s admonition is instructive. First, it suggests that de la Peña physically punished Indians 
himself. Punching, ear pulling, rapping, and slapping are intensely personal actions that were off 
limits to the missionaries based on their own precepts. Second, in most defenses of Franciscan 
discipline, punishment consisted of lashings, wearing stocks, or being fitted with a hobble or 
boot. De la Peña’s punishment style was apparently unorthodox and closer to hand-to-hand 
combat than officially sanctioned Franciscan discipline.237 Third, Lasuén’s chief concern, while 
being aware of de la Peña’s excessive use of force, was not with the Indians taking these 
beatings, or with the damage they might do to missionary-Indian relations. Rather, he was 
chiefly concerned with the scandal these actions might cause if made public.  
 Notably, instead of recording their exchange, as he had with previous witnesses, Lasuén 
only provided his version of what de la Peña said in response, rather than a transcript. Lasuén 
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completely controlled the accused missionary’s recorded response. First, de la Peña promised 
Lasuén that he would no longer strike Indians at the mission, which contradicted Noboa’s 
account that de la Peña did not engage in such behavior. Unlike Diego’s case, this inconsistency 
was not unpacked and examined. De la Peña, according to Lasuén, claimed that mission Indians 
did not make these accusations, but rather they came from the Spanish colonists. De la Peña 
admitted that the accusation of murder against him came after he was violent with baptized 
California Indians. De la Peña believed that the region’s colonists, or the gente de razón, linked 
him with the older, mysterious death of Sixto in order to frame him. He failed to provide 
motivation for this supposed conspiracy. What Lasuén recorded next was shocking in its irony, 
which was clearly lost on the father president, the accused missionary, and Fray Cambón, the 
witness. The conspiracy “[relies] solely on the evidence of Indians,” Lasuén wrote, “who can be 
easily influenced and instigated against the missionary, for it is he who curbs their excessive 
liberty, subjects them to justice, and punishes their excesses.”238 The missionaries ignored the 
idea that their own witness might also be influenced by the threat of torture.  
Before finishing his report, Lasuén noted that de la Peña feared the accusations getting 
out a second time. He asked Lasuén to record that he requested a formal investigation the 
moment that Lasuén arrived at Mission Santa Clara. In response, Lasuén shared the reasons he 
preferred covering up the situation. “There was no clear evidence of such proceedings,” Lasuén 
reminded de la Peña, “since nothing specific had been brought to my notice which would be 
prejudicial to his good conduct and…because the subsequent imprisonment…of the witness 
should effectively dispel the scandalous public rumor and give rise to one rooted in well-merited 
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esteem for his blameless reputation.” Finally, de la Peña promised to tell the truth if reports of 
Sixto’s possible murder reached Mexico. With that, Lasuén closed his judicial proceedings.239 
In July, dissatisfied with Gonzales and Sal’s investigations, Fages began his own. The 
governor discovered his Indian witnesses gave contradictory testimony. He found three of the six 
Indian men guilty of perjury and sentenced them to prison in Monterey’s presidio, where they 
languished for ten years.240 As his case unraveled, and perhaps concerned about his reputation as 
the persecutor of the friars, Fages issued a harsh decree banning the public from gossiping about 
the Franciscans and threatening the arrest of any soldiers who denounced the missionaries.241 
This represented a profound reversal for the governor, as he had brought attention to Franciscan 
violence throughout his career in Alta California. As Fages’ momentum slowed, Lasuén’s 
confidence in his defense grew. Throughout June 1786, Lasuén continued his own research and 
in early July wrote a document that resembled a manifesto more than a report on his juridical 
proceedings.  
On July 3, 1786, Lasuen sent two documents to the acting Commander General of the 
Internal Provinces, Don José Antonio Rengel. Word of the de la Peña case finally made its way 
to Mexico City and Lasuén revealed his findings to the imperial government. Lasuén first 
acknowledged that there were “certain rumors” swirling around de la Peña. Lasuén knew that 
Serra had found his greatest support against reformist or oppositional governors from officials in 
distant Mexico and endeavored to find the same support with Rengel. “So annoying a report,” he 
wrote, “must naturally have moved Your Lordship to indignation, and must have offended your 
Christian zeal; but the truth which, on my priestly honor, I impart to you will at least serve to 
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hold such sentiments in suspense.”242 After promising to provide proof of the missionary’s 
innocence whenever requested, Lasuén closed the introduction and moved on to a document that 
revealed much about the institutional culture of the Franciscans in California, and Lasuén as their 
leader.  
Lasuén began by describing the terms of his probe, to demonstrate to the civil authorities 
in Mexico that his findings were reliable. “I instituted certain investigations of a judicial nature,” 
he wrote, “observing due procedure according to the best of my knowledge, capacity, and 
training.”243 However, in the process he revealed that his own methods were problematic. First, 
Lasuén argued that “the charges against the Reverend Father Peña should be regarded from 
beginning to end as nothing but a plot inspired by malice, concocted much earlier behind a 
façade of investigations and inquires that were at once irregular, heated, and prejudiced.”244 
Despite his claims that Fages instituted a corrupt investigation based on falsehoods, Lasuén 
announced that he took “for granted the favorable results I had anticipated would follow from the 
judicial inquiry I instituted…I dispensed with legal formalities in many cases when the evidence 
in vindication of the father was cumulative and well authenticated.”245 Moreover, because these 
allegedly just principals guided him, it did not matter that his own inquiries “were 
extrajudicial.”246 
Much of what Lasuén offered early in the July report mirrored what he wrote in late May. 
During that time, the supposed conspiracy against de la Peña had grown larger. It no longer was 
Plácido and his cronies in cahoots with Spanish soldiers, but now included some of California’s 
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more important civil and military figures. Lasuén revealed he had secret testimony that he had 
not written down before July for fear of the word getting out. Fray Matias Noriega of Mission 
San Carlos reported to Lasuén that in October 1785, Captain Nicholas Soler, adjutant inspector 
and physician, “asserted with indignation that Father Tomas de la Peña had become demented 
and turned his rage against the Indians, and that the latter were presently opportuning the 
corporal of that escort and all the guards; and for that reason the mission was in evident danger 
of revolt.”247 Soler repeated the same story at Mission San Antonio de Padua to Fray 
Buenaventura Sitjar. Soler told Sitjar that “Father Peña frequently punished the Indians by 
inflicting on them one hundred or two hundred lashes, and this he did after he had exhausted 
himself by administering buffetings, and thrashings, and kicks to them,” to which Lasuén 
interjected, “What Nonsense! May God forgive him for what he said.”248 He blasted away at the 
physician’s motives, declaring that Soler’s “dastardly fabrications were calculated to stir up 
clamorous and sacrilegious accusations against the missionary in question,” while offering no 
corroborating facts or testimony.249 The only evidence Lasuén used to buttress his accusation 
was that he spent some time with Soler at the Santa Barbara presidio in December 1785 and the 
physician kept silent about De la Pena’s alleged crimes. To Lasuén, “this coincidence by itself is 
enough to help us draw a conclusion,” but he remained committed to revealing all of his 
evidence.250 Considering the cryptic statement contained in Lasuén’s initial report, regarding 
peculiar circumstances in the de la Peña case, his response to Soler’s silence is instructive.  
Back on May 23, Lasuén made an intentionally vague comment before the transcription 
of Silverio’s testimony. “Nevertheless, some very peculiar circumstances, which I continue to 
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uncover in our case, force me to the conclusion that it is necessary to take every possible 
precaution to attain the objectives laid down at the beginning…I therefore considered that I 
should continue…this inquiry.”251 Lasuén referred to Soler’s gossip on May 23. Frays Noriega 
and Sitjar spoke to him after he received Noboa’s original letter dated May 2, as he had never 
heard any details of the case before that day. Sometime around that report, Lasuén found out 
about the gossip, realized he had seen Soler since the two incidences recounted to him, and 
because the physician stayed silent, Lasuén determined that he lied. It never occurred to Lasuén 
that Soler might have his own non-conspiratorial reasons for concealing damning accusations 
from the new father president. Perhaps he did not feel the evidence sufficed to begin official 
proceedings. Perhaps he wanted to go to Fages first. Perhaps, like Lasuén, he held on to his best 
evidence until the proper moment. Regardless of Soler’s reasons, Lasuén’s denunciation of his 
silence in Santa Barbara was strange considering his own stance on secret evidence.  
Soler was not the only agent conspiring against de la Peña, according to Lasuén. There 
were two other men, both presidio soldiers. One of them, the previously mentioned Arellano, 
became angry with de la Peña when the missionary allegedly admonished him for striking a 
neophyte at Santa Clara. Plácido overheard the exchange and took Arellano’s side. “Then, as is 
known,” Lasuén claimed, “Arellano threatened that he might have one or two cards to play 
against Father Peña.”252 Plácido and Arellano then became fast friends. Lieutenant Gonzales, 
another friend of Arellano’s, allegedly began pressuring a second soldier, Mariano Cordero, to 
make false murder charges against de la Peña. Cordero repeatedly told Gonzales he knew of no 
such event and would not say that he did. When asked to testify, Cordero told Lasuén he never 
heard of de la Peña “administering blows, or…inflicting punishment” on baptized California 
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Indians. He went further, claiming there was never “discontent, hostility, or insubordination” at 
Mission Santa Clara.253 Cordero’s testimony stood in stark contrast to the facts established by 
Lasuén’s defense. First, de la Peña admitted to striking Indians and second, Noboa’s testimony 
rested on Plácido’s discontentment, hostility, and insubordination at Mission Santa Clara over 
losing his keyholding privileges. Cordero may have told the truth regarding not hearing about de 
la Peña killing Indians, but his demonstrably inconsistent testimony undermined his credibility as 
a witness. He either lied about de la Peña’s violence, or he was so unaware of daily life at the 
mission that his statements have no relevance.   
The rest of the Lasuén’s conspiracy followed a pattern similar to Cordero’s inconsistent 
testimony. Much of it focused on uncorroborated statements. Lasuén interviewed Gabriel Peralta, 
the father of the Spanish soldier Corporal Juan José Peralta because he was god-fearing and 
pious. The senior Peralta said that he never saw de la Peña strike anyone, or punish Indians at all, 
“except after the manner of a parent,” which in the Franciscan parlance included twenty-five 
lashes with a whip, or time in the stocks or chains.254 Isabel Peralta, Juan José’s wife, also stated 
that Gonzales pressured her, and that she “know[s] nothing about a death, or blows, or insults. 
All I know and hear is that the Father disciplines the Indians as the other Fathers do.”255 Again, 
another witness testified that de la Peña physically punished Indians. Finally, Juan José Peralta 
testified that he was unaware of discontent among the Indians at Santa Clara and that he never 
saw de la Peña strike anyone, let alone kill an Indian. Another soldier, Sergeant Juan Pablo 
Grijalva, asserted that during Gonzales’ interrogation of the six Indians back in April, Fages’ 
primary investigator asked leading questions that the witnesses happily answered in the 
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affirmative.256 After recounting the details of the conspiracy against de la Peña, Lasuén moved to 
the Church’s opinion on Indian testimony. This was the first window into Franciscan mentalities 
that Lasuén truly offered during his tenure as father president. These windows ultimately became 
a hallmark of his administration.  
Lasuén illustrated Franciscan disregard for Indigenous peoples’ basic humanity when he 
argued against the validity of Indian testimony in cases against Europeans and particularly 
against members of the Church. He recounted that Plácido lost keyholding privileges and 
received a “light punishment” which led “in typical Indian fashion” to bringing false murder 
charges against de la Peña.257 After discussing Grijalva’s description of Gonzales’ examination 
of the witness against de la Peña, the father president turned to the fundamental trustworthiness 
of Indian testimony. Lasuén cited a seventeenth-century Spanish bishop, Alfonso de la Peña y 
Montenegro. Montenegro recounted a story about a nameless missionary visiting a town where 
the Indigenous residents accused a priest of an unknown crime. The visitor asked one of the 
Native witnesses “So on one Sunday after prayers your pastor killed King David?” to which the 
witness replied, “Yes, Sir, I myself saw him kill him,” implying that all Amerindians, regardless 
of time or place, simply told missionaries what they wanted to hear.258 Lasuén supported this 
claim with provisions from the Third Council of Lima, held from 1582-1583 which stated: 
 Since it is well known…that Indians can be led by deepseated [sic] 
malice, while the missionaries are at the mercy of false charges in 
proportion as they reprove the vices of the Indians, or oppose the 
avarice or cruelty of the Spaniards, the Holy Synod, desiring to 
make provision for the good name and stability of the priests who 
labor among the Indians and are in charge of them decrees: 
 “Where there is an urgent reason for obtaining evidence and the 
decision will have to be based on the evidence of Indians, let the 
judges weigh carefully the amount of credence that should be 
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given to the evidence of people such as these, for, as is well 
known, they can easily be induced to testify falsely.”259 
 
Again, Lasuén failed to realize that his efforts to discredit the presidio’s investigation of de la 
Peña undermined his own. During his interviews of the witnesses, he employed leading 
questions and the threat of physical punishment, a very real threat for baptized California Indians 
who had seen or experienced it before. Lasuén’s sense of moral indignation clouded his 
judgement, and he believed that knew what transpired. From Lasuén’s perspective, his 
admittedly extrajudicial tactics produced the truth, whereas Gonzales’ use of them led to lies and 
slander.  
 Reaching back further in time to establish the Church’s misgivings regarding credible 
witnesses against the clergy, Lasuén referenced Pope Innocent III’s 1212 declaration that only 
charges against missionaries “presented by those who are upright and honorable and not by those 
who are vindictive and depraved” should be honored by a court.260 Innocent III continued: 
“Should some information in regard to any particular cleric come to your knowledge, and should 
it be of such a nature as to afford you good reason for taking action, do not readily believe it; and 
unless it is readily proved, let it not move you to punishment.”261 Lasuén chose this last passage 
well. The father president believed that there was nothing more important in a given missionary 
field than the unspoiled reputation of the missionaries, regardless of their behavior.262 
To that end, Lasuen undermined the entire premise of Fages’ investigation, reminding 
Commander General Rengel that aside from ecclesiastic opinion, Spanish law also held 
provisions meant to protect priests from legal proceedings. He complained that Fages failed to 
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follow protocol because he never allowed de la Peña to defend himself against the charges. The 
aspect of Fages’ process that distressed Lasuén the most was the case’s public nature. It was “the 
sympathy and understanding of our Catholic Sovereigns for the dignity of the ecclesiastics, even 
when they are unworthy,” according to Lasuén, that ordered all inquiries against the clergy to be 
secret rather than in “the noisy legal proceedings of ordinary court trials.” Lasuén claimed that 
“even if it is conceded that the murders imputed to the father were real, and were the 
consequence of excessive severity and of indiscreet and frenzied zeal,” there could be no case 
against de la Peña because the governor failed to follow the law in his investigation. Having 
made his point, Lasuén cited Spanish precedence that resonated with the crux of his defense of 
the accused missionary: “‘For it is neither right nor fitting that the shortcomings of ecclesiastics 
be made public.” In matters such as these, Lasuén wrote that maintaining “the good name of the 
missionaries” should always be the primary goal of Spanish authorities.263  
 With Lasuén’s vigorous defense and the collapse of the testimony offered by Fages’ 
Indian witnesses, the case eventually fell apart, and the Audiencia exonerated de la Peña. It was a 
lengthy affair that changed venues from California to Mexico City. During that time, the 
Audiencia officially rebuked Fages, which informed him that any further unproven allegations 
against the Franciscans in California would earn him a loss of position and honors.264 A year 
later, in 1787, the governor conceded that de la Peña was likely innocent, though he continued to 
believe that the missionary treated the Indians at Santa Clara cruelly.265 In 1791, de la Peña 
travelled to Mexico as the Audiencia began to process his case. Two years later, some Spanish 
witnesses who lived in California at the time of the alleged crime testified to the missionary’s 
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character. All involved answered the questions favorably for de la Peña. No California Indian 
people were questioned. The missionary wrote his own defense, and despite all the claims made 
by Lasuén’s witnesses that the priest  never acted violently towards baptized California Indians, 
de la Peña admitted pulling young Barnábe’s ear, causing it to bleed, and to hitting an Indian in 
the head with his wooden cane. This second act was at the very root of the murder charges 
against him. His admission that he had at least on one occasion struck an Indian in the head with 
a heavy piece of wood mattered not, and de la Peña was exonerated. Now in poor health, he 
retired to the College of San Fernando where his peers elected him to its council in 1795.266 That 
same year, the three Indian men who were jailed in San Francisco’s presidio on perjury charges 
for ten years took the knee in front of the new Franciscans at Mission Santa Clara. All three men 
said they had given false testimony and confirmed de la Peña’s innocence. The missionaries then 
released them.267 
Although the de le Peña murder trial remains as opaque and dissatisfying today as it was 
during the summer of 1786, it revealed the frustrations civil authority had with Franciscan 
control of California. Governor Fages, who considered himself a religious man, nevertheless saw 
an opportunity to curb missionary power when he perceived that it threatened the balance of 
power too far in Franciscan favor. He was a colonial administrator who spent most of his life 
dedicated to the transformation of California Indian people into quasi-Europeans. Yet, he pushed 
back against Franciscan tendencies towards autonomy or outright independence. Franciscan 
arrogance remained a consistent issue for the governor. He was concerned that Franciscans, from 
Serra, Lasuén, and Palóu, to the rank-and-file priests at the missions, held him in contempt and 
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were overtly disrespectful in letters and in person. By the time he brought charges against de la 
Peña in late March 1786, his frustration intensified so that his disaffection with the missionaries 
was a constant topic of his correspondence. He knew of de la Peña’s temper, as he saw the priest 
bloody Barnábe’s ear for playing in church. When the rumors the priest beat multiple Indians to 
death made it to the governor, he had his chance to make a real move against the Franciscans. He 
put his reputation on the line based on testimony from witnesses that he and Lasuén both 
threatened, the latter with torture, the former with prison. It was a bold play over which Fages 
quickly lost control. That miscalculation followed him for years. 
 Lasuén probably never imagined his first several months as father president would be 
consumed by a scandal unlike any that Serra had confronted. He found himself immediately at 
the nexus of tensions that existed between church and state in New Spain since the mid-
eighteenth century, and in California from the founding of Mission San Diego. The missionary 
that once described himself as useless and had begged to leave California had become the most 
powerful colonial in the province. Faced with Fages’ investigation, Lasuén used the lessons 
Serra taught him to protect the Franciscan order’s reputation at all costs. He operated in secrecy 
when necessary. He attacked the character of everyone who made accusations against de la Peña. 
To Lasuén, the entire affair seemed nothing more than a spiteful attack on the spiritual conquest 
of California. Even if it meant holding extralegal proceedings, Lasuén would not only fight to 
exonerate de la Peña, but to demonstrate that he had Serra’s mettle. If Spanish governors looked 
to limit the power of the missionaries, they would find their new opponent as obstinate as his 
predecessor.  
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Fages’ 1787 Code of Conduct  
In January 1787, with the aborted uprising on San Gabriel and the de la Peña affair 
behind him, Fages faced a new dilemma. In his time as governor, the little pueblo of Los Angeles 
expanded, in tandem with Mission San Gabriel, the mission nearest the town. Nicolás José and 
Toypurina demonstrated that the growth of both town and mission represented potential conflict 
between the baptized and unbaptized California Indians, unbaptized Indians and soldiers, and the 
Franciscans with all parties. Fages spent most of his life in the Spanish military, and most of that 
on the northern borderlands of New Spain and Indigenous country. Fages had experienced the 
violent results when soldiers, colonists, and missionaries had disparate agendas that pushed 
Indigenous people to resist colonization. Aside from his sorties against the Quechans in 1781, as 
a lieutenant he had two different assignments in Senora, battling the Seri people, known for their 
martial prowess.268 Fages’ units also clashed with Apaches in New Mexico.269 By 1787, these 
experiences, coupled with Los Angeles’ and San Gabriel’s growth, concerned Fages.  
Fages responded to the expansion of the California mission system and the intensification 
of tensions around Los Angeles by issuing a code of conduct to manage relations between 
secular Spaniards and Southern California Indians. Like Portolá and Neve before him, Fages 
created a structure similar to that in use throughout northern New Spain. He established that the 
military, not the pueblo’s alcalde, or mayor, nor the regidores, or town council, held real power. 
He decreed that the acting corporal of the pueblo, Vicente Félix, become the comisionado, or the 
de facto leader of Los Angeles. The governor placed great responsibility in Félix’s hands. He 
 
268 For notes on Fages’ military career see, William Marvin Mason, “Fages’ Code of Conduct Toward Indians, 
1787,” The Journal of California Anthropology 2, no. 1, (Summer, 1975): 90-94; for information on the Seri as 
warriors see, Thomas Bowen, “Seri,” in Handbook of North American Indians Volume X, Southwest, ed., Robert 
F. Heizer (Washington D.C., 1978), 232.  
269 Mason, “Fages Code of Conduct Towards Indians,” 90-94.  
 
 
96 
 
maintained security for the town, oversaw farming and small-scale production, and 
communicated matters of military importance to his superiors. Félix reported to the corporal at 
the Santa Barbara presidio, who reported to Fages. This ensured civil authorities’ goals for the 
town’s development would not be overshadowed by townspeople’s concerns or those of the 
missionaries. At Purísima Concepción and San Pedro y San Pablo de Bicuner, disparate agendas 
led to disaster for Spain, an outcome Fages strove to avoid in California.270   
Fages wrote several rules regulating contact between the townspeople and non-baptized 
Tongva Indians. Fages argued in his code that the people of Los Angeles and the Tongva were 
too familiar. According to Fages, Los Angeles’ denizens’ dependency on Tongva labor bred a 
complacency that could lead to disaster. He ordered Félix to correct this behavior, but very 
carefully, so as to not insult or offend the Tongva. Despite those instructions, Fages severely 
limited Tongva people’s freedom of movement and to procure work. For example, Indian men or 
women hired to work in the pueblo were barred from working indoors, and they could not sleep 
in Spanish people’s homes. If they had travelled from a significant distance, they could sleep 
outside, near the guard house, where they could be watched. Fages projected the violence of the 
Quechans onto the Tongva people. He did not want another surprise attack.271 
Fages’ decree also dictated Spaniards’ travel to Tongva towns to recruit laborers. Anyone 
who did so must obtain permission from both the comisionado and the alcalde, who would only 
agree if the petitioner enjoyed good standing in the town. Men from the pueblo were forbidden to 
travel to the rancherías alone, and women and children could never visit them. Anyone breaking 
this rule would face a week in the stocks and perhaps a significant fine. When in the ranchería, 
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the recruiter could speak only to the village leader. Fages specifically ordered that no Tongva 
person should be compelled to work against their will, and that the Spaniards could never cheat 
workers, or promise them payment and then refuse it. Moreover, when the recruiters brought 
Tongva laborers to Los Angeles, those workers should have an overseer. Not because they 
needed one to work, or to keep them from stealing, but because Fages argued that he wanted 
someone to stop Indians from being abused or treated unjustly in the town. Spanish violence 
against Tongva men and women for trifling offences engendered the resentments Fages 
feared.272  
Mitigating violence against California Indians was at the core of the governor’s code of 
conduct. The Quechan uprising in 1781 made Fages worry that the aborted Nicolás José-
Toypurina uprising could have led to the destruction of both Los Angeles and Mission San 
Gabriel. Spanish arrogance and violence sparked the massacre on the Colorado River. He did not 
want that to happen again in California. Fages turned to draconian methods, against his own 
people and the Tongva. For example, any townsperson who abused Tongva people for any 
reason would be injured in the same manner as their victim. Moreover, it would be done in the 
aggrieved Indian’s presence, to end the need for retribution. If an Indian transgressed in a way 
that warranted punishment, such as stealing or killing animals, damaging persons, or property, 
they could face punishment. Even then, the leader of their ranchería needed to be notified to act 
as a witness during the lashing. In an interesting twist, to position secular authorities as more 
compassionate than their Franciscan counterparts, Fages stipulated that the transgressor should 
not receive any more than fifteen to twenty lashes – fewer than the typical Franciscan sentence of 
twenty-five – and ordered that they were to be given with humanity. Most important, the Tongva 
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person should not face humiliation during the punishment to avoid creating a cause for 
vengeance.273  
Fages used his authority and experience to minimize potential flashpoints between 
colonists and California Indians, but as an occupying military commander he nonetheless forged 
policies that created more tensions. For the security of Los Angeles, Fages ordered the closest 
rancherías to the pueblo relocated to a safer distance. The governor viewed security through the 
eyes of his military experience. He crafted policy to curb familiarity, physical violence, labor 
exploitation, and arbitrary punishment. These represented concrete factors that led to retributive 
violence. What Fages’ did not find important were the alliances and rivalries between the 
Tongva people surrounding Los Angeles, or the importance of geography. One of the sparks of 
conflict for Toypurina and Nicolás José just a little over a year prior was the indiscriminate 
mixing of peoples at the mission. Subtle cultural distinctions between rancherías did not affect 
Fages’ plans for stability. Similarly, he ordered that soldiers should place sentries around the 
areas where the Tongva held their dances, or wherever they congregated in large groups, as these 
were moments that they could plan and execute a revolt. With this order it appeared that the 
governor understood the total ban on dances in 1782 caused resentment among the Tongva. Yet 
he worried that leaving them unobserved opened the door to revolt. The governor sought to 
maintain a delicate balance.274 Fages’ experience on the front line taught him to plan for Indian 
uprisings and try to understand the root cause behind them, though he was not always successful. 
Lasuén lacked that experience and worked only to better the Franciscan position, even if that 
meant arming some baptized California Indians and teaching them to ride horses.  
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Neve’s reglamento Repealed 
 In the summer of 1787, the Royal Audiencia requested that Lasuén respond to the 
memorandum Governor Fages sent them in 1785 regarding his five complaints about Franciscan 
leadership in California. Lasuén used the opportunity to address his specific concerns.275 
Throughout the final years of the 1780s, two issues became a point of major contention between 
the civil government and the Franciscan missionaries. The first was that of armed and mounted 
baptized California Indians. Because Fages included this topic in his five complaints, Lasuén had 
a forum to share the Franciscan view on the matter. Lasuén noted that each mission relied upon 
mounted horsemen to drive and look after their cattle and sheep herds. There were not enough 
colonists who could take this responsibility away from baptized California Indians. Fages heard 
this argument earlier in the summer and attempted to ban the practice, based on his encounters 
with Apaches. He also charged that some missionaries taught Indians the arts of riding “to 
excess.”276 Lasuén reminded Fages that the king ordered the missions to breed herds of cattle and 
that horsemen were therefore necessary. Furthermore, Lasuén continued, it was Fages and Neve 
that limited the military’s assistance to the missionaries. If training baptized California Indians to 
ride horses was an excess, as Fages had put it, that excess was the responsibility of the last two 
governors. Anticipating another potential complaint from Fages, Lasuén admitted that some of 
the baptized caballeros may have carried sharp weapons (only to carry out specific harvesting 
tasks), but again, if the military provided more escorts, the missionaries would not need to rely 
on them.277 With the memory of the Audiencia’s warning the year before hanging over him, to 
avoid friction with the missionaries, Fages relented and apologized for being overzealous.278 
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When Lasuén addressed the Audiencia in September regarding Fages’ five complaints, he 
already knew the governor had backed off the issue of mounted mission Indians.  
 Having dealt with the bulk of Fages’ 1785 complaints, Lasuén turned to the second major 
issue, that of missionaries boarding ships to return to Mexico without notifying civil authorities. 
Lasuén, once himself eager to leave California and return to the College of San Fernando in 
Mexico City, held strong opinions regarding this subject. Both he and Palóu claimed this policy 
was beyond the powers of the provincial governor. Lasuén cited precedent going back to the 
beginning of the Franciscans’ time in Alta California. He noted that during Neve’s time as 
governor, missionaries could leave the province if the father president or the father guardian at 
the college allowed it. When Fray Juan Riobó asked to retire, Fages informed Lasuén that the 
missionaries simply needed a replacement, and the priest could depart. Only after Bernardo de 
Gálvez became the viceroy of New Spain was there a policy prohibiting missionaries from 
leaving, or entering, California without his permission.279  
As Lasuén questioned the viceroy’s decree, he argued that few missionaries would 
volunteer to serve in California if they understood the conditions in the province. Lasuén’s claim 
illuminated the wide gulf in religious zeal that existed between the new generation of 
Franciscans and Serra’s cohort. “There is no religious who makes up his mind to depart from his 
college for a destination like this,” Lasuén declared, “who does not experience deep misgivings, 
and there is nothing which can overcome them more effectively than the assurance that it would 
be possible to return, should climate or occupation prove unsuitable.”280 This was an astonishing 
admission coming from any missionary, but particularly from a Franciscan. The order was 
founded upon the principal that intense hardship and suffering was the path to a Christ-like life. 
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Franciscans often welcomed martyrdom while evangelizing.281 Lasuén’s defense of a 
missionary’s right to opt out of service because they did not enjoy California revealed much 
about him and the dramatic change that occurred in the Franciscan order after the 1749 
secularization decree and other mid-century anti-missionary policies. Finally, he suggested that 
sending more missionaries to California would solve any problems that arose if one chose to 
depart. If this was the case, then Gálvez’s decree “and our well-merited convenience could be 
secured at one and the same time.”282 
In late summer, 1787, Mexico City gave its ruling on Fages’ complaints. Just after his 
defense against Fages’ charges, Lasuén received positive news from Fray Palóu at the College of 
San Fernando. He wrote to tell Lasuén that King Carlos III repealed most of Neve’s regulations 
for the missionaries because they were “unjust.”283 First among the rulings was that the 
missionaries would continue to staff the missions in pairs. Additionally, the fathers “have no 
obligation to go and celebrate holy Mass at the presidio,” though he encouraged them to 
celebrate it there “when they found it convenient.”284 With something resembling glee, Palóu 
also informed Lasuén that Fages, as the chief defender of Neve’s policy and the governor who 
brought murder charges against de la Peña, suffered a sharp rebuke. “They tell me that he will 
see how to behave himself,” he quipped, “and that at the least complaint of the Fathers he will be 
deprived of his office and honors.”285 With one ruling from the crown, the work of two 
governors to constrain missionary power in California, which was carried out in the spirit of 
Bourbon Reforms, came to a halt. 
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Fages’ five complaints to the Audiencia remain significant because they are at the core of 
the dispute between the civil government and the Franciscans in California, and the issues 
enumerated only intensified as time passed. The Franciscans’ haughtiness regarding Mass at the 
presidios, control of the mission temporalities, the treatment of and relations with California 
Indian people, refusal to produce mission inventories, and the missionaries’ right to retire were a 
constant source of tension between the church and the military throughout California’s mission 
period. They were the symptoms of Spain’s ambivalent colonial policy in one of its most remote 
outposts. The Bourbons took the Spanish throne, and over the course of a century, worked to 
reduce the power and influence of the mendicant orders within the Americas. Yet, when Russian 
encroachment threatened the Spanish Pacific in the 1760s, the crown turned to one of those 
orders, whose numbers and commitment had dwindled, to secure their territorial claim of North 
America’s western shore. And though the Spanish monarchs had, on paper, long ago turned 
away from military conquest as the sole means of expanding their empire, their experience along 
the northern frontier mandated the military’s necessity in California. This coupling 
unintentionally created a contest for jurisdiction between the two groups. Franciscans controlled 
baptized California Indians and the mission temporalities while civil government managed 
commerce, colonists, and soldiers. However, in California, particularly before 1780, there was 
little more Spanish infrastructure than the Franciscan missions. Early governors like Neve and 
Fages, buttressed by Spain and Mexico City’s coolness towards missionary power, acted as 
though it was their duty to curb missionary autonomy. The Franciscans in turn resented what 
they considered the military meddling in their affairs. Because there was no clear direction or 
chain of command in California, the two institutions clashed over authority. The longer the 
situation festered, the more hostility and resentment grew between them.  
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Fages After the Nullification 
Lasuén thought he and his missionaries were free of Fages’ obstructions, and attempted 
to go on the offensive, only to find the governor unchanged. Embedded within the crown’s ruling 
was the notion that provincial governor must give all necessary assistance to the missionaries in 
carrying out their duty of converting California Indian people to Catholicism. Lasuén imagined 
that this vague clause could force the presidio to acquiesce to Franciscan demands for armed 
escorts. When Fages continued denying the father president’s request, Lasuén reminded him 
“courteously and by word of mouth,” of his obligations, he later reported to Palóu.286 The 
governor responded that the crown gave him secret orders to continue with his escort policy and 
that Lasuén was the first person to inform him otherwise. Fages’ behavior incensed Lasuén. He 
complained to Palóu that “Don Pedro Fages will always do what he pleases with us, and that no 
matter the concessions we get…they will carry no weight with him.”287 Fages’ position regarding 
armed escorts went further. From the lieutenant at San Francisco presidio, Lasuén learned that 
the governor ordered his men to bring baptized California Indians who had fled the mission back 
to the presidio to work, rather than returning them to Franciscans. If this policy held, “they will 
become as wild as before, with the same lack of instruction as in the forest,” he warned Palóu.288  
Despite being ordered to avoid conflicts with the Franciscans, Fages continued pressing 
them on security and relations with Indians. Two new problems concerned Fages. One was the 
practice of transferring baptized California Indians from one mission to the next as a means of 
punishment. Invariably, the exiled man or woman’s family abandoned their homes and followed 
them to their place of banishment.289 Aside from being an inconvenience, it was the sort of 
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behavior that not only bred resentment, but also spread discontent. The second problem was the 
missionaries locking up baptized California Indians for more than ten days, whether at the 
mission or the presidio.290  Fages did not want the missionaries to have the power to confer 
sentences of that length. Though it angered Lasuén, this mandate resonated with much of Fages’ 
previous decisions. He continued to shape a policy that strove for stability and security, even 
when it meant risking his rank and privileges.  
In early August 1788, just a month after the leaders of the military and missionaries 
squabbled over the king’s decree, another serious charge of abuse against the Franciscans 
emerged. It came from the commander of the presidio at San Diego, José de Zúñiga. He revealed 
to Fages that the Franciscans at that mission, Frays Hilario Torrent and Juan Mariner, forced 
baptized California Indians to labor far past the point of fatigue, and sometimes for no 
discernable reason. Zúñiga also reported that the missionaries punished them using “very hard” 
lashings.291 When he had two Indians accused of stealing cattle moved from the mission to the 
presidio, the missionaries became enraged with the soldier, who acted on Fages’ wishes. Usually 
somewhat cordial in his communication with Lasuén, the governor told the father president 
exactly why he had the men relocated. Perhaps their bickering over armed escorts in July still 
angered him, or perhaps it was Lasuén’s smug demeanor after the king’s decree negating Neve’s 
reglamento. Fages leveled a withering attack at Lasuén. “It was to prevent you from intervening 
with your authority as to avoid these abuses,” he seethed, “and from demanding that the said 
padres interfere with the investigation.”292 Fages directly confronted Lasuén’s tendency for 
unconditionally defending missionaries’ behaviors and for tampering with investigations.  
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In his response to Fages, Lasuén addressed the issues plaguing military-missionary 
relations, along with those specific to San Diego. He rationalized the missionaries’ anger at 
having the Indian prisoners moved. They were only disrespectful because they felt ignored by 
the soldiers. It was yet another example of Lasuén protecting the good name of the missionaries. 
The Franciscans asked the soldiers to break a direct command, and then berated them when they 
refused. Yet, to him, the missionaries were the aggrieved parties. Regarding the movement of 
Indians accused of wrongdoing between the mission and the presidio, Lasuén reminded the 
governor of the 1773 ruling that made the “management, control, discipline, and education” of 
the Indians the sole purview of the Franciscans.293 The military should only involve themselves 
in the punishment of Indian converts when they were charged with major crimes. This sentiment 
also applied to the soldiers’ complaints regarding excessive floggings. Lasuén informed Fages 
that he and his missionaries never issued a more severe punishment than “keeping them under 
instruction for long periods each day when they are being prepared to become Christians.”294 The 
entire tenor of Lasuén’s response emphasized that he was prepared to be as obstinate and aloof as 
Fages had become with him. All the controversies of the last year, recapturing runaways, armed 
escorts for the missionaries, abuse of the Indians, were simple cases of Fages overstepping his 
jurisdiction, according to Lasuén. Their ability to collaborate as the two most influential Spanish 
officials in California had completely eroded.  
Lasuén’s response served its purpose, as Fages admitted defeat and issued a warning to 
Zúñiga to respect the missionaries at San Diego. His note was brief, but it demonstrated Fages’ 
repositioning after a series of defeats and Lasuén’s newfound confidence. The governor ordered 
Zúñiga not to “get mixed up with the padres in their handling of the Indians.” If he had to make a 
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complaint regarding abuses at the mission, the commander must be sure it was serious, and from 
a reliable source. Complaints could go both ways, Fages reminded the soldier, as Lasuén had 
marked Zúñiga as obstinate and unhelpful to the spiritual conquest. The commander needed to 
stop complaining about accompanying the missionaries when they went to rancherías to hear 
confessions, and the soldiers should not tell the missionaries when it was time to return. Mexico 
City did not approve of these actions and threatened serious measures if they continued.295 After 
writing the presidio commander, Fages, looking to avoid said measures, informed Lasuén that he 
had admonished Zúñiga.296 For now it seemed, the Franciscans had full control of baptized 
California Indians.  
 The rhetorical battles between Fages and Lasuén were more than petty cases of political 
intrigue in the furthest reaches of the Spanish Empire. They were indicative of a new phase of 
the California mission project. These contests were, in one sense, as old as the empire itself, and 
in another, represented the changing perspectives brought by the European Enlightenment.297 
The conversion, management, and relationships with Indigenous Americans had been debated 
since the mid-sixteenth century. Scores of kings, jurists, missionaries, bishops, nuns, and soldiers 
fought over the place that Indigenous people held under Spain occupation. A dynastic shift from 
the Hapsburgs to the Bourbons brought a modernizing impulse to the empire, and a focus on 
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limiting the power of the mendicant orders in the Americas. Missionaries became too expensive, 
too rooted in a medieval past, and too autonomous to justify. As demonstrated throughout this 
chapter, imperial Spain, after centuries of colonial domination, still did not have a coherent 
policy for Spanish-Indigenous relations, and in a land thousands of miles from the imperial 
capital, the effects of that unfocused policy became apparent.  
Spain’s desire to control California and keep it from the Russians led to a series of 
increasingly untenable outcomes. King Carlos III’s Inspector General José de Gálvez ordered the 
invasion of Alta California, and rather than attempting creative innovation, he relied on a 
missionary order whose decline the crown had intentionally set in motion twenty years earlier. 
The royal government was fortunate that in 1769 there were still missionaries capable of carrying 
out their colonial designs at the College of San Fernando, like Serra, Crespí, and Palóu, who 
craved a difficult life on the edge of Christendom. By the end of Fages’ tenure, those fortunes 
were about to shift. With the struggle for control of the province ended, for a time, in favor of the 
Franciscans, the expansion envisioned by Serra and craved by Mexico City could finally begin. 
Franciscans founded two new missions, Mission Santa Cruz, and Nuestra Señora de la Soledad, 
both in 1791. New priests arrived more frequently in California. All of them came through the 
College of San Fernando after the policies of secularization reduced their numbers, and as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, also reduced their abilities and commitment to life in California. 
The Franciscan victory over Neve was pyrrhic. The decline of the order had already begun, and it 
started at the source. The College of San Fernando now trained priests who would cause 
significant problems for Lasuén, the civil administrators, and California’s Indigenous peoples 
attempting to find their way in this ever-transforming world. 
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Rubí, Gilí, and the Padres Descontentos Come to California, 1790-1794 
 By 1790, following Mexico City’s nullification of Felipe de Neve ’s 1781 reglamento, 
the Franciscans had a period of autonomy and resumed cooperation with the imperial 
government’s desire to found new missions in California.298 From Seville’s perspective, Spain’s 
hold on North America’s west coast grew increasingly tenuous. Imperial Russia was moving into 
the Pacific Northwest, but they were no longer the only threat. In 1786, the French navigator 
Jean François de La Pérouse’s journey around the world brought him to Monterey where he met 
California Indians, missionaries, and the military before continuing his voyage. Englishman 
George Vancouver’s appearance several years later in 1791 only reinforced Spain’s anxiety, 
when he landed in Chumash territory and visited Mission San Buenaventura.299  While Seville 
and Mexico City might have preferred sending the military to fortify the remote province, they 
still had too few troops in reserve to do so.300 The colonial government admitted as much when 
they put a halt to attempted clerical reforms in California and reaffirmed their commitment to 
both Franciscan institutional supremacy and the spiritual conquest.  
 In response to imperial anxieties, the Franciscans founded three new missions in central 
and Northern California, creating heightened expectations and new staffing problems for the 
Apostolic College of San Fernando. In December of 1788, they founded the third mission in the 
Santa Barbara Channel region, and the fourth in Chumash territory, La Purísima Concepción.301 
In August 1791, Mission Santa Cruz began operations on the north shore of Monterey Bay, the 
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third mission in Ohlone territory. Mission Nuestra Señora de la Soledad followed two months 
later in October. Soledad was the furthest inland mission to date, founded near the confluence of 
traditional Esselen and Salinan peoples’ homelands, as Spain attempted to deepen its influence 
among California’s Indigenous people.302 This fairly rapid expansion strained the Franciscans’ 
limited resources and manpower. The new establishments required at least six additional 
missionaries and half that number in supernumeraries if they were to run effectively. While not 
appearing onerous, filling the new openings while also replacing the priests in California of 
retirement age proved a significant challenge to the College of San Fernando. The order 
struggled to find capable missionaries in Spain after decades of secular reforms and limitations 
decreased the numbers of their recruits. Several of the new missionaries, known at the College of 
San Fernando as the padres descontentos, sent to California during the period of 1791 through 
1795, were among the least capable to work in the region.303 They caused scandals for Lasuén, 
abandoned their posts, fought with one another verbally and threatened each other with physical 
violence. Two of them, Frays Manuel Fernández and Antonio Dantí, represented real danger for 
California Indians both within and beyond the mission, and the soldiers who faced the danger 
Franciscan hubris created. Following Fages’ retirement in 1791, two ineffectual governors 
served through this same period, causing Franciscan leaders to handle these crises internally, 
with varying degrees of success. By late 1794, Lasuén purged some of the troublemaking priests 
from the system, yet the problems they caused and the tensions within the order these men 
represented revealed the decline of Franciscan leadership in California and at the College of San 
Fernando during the critical expansion phase.  
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 The period of missionary autonomy also reduced the opportunities for California Indians 
to use tensions between the military and missionaries to their advantage, like the Chumash did 
before them. Yanonali, the powerful Chumash chief near Santa Barbara, had successfully 
negotiated with Governor Neve to keep some physical and spiritual independence for his people 
in return for helping to construct that mission. But after Fages’ last unsuccessful bid to report 
physical abuse occurring at Mission San Diego resulted in a gag order, Indigenous Californians’ 
leverage against missionary authority diminished. The addition of two new missions among 
people already under heavy pressure to accept Christianization caused immediate animosity, 
which led to an attack on the newly established Mission Santa Cruz. Spanish policies during this 
period demonstrated little ingenuity and emboldened Franciscans against the strenuous 
objections voiced by nearly every governor that served in the province. Spanish policy also 
increased the resistance of Indigenous Californians against their Spanish invaders.  
Ohlone Relations with the Spanish Military  
 One of Fages’ last actions as governor demonstrated the importance of negotiating with 
the military for California Indians, in this case, Ohlone peoples. In 1789, Ohlone people living in 
the Santa Clara Valley gained several concessions from Fages, using his fear of instability and 
potential violence to their advantage. Ohlone leadership ensured Spanish townspeople in San 
José could not employ men and women without permission. This stopped Spaniards from 
overworking Ohlone laborers and ensured that they paid workers the promised amount. Tribal 
leaders also secured a promise from Fages barring Spanish employers from offering advanced 
loans to Ohlone people, removing the possibility of debt peonage. These agreements between 
tribal leaders and Spanish military officials allowed for a rare instance of positive exchange 
between the two groups. For a time, Ohlone men and women traded their labor of their own 
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accord for Spanish goods and learned new skills outside of Franciscan influence. The 
arrangement worked for both groups. Fages did not need to ask the missionaries for laborers, and 
the Ohlone benefited materially without converting to Catholicism.304 
 In 1790, Fages’ plans to modernize the Monterey presidio provided further opportunity 
for Ohlone people to enter into this arrangement. Leaders of several tribes around San José 
negotiated successful terms with the governor. They possessed the skills necessary for his project 
and spoke Spanish. Fages dictated the size of the work crews and their compensation. But 
Ohlone leaders demanded protection while they traveled between San José and Monterey, a 
space where some of their rivals lived. They similarly sought protection for the women and 
children left behind in San José while they worked in Monterey. Ohlone laborers also negotiated 
for meals as well as rest days. The arrangement worked so well that the men told Fages that they 
would work for him again in the future.305 Fages took this relationship seriously and castigated 
his men if they broke its terms. For example, the commissioner of the Pueblo of San José, 
Macario Castro, raided a traditional dance in a village outside of town to capture workers. The 
governor was incensed. He wrote to Castro, “This incident with these pitiful Indians has been an 
unwelcome cause of grief to me, this going to surprise them at their dance. . .in no way did I 
desire these outrages, and much less than when they are at their fiestas.”306 Fages’ anger slowed 
military attempts to compel Ohlone people to work for several years.  
 The cooperation between Ohlone peoples and Spanish soldiers continued through the 
early years of Mission Santa Cruz. When the Spanish scouted for an appropriate mission site, 
they paid respects to local tribes and their leaders, such as Suquel of the Uypi people. Suquel’s 
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two daughters had already received baptism, which fostered peaceful relations between the two 
groups. Because Lieutenant-colonel Hermenegildo Sal, who led the search, shared Fages’ 
anxiety over the strength and numbers of the people around the proposed mission site, he acted 
within the cultural expectations of Suquel and his people. The meeting went so well that Suquel 
and his wife promised to receive baptisms themselves and the leader gave his blessing to the 
construction of Mission Santa Cruz.307 
 Spanish regulations for conduct and trade with the people living near Mission Santa Cruz 
revealed the military’s awareness that they did not hold the balance of power in their relationship 
with Ohlone. Sal’s caution represented the legacy of Neve and Fages’ concern that Indigenous 
power could undo the colonial project in California if soldiers and colonists antagonized local 
residents. Sal ordered his men to treat the Ohlone well, but to be ready for surprise attacks. If 
fighting did break out, he ordered his soldiers to immediately cease hostilities if belligerent 
Indians requested a truce. Sal wanted no retributive violence that could lead to vendettas. 
Furthermore, he ordered his men to stay away from Ohlone villages and promised to punish to 
those who disobeyed. Sal’s orders at Santa Cruz represented a continuation of the policies 
enacted in Fages’ codes of conduct for Los Angeles and San José. The older generation of 
Spanish soldiers understood that they were profoundly outnumbered in this territory and should 
conduct themselves in a matter befitting their position.308 
 Positive relations between the military and Ohlone people during Mission Santa Cruz’s 
founding demonstrated the possibilities of cooperation and coexistence when Spaniards 
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respected Indigenous peoples.309 These negotiations reflected the military’s ideology that towns 
and business offered a better path to assimilating California Indians into Spanish society. The 
Ohlone used the military and their projects as a means to learn new skills and acquire trade 
goods. Their leadership used the threat of overwhelming numbers to gain concessions and 
autonomy that were not available within the Franciscan missions. Mission Indians could work at 
the presidio, although the priests deeply resented it. The missionaries also blocked baptized 
California Indians from working for the townsfolk. They argued that the soldiers and colonists 
negatively influenced the converts, allowing them to engage in non-Christian activities. While 
some Spanish soldiers did take advantage of Indigenous men and women, these labor 
arrangements challenged the Franciscan notion of the monolithic Spanish soldier bent on 
exploiting Indigenous Californians.  
 During the summer of 1790, a change in Spanish policy facilitated the movement of 
baptized Indians in and around the missions and illustrated how some California Indians used the 
military to counter Franciscan domination. Initiated by the Commander General of the Interior 
Provinces of New Spain, Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, the royal decree demanded that civil and 
religious authorities ease existing restrictions on California Indians’ freedom of movement, and 
thus opportunity, across most of New Spain’s northern reaches.310 This new law affected Fages’ 
building plans by allowing mission Indians to travel to work sites. Lasuén supported the move as 
it pertained to non-Christian Indians, but vehemently opposed it for mission Indians. He declared 
that limiting the movement of baptized Indians ensured the success of the spiritual conquest. 
Before coming to the missions, Lasuén asserted that California Indians existed “scattered 
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throughout the hills and beaches like animals, or. . .in a society far from civilized and scarcely 
human.”311 Lasuén believed constraining freedom was the chief mechanism in breaking baptized 
Indians’ connection to their homeland and desire to see their families and that “the type of liberty 
we are speaking of is either directly opposed to this essential undertaking, or destroys it,” he 
wrote to the commander general.312 In a letter to Ugarte y Loyola, Lasuén explained, “It is not 
my understanding that our Indians can be transferred either to the presidio or to the pueblos for 
in neither the one nor the other is there a resident priest. Instruction will not be given there; they 
will forget what they have learned.”313 One concession the missionaries made was sending 
converts to missions closer to their homes if a new establishment was founded there, for 
example, transferring some Chumash people from Mission Santa Barbara to La Purísima after it 
opened. Lasuén informed Ugarte y Loyola that the Franciscans would attempt to follow the law, 
but only if potential transfers did not cause great inconvenience and only “insofar as it agrees 
with our Indian’s way of thinking.”314 Lasuén refused to abide by the new law directly 
challenged civil authority. He followed with a secret memo to the California missionaries asking 
them not to protest the new law, but to refuse any outsider’s transfer requests without his 
permission. Lasuén then promised to fully support them if they chose to block a transfer.315 
By early 1790, the constant struggles against the Franciscans in California became a 
series of defeats for Pedro Fages, and the governor prepared for retirement. He wanted to leave 
the Americas and return to Spain. In May of that year, the new viceroy, the second Count of 
Revillagegido, Juan Vicente de Güemes Padilla Horcasitas y Aguayo, accepted Fages’ 
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resignation. In preparing to leave the province in which he had spent so much time, he composed 
instructions for his successor, José Antonio Roméu, as Neve had for him. In fact, much of what 
Fages wrote to Roméu mirrored Neve’s earlier instructions to Fages. It was his last attempt at 
continuing Neve’s work to stabilize relations with Indigenous Californians. Fages reiterated that 
sending soldiers after runaway baptized California Indians should only occur when all other 
means of recapture, such as using gifts and kindness, had failed. And though the missionaries 
would complain, Roméu was not to allow armed escorts to stay with them away from the 
mission overnight and escorts should be limited even during the day. Fages repeated to Roméu 
what he told Lasuén: there were secret orders from the king that supported these measures. 
Similarly, mail carriers needed armed escorts but were to avoid conflict with unbaptized 
California Indians, as they deserved humane treatment. In a second letter to Roméu, he went into 
detail about the missionaries in Baja and Alta California. Fages praised the Dominicans in Baja 
but warned that the Franciscans in Alta California constantly quarreled with the government and 
wanted total autonomy. As an example, Fages suggested that the priests in San Francisco and 
Santa Clara were creating their own establishments away from the missions and should be 
watched. Additionally, some baptized California Indians were becoming skilled horsemen under 
Franciscan tutelage and had developed an “Apache insolence.”316 With that message, he left 
control of the military and civil government to his successor.  
  Pedro Fages was an embodiment of the contradictions and violence inherent in the 
invasion and subsequent colonization of California. He was a colonial to the core and spent his 
adult life serving Spain in the attempted conquest of what is now the American Southwest. He 
was an Indian fighter who felt that dispossessing the “heathens” or “gentiles” as the Spanish 
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termed unbaptized California Indians, was a noble, if not a natural, aim. As governor, he raped a 
young Indian girl in his family home while residing in California’s capital of Monterey, while 
charging his own soldiers with sexual assault against Indian women.317 Despite all of this, he 
appeared earnest in his desire to protect California mission Indians from abuse at the hands of the 
missionaries.318 Fages admonished the soldiers under his command to treat those same Indians 
with kindness. He dutifully followed Neve’s policies and put his professional reputation on the 
line to enforce them.  He believed in not pushing California Indian people towards open conflict. 
Fages worked to avoid bloodshed in California, having seen its results time and again on New 
Spain’s northern frontier. 
 In November 1792, Lasuén again chafed at secular authorities meddling by creating new 
opportunities for baptized Indians to learn skills applicable in the towns or presidios. Eight 
Spanish workers came to California from Mexico to teach Indigenous men masonry, 
stonecutting, construction, tanning, blacksmithing, and cobbling, among other skills. Lasuén 
followed the orders issued by commander at San Francisco’s presidio, José Argüello, and 
assigned five of the workers to Missions Santa Clara, San Carmelo, and San Francisco, but not 
without complaint. Several days later, he wrote the interim governor, José de Arrillaga, to air his 
anxieties. Three tailors were part of the contingent, which perplexed Lasuén as the Indians made 
their own clothes at the missions and only wore a small range of garments. This was also true for 
the soldiers at the presidio. Lasuén wrote the governor that he preferred the soldiers made their 
own clothes rather than sending Indians to the presidio. “For there is no priest there,” he wrote, 
“and because the soldiers. . .use them for work around the house.”319 Furthermore, he argued that 
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no market existed for a tailor’s products or services because of the small number of Spaniards in 
California. Thus, Lasuén saw no point in teaching the Indians tailoring skills that “they would 
quickly forget through lack of practice.”320 Lasuén found the tailors useless, felt their presence 
drained resources, and believed that their presumed idleness was a negative influence. Lasuén 
had learned from Serra to be wary of secular teachers interacting with baptized California 
Indians. Franciscans allowed interactions with soldiers, despite it being distasteful and often 
problematic, as they were sometimes necessary in cases of baptized Indians accused of 
committing violent crimes. However, the missionaries saw little to gain from townspeople 
mingling with baptized Indians. Now, workers from Mexico, with whom the missionaries had no 
experience, opened new possibilities for California Indian people to backslide into paganism. 
Lasuén concluded by reminding the governor “not only are they acquiring training they are not 
supposed to, but they lose the greater part of what they had acquired in religion.”321 Despite his 
protests, Lasuén lost this battle to Mexico City’s desire for California’s economic self-
sufficiency.  
 The controversy over mission Indians’ freedom of movement and control of their own 
labor demonstrated how Indigenous people counterintuitively experienced more agency with the 
military than with Franciscans missionaries. Since the time of Serra, the Franciscans loathed the 
military’s desire to use Indian labor for its own ends.322 Outwardly, they denounced soldiers as 
bad influences who undid spiritual progress achieved at the missions. Once Neve founded towns, 
Franciscans added the settlers to their list of undesirables. Inwardly, Lasuén knew that many 
baptized Indians never wholly embraced the Catholic faith and would gladly free themselves 
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from the fetters of Christian life if given the opportunity. Founding new missions put Lasuén in a 
difficult position. New establishments required labor, more than the small Spanish population 
could provide. However, building projects using Indians who did not know much Spanish and 
did not possess the skills needed for building proved difficult and slowed progress. Fages had 
wanted access to relatively skilled workers to expedite construction and renovation. Thus, 
Indigenous men and women who wanted to leave the missions found an outlet that fostered 
autonomy and access to both new skills and trade goods. Though this relationship provided good 
results in Ohlone and Chumash territories these opportunities diminished after Fages retired in 
1790.323 
Although founding the new mission at Santa Cruz allowed for a brief period of positive 
relations between Natives and Spaniards, staffing the three new missions presented a host of new 
problems. Just as the mission system expanded in California, the strain of nearly a half-century 
of weakening missionary power in the Americas brought younger, less capable missionaries to 
the province, ushering in a period of turmoil that hastened the decline of the Franciscan order in 
Mexico and California.  
The Padres Descontentos in Mexico City and California 
In 1790 and 1791, four new missionaries arrived in California. Three of them typified the 
systemic issues emanating from the Spanish crown’s mid-century anti-missionary policies. On 
August 2, 1790, Antonio Dantí and Mariano Rubí landed in Monterey.324 Several months later 
another much-needed influx of missionaries came to the province, including Bartolomé Gilí.325 
Frays Dantí, Rubí, and Gilí all earned infamous reputations while in California. Of the three, 
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Dantí became the most dangerous to California’s Indigenous peoples. However, Rubí and Gilí’s 
placement at San Antonio and Soledad demonstrated the decline in missionary leadership and 
character that ultimately led to a California mission system far more dangerous for baptized 
California Indians in the mid-1790s.  
 Mariano Rubí and Bartolomé Gilí arrived in New Spain in 1786 and 1788 respectively, 
nearly forty years after the crown placed limits on both the number of acolytes the mendicant 
orders could recruit and the age that those entering could take their vows.326 Like Junípero Serra, 
both men were born on the island of Mallorca in Spain and joined the Franciscan brotherhood 
before their eighteenth birthdays.327 Little is known of the pair before they came to New Spain, 
but nothing indicated the problematic behavior or the rebelliousness that they evidenced upon 
their arrival at the College of San Fernando. While their earliest months in Mexico City are also 
obscured, something about the institution or the realities of missionary life caused them to 
reportedly engage in behaviors that ranged from peculiar to disturbing.  
 Both Rubí and Gilí became a part of the group at the college known as the “padres 
descontentos.”328 These seven missionaries chafed at the college’s condition and its policy on 
mission temporalities. Missionary control of temporalities caused both an ongoing internal 
debate within the Franciscan order and between church and state within New Spain.329 This 
evidenced the crown’s desire to constrain and minimize missionary power, but civil 
administrators remained quiet about temporalities. The closest thing to a decision for California 
was Inspector General José de Gálvez’s overruling of Governor Gaspar de Portolá’s decision in 
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Baja California to hand control of mission temporalities over to civil administrators after the  
Jesuits’ 1767 expulsion.330 New Spain’s former Viceroy, Martín de Mayorga, also wanted to 
relieve the missionaries from their temporal powers in the early 1780s.331 Though the crown 
made no direct ruling, imperial officials favored missionary management of all mission spheres. 
However, control over a mission’s material products was an issue that Franciscans debated 
internally since the beginning of their time in New Spain in 1524.  
 The first Franciscans that came to proselytize in the Americas, the so-called Twelve 
Apostles, brought the temporalities debate with them. It continued in various forms through the 
arrival of the padres desconentos in the late eighteenth century. The Twelve Apostles 
represented a reformist, millenarian branch of the order that sought a return to the “primitive” 
state of St. Francis himself, who sought to recreate the life of Jesus Christ. The Observants took 
their vows of poverty literally, as opposed to the Conventuals, who believed that property and 
some accumulation were necessary to increase the scope of their evangelical goals.332 The 
Twelve Apostles sought a double conversion in the Americas, both for Indians, and of their 
missionary brethren, whom they hoped to return to a fundamentalist, medieval worldview that 
accepted the poverty envisioned by St. Francis.333 Though the Observants failed to reinstitute the 
virtue of poverty in their peers, the debate over temporalities and wealth continued due to the 
behavior of Franciscans in New Spain and Peru.  
In the mid-eighteenth century, the Spanish crown became wary of Franciscans amassing 
too much wealth and autonomy after receiving disturbing reports of missionaries acting outside 
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the norms of religious behavior. In 1735, Ferdinand VI dispatched Spanish naval officers Jorge 
Juan and Antonio de Ulloa to secretly monitor Franciscan behavior. The men uncovered a series 
of scandals in Peru, where Franciscans had accumulated both wealth and power. One group of 
missionaries had enacted a system of spiritual debt peonage on saints’ days, charging Indians for 
saying mass, conducting sermons, and for the materials necessary for religious festivals.334 Some 
Franciscans were so well off that in Peruvian cities, they kept houses for their concubines and 
did not live at the monastery. “In large cities,” Juan and Ulloa reported, “monasteries serve only 
those [priests] who have no possible way to maintain a house.”335 These scandals spurred the 
1749 secularization decree and the crown’s policies reducing both the influence and numbers of 
missionaries in the Americas. Now at the College of San Fernando in the 1780s, the padres 
descontentos’ alternate designation, temporalistas, represented a new challenge to Franciscan 
control of wealth produced at the missions. Rubí and Gilí’s actions at the college and in 
California illustrated the bitterness of the struggle. 
In the late 1780s, veteran Franciscans at the College of San Fernando in Mexico City 
were uninterested in debating control of temporalities with newcomers. Leadership at the college 
argued that strict adherence to poverty was an extremist position that infected a younger 
generation of recruits from Spain. The college’s leader, or father guardian, Tomás Pangua argued 
that their recruitment of new missionaries needed to filter out possible malcontents before they 
arrived in Mexico. He wrote to Lasuén in California, describing the situation at the college, 
“some have become discontented and scrupulous over the smallest details, convincing 
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themselves that the management of the temporalities is against the first of our rules.”336 Pangua 
complained that he desired a better group of missionaries, “not like those of the new system of 
temporalities who balk at swallowing a mosquito, then turn around and gulp down elephants.”337 
Finally, he asked Lasuén to remain vigilant against anti-temporalities sentiments spreading in 
California. “Your reverence will endeavor” to “make them see the fatal consequence of their 
opinion,” he ordered, “and that far from being opposed to our religious state, the management of 
temporalities for the Indians is very acceptable to God.”338 While the father guardian believed he 
knew what God would accept, the debate over temporalities tore at the fabric of the college and 
California missions. 
 In April 1788, all seven of the new recruits known as the padres descontentos, including 
Rubí and Gilí, suddenly petitioned leadership at San Fernando for transfer to the Franciscan 
Apostolic College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro in Michoacán, Mexico. Though they were 
dissatisfied with conditions at San Fernando and the college’s stance on mission temporalities, 
they claimed ill health due to living in Mexico City. Three of the friars, Pedro Pinedo, Antonio 
Seguí, and Martín de Landaeta, who eventually went to California, secretly fled to the College of 
Santa Cruz, angering San Fernando’s leadership. Though Rubí and Gilí did not abandon San 
Fernando like their peers, Gilí drew ire for leveling complaints against the college in his petition 
to transfer. Aside from his poor health, he wrote that he experienced depression and frustration at 
not yet receiving assignment to a missionary field after two years in Mexico City. If San 
Fernando refused to assign him to a mission, perhaps the leadership in Santa Cruz would.339 Gilí 
never found out, because in June, the viceroy refused all seven petitioners and ordered the three 
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who ran away to Santa Cruz back to San Fernando. The college was not yet rid of its group of 
agitators, and over the coming two years, Rubí and Gilí’s behaviors became much more 
disruptive.  
 The leadership at San Fernando, both the advisory council known as the discretos and 
Father Guardian Pangua, wrote to the viceroy to discredit and expose the two “sons of darkness,” 
as Pangua called Rubí and Gilí.340 Pangua informed the viceroy that Rubí and Gilí “manifested 
repugnance at the regular life” at the college.341 He wrote that both men were malingerers and 
actually suffered from no illness. In his mind, because the duo found “no other excuse for 
withdrawing from the religious exercises, they took advantage of the charity with which our 
infirmary treats the sick.”342 Moreover, they engaged in disruptive activities. According to 
Pangua’s letter, they loosened bolts on storeroom doors to steal items, such as chocolate. They 
also stole balls that their fellows used during recreational periods. One or both men then rolled 
the balls up and down the floors of the missionaries’ dormitories “at unseemly hours of the 
night,” Pangua revealed.343 The two even took kettles back to their quarters to play like drums. 
But Rubí and Gilí did not stop at school-boy pranks. Pangua informed the viceroy that the duo 
refused to participate in religious life by failing to meditate or attend choir. And when they did 
attend Mass, they behaved like rowdy children according to their peers. Worst of all though, 
Pangua reported, much like the Franciscans in Peru in the 1740s, at night Rubí and Gilí “scaled 
the walls of the college and went out, likely not for any virtuous deed.”344 The father guardian 
wanted the men exiled back to Spain, not rewarded with a transfer to another college.  
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Leadership at San Fernando implored the viceroy to ignore the duo’s complaints and to 
refuse any future requests for a transfer. If the viceroy granted their request, “others will want to 
follow [their] example,” he admitted, “This would open the door for everyone else to leave.”345 
The discretos also warned: “If this religious [Rubí] is granted his petition, others will want to 
follow his example…the Colegio would be left without ministers and the King's goals would be 
hindered.”346 Pangua’s and the discreto’s pleas to the viceroy revealed an anxiety embedded in 
their condemnation of the padres descontentos. The father guardian asserted that personal flaws 
in Rubí and Gilí were to blame for their outlandish behavior. The controversy led to a 
fundamental question. Were the seven frustrated missionaries the problem at San Fernando, or 
were they symptoms of something deeper?347 
 An April 1789 audit of the College of San Fernando conducted by Fray Romualdo 
Cartagena further deepened the ambiguity surrounding the college. He reported to the viceroy 
that San Fernando “has deteriorated from the state which I found it in nine years ago.” 
Cartagena, like the college’s leadership, found Rubí and Gilí at the heart of the current problems, 
as they were “filled with disgust, ill will, and desire to leave the Colegio.” Moreover, Cartagena 
reported that “it will be impossible for the Colegio to restore itself to its former state unless Frs. 
Mariano Rubí and Bartolomé Gilí…leave the Colegio.” However, Cartagena had also visited in 
1780, and noted the college’s disarray. The library and archive had gone to ruin, and the brothers 
were in the habit of inviting young boys to the college, which disrupted the serenity necessary 
for religious life. Even in 1780 Cartagena’s complaints were not new. Auditors filed similar 
reports in 1764 and again in 1774. Another item missing from the 1789 audit was the mental 
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health of the father guardian before Pangua, Palóu. He was an old man, who, according to 
Pangua, had “already approached his second childhood. In the face of the calamites, he found 
nothing else to do than to weep like a child and lock himself in his cell from fear.”348 Despite 
this, Cartagena concluded that he did not know what to do with the two men, because punishing 
them would produce no other result than infamy for the Franciscans.349 The college was in 
turmoil. But the 1789 audit did not resolve whether this outcome resulted from long-standing, 
systemic issues, or Rubí and Gilí’s sabotage.  
 That the two missionaries acted outside the bounds of acceptable behavior for Franciscan 
brothers at San Fernando cannot be disputed, however, their actions remain open to 
interpretation. Were they the incorrigible malcontents that Pangua, Cartagena, and the discretos 
described? Or did the state of the college frustrate the two priests? The answers probably lay 
somewhere in the middle. In their brief time in San Fernando, they went to great lengths to 
annoy and frustrate not only the leadership there, but their peers as well. And if the stories about 
their late-night forays over the college walls were true, they were reluctant to embrace the 
monastic life. But if they hated the Franciscan life, why did they only ask for a transfer to 
another college, or assignment to a missionary field? Why did they not simply abandon the 
order? Their correspondence indicated that both men wanted to remain Franciscans. They just 
wanted to be Franciscans somewhere other than the College of San Fernando. Moreover, their 
actions can be read as a protest. A sloppy, short-sighted form of protest, but protest, nonetheless. 
The two men had three basic complaints. Rubí and Gilí opposed missionary control of mission 
temporalities because of their views on Franciscan poverty. They chafed at the decaying state of 
the college. Finally, they wanted an assignment in a missionary field. They may have found their 
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position particularly frustrating as they understood the college’s need to staff Alta California. 
Any of these issues may have engendered willful protests. In the aggregate, perhaps they 
stimulated a poorly conceived mutiny.  
 With no solution at hand, in 1790, Viceroy Juan Vicente de Güemes, the second Count of 
Revillagegido, forced Father Guardian Pangua to send Rubí and Gilí to Alta California. 
Revillagegido sought to establish the two new missions he ordered in October, 1789.350 These 
new missions needed priests and he hoped sending the men there might give them the purpose 
they craved. That same year, Gilí renewed his appeals to go to the northern province, bypassing 
his superiors at the college and appealing directly to Revillagegido. The viceroy knew the two 
men’s reputation well at this point but was loath to waste the money and resources already 
invested in them, and refused to return them to Spain, as Pangua desired. Pangua had little choice 
but to send the men to Lasuén. Though he thought little of either man, he hoped that their 
assignments might settle the situation.351 Of Gilí, Pangua later wrote, “It was believed that by 
transplanting him to a different climate and different interests he might be of some use.” Pangua 
remained unconvinced, claiming that “Gilí is better suited for destruction than construction.”352 
Without warning Lasuén, the college transferred both padres descontentos to Alta California in 
1790 and 1791.  
 About a year after the two men arrived at their missions, Gilí at San Antonio and Rubí at 
Soledad, news reached Lasuén that Rubí terrorized his partner, Fray Diego García. On February 
5, 1792 while at Mission Santa Clara, Lasuén received a letter from García describing the 
“violent friction” between himself and Rubí.353 The discord fomenting between them came to the 
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surface when the two berated each other in front of Fages’ replacement, Governor José Antonio 
Roméu. After Roméu left Soledad, García abandoned his post and fled to Mission San Carmelo. 
According to García, their previous arguments became so vicious that he asked the corporal of 
the guard to escort him home as he feared, according to Lasuén’s report, that Rubí “might lay 
violent hands on him, or even do worse.”354 According to García, Rubí “carries side-arms, and 
that a horrible secret is attached to one of them, for he boasts that he had it with him in the 
college on the occasion of some disturbance.”355 Like his superiors at the college of San 
Fernando, Lasuén thought the worst of Rubí. “There is no hope,” he surmised, “judging by what 
one can see and by what all who know him report.”356 Again, Franciscan leaders could not 
simply strip the man of his habit. The California mission system finally expanded, yet 
missionaries remained scarce. 
 Governor Roméu urged Lasuén to transfer Rubí away from García. Lasuén took his usual 
position that the good name of the missionaries must be protected above all other concerns. He 
seethed when Rubí broke the chain of command and asked the governor to intervene at Soledad. 
Both he and the governor wished to avoid making a “noisy scene” as Lasuén described it, but he 
worried that any veteran missionary would balk at pairing with Rubí, a known malcontent.357 
The governor agreed with Lasuén and pledged to support any decision that he made to solve the 
situation. Wanting to spare his veterans from García’s experience, Lasuén made a spectacular 
move. He paired Rubí with another of the newer men in California: Bartolomé Gilí.358 For a 
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time, the duo kept themselves out of trouble. Yet the peace did not last. Lasuén’s reshuffling of 
the missionaries would produce far-ranging consequences. 
 Though Lasuén knew the duo caused trouble in California during their brief tenure, there 
is no indication in his correspondence that his superiors at the college ever told him about their 
behavior there, which made his choice defendable. He did not plan to pair the men for long, as 
there were more missionaries arriving on the next boat from Mexico. Still, that Lasuén never 
learned of Rubí and Gilí’s antics illuminates the many problems plaguing the College of San 
Fernando and the missionaries they sent to California. By 1791, when Rubí and Gilí arrived, 
Lasuén and the California Franciscans dealt with myriad scandals and near constant fighting with 
the civil authorities over every aspect of mission administration. The colonial project in 
California needed missionaries, even if they were substandard. Furthermore, Mexico City 
refused to waste the king’s coin by shipping the pair back to Spain, but that only explains how 
they ended up receiving an assignment. It does not explain why the leadership at the college 
never communicated Rubí and Gilí’s disruptive acts and bitter attitudes to Lasuén. His previous 
record, particularly his concern regarding the good name of the missionaries, suggests that 
Lasuén would have resisted the disruptive duo coming to his missions. Even if forced to accept 
them, he could have prepared. Instead, the lack of information forced his hand, and he made a 
choice that was understandable from his position, even if it appears doomed to fail with the 
clarity of hindsight.  
 Lasuén’s decision to pair Rubí and Gilí at Soledad meant finding a new home for Fray 
García. The aftermath of his fights with Rubí seemed more like punishment than relief. Lasuén 
assigned him to Mission San Antonio, which already had two men serving there, Frays Miguel 
Pieras and Buenaventura Sitjar. This represented a demotion, as García became a supernumerary. 
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Lasuén understood García’s unhappiness and reported to the college that the missionary now 
occupied “a position little in harmony with his disposition.”359 It was not simply the new position 
García chafed at, but also his new home. García complained to Lasuén that he had developed a 
“horror and dislike” for Mission San Antonio “because of the many hazards and experiences he 
met there.” 360 Still he accepted the Father President ’s decision. Lasuén realized that the priest 
suffered and that García’s feeling of having unjustly received harsher consequences than Rubí -
the root of the Garcia’s discontent - was fair. He told García to rest at San Luis Obispo until he 
regained his health. Then Lasuén promised him that if the situation at San Antonio proved too 
difficult, he would receive another transfer. García accepted these terms and vowed to work on 
fitting in at his new mission.361 
 On April 9, 1792, while Lasuén worked out the situation of the feuding missionaries, 
disaster struck. Governor Roméu suddenly died. Roméu, one of the friendliest to the missionaries 
during the eighteenth century, only served a year in California before succumbing to an unknown 
illness. On his arrival, he wrote to Lasuén pledging his cooperation with the Franciscans – a 
message that pleased Lasuén after years of struggle with Fages.362 Unfortunately, continual 
maladies marred Roméu’s brief time in the province. Though he assisted Lasuén with the first 
troubles amongst the missionaries, Roméu’s health stopped him from fulfilling many of his 
functions as governor. In March 1792, he declined rapidly and Lasuén arrived to take his last 
confession and give him his last rites. Roméu died in Lasuén’s arms in the late morning of April 
9. Many of the Spaniards in the province grieved for the fallen governor. The Franciscans 
welcomed Roméu because they assumed that his arrival meant a new era in relations between the 
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civil government and the missionaries, something they desired since Serra’s time. The military 
grieved because Roméu was a highly respected and decorated veteran of New Spain’s 
campaigns. Sal wrote upon the governor’s death that California was not good enough for a man 
of Roméu’s caliber.363 A council of California soldiers headed by Sal named Captain José 
Joaquín de Arrillaga interim governor.364 He followed his predecessor’s lead and promoted 
harmony with the missionaries. Arrillaga made no attempt to manage or reform the Franciscans. 
 In late December 1792, Rubí and Gilí again became a problem for Lasuén. Both men 
reported being ill.365 In response, Lasuén began the process of exiling the two men from 
California.  It is unclear how both men’s history of feigned illnesses played into their exit. They 
once successfully turned malingering into an exit strategy. There is nothing that transpired during 
their time under Lasuén that suggested they did not feign illness again. Ironically, the physician 
Pablo Soler became Lasuén’s chief aid in declaring the men unfit for their duties. He was the 
doctor Lasuén had charged with conspiring against the missionaries during the 1785 de la Peña 
affair. Lasuén smeared the doctor’s medical reputation at that time. Now, in January 1793, 
Lasuén used the word of a colonial official he distrusted to rid himself of two missionaries that 
he not only wanted banished from his mission field, but also clearly came to despise.366 
 At the start of 1793, Lasuén moved forward with Rubí’s removal. He wrote Soler just 
after the new year to ask if he believed Rubí’s “illness will render him incapable of carrying out 
the particular duties of his ministry or make it very difficult for him.”367 Lasuén never mentioned 
Rubí’s particular condition and symptoms in his correspondence with the college or the 
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physician, only that he was ill. Even though he needed the royal government’s permission to 
send Rubí back to Mexico, a fact of which he conspicuously reminded Soler in his letter, Lasuén 
did not create a paper trail documenting Rubí’s malady. Soler responded that with proper 
medical care and medicine unavailable in California, the priest could recover in two months. The 
doctor bemoaned the policy that forbade Rubí from leaving for Mexico without the governor’s 
permission since, in his estimation, Rubí could be quickly cured there. With only an interim 
governor in California, Lasuén felt unsure if they could send Rubí back to Mexico. Lasuén 
quickly mailed a copy of Soler’s letter to Pangua at the college – the same father guardian who 
labeled the man a malingerer before sending Rubí to California.368 
 The validity of Rubí’s illness remains more important than a single missionary’s health 
on the edge of empire in the late eighteenth century. Like everything about the padres 
descontentos, the players’ handling of Rubí’s alleged illness illuminates the decay of Franciscan 
leadership in California and at the College of San Fernando, both of which had real 
consequences for the Indigenous peoples. First, it demonstrated imperial Spain’s lack of 
imagination or flexibility in managing a deteriorating situation in a remote but strategically 
important province. Several colonial governors saw the decline firsthand and worked both to 
alert the royal government in Mexico City to the problems and to institute reforms. Each time, 
Mexican administrators with no experience in California blocked reform efforts, and even 
threatened Fages with a loss of title and stature if his harassment of the missionaries continued. 
Those same officials now worsened the situation in California when they insisted that Rubí and 
Gilí go there, for no other reason than to save the king’s coffers from wasted expense. The royal 
government so desperately needed priests in California that it turned a blind eye to the 
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malcontent priests’ behavior, although it mirrored the problems that Juan and Ulloa reported in 
Peru in the 1730s. Nor did the notion that Rubí and Gilí’s behavior may have threatened the 
fragile Spanish presence in California by angering Indigenous peoples. In the end, saving money 
and not upsetting the missionaries seemed to be Spain’s two most important policy directives in 
California after 1785.  
 Second, the manner in which Lasuén handled Rubí’s illness again demonstrated Lasuén’s 
tendency towards cynical leadership. Though his choice to pair the men in Soledad was 
defendable given what is known about the situation in early 1792, once it became clear that Rubí, 
and later Gilí, refused to fall in line, Lasuén once again used any means necessary to rid himself 
of a problem and save face. That he turned to Soler, holding his medical opinion up as valid 
years after assassinating the doctor’s character by nearly accusing him of treason and heresy in 
the de la Peña affair was cynical enough. That he did it at the same moment the Audiencia 
reviewed the 1885 charges against de la Peña in Mexico City is a historical coincidence that casts 
a floodlight on his hypocrisy.369 Lasuén probably did the right thing when he removed Rubí and 
Gilí from his missionary field, but his reasons were suspect. He moved to both save his men 
from the frustration of working with them and to save the order from further scandal, rather than 
removing the men from a position where they might harm Indigenous Californians, or at the very 
least harm the spiritual conquest. The methods he employed demonstrated a tendency towards 
cynicism during an era increasingly defined by upheaval – an era that demanded open-minded, 
flexible leadership.   
 In the early weeks of January 1793, Lasuén wrote a series of letters to multiple authorities 
in a bid to hasten Rubí’s departure. He wrote the father guardian at the College of San Fernando, 
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San Francisco presidio’s commander, and finally governor Arrillaga. Institutional distrust 
immediately bogged down the process. Lasuén informed Argüello at San Francisco that Soler 
deemed Rubí “entirely unfitted for the duties of missionary in these parts,” and had “begged” the 
physician to let Rubí depart.370 For, even if demoted to supernumerary, “he runs the risk. . .of 
being unfit for any kind of work,” he concluded.371 Argüello reminded Lasuén that he needed a 
copy of the doctor’s certification before Rubí’s transfer. Though the soldier told Lasuén his word 
was good, Argüello required documentation. When Lasuén wrote Soler to request the certificate, 
he asked the doctor to hurry “so that I may make the necessary arrangements with the naval 
personnel. . .so that we may reap the most benefit.”372 Soler quickly produced the certificate, 
which stated Rubí “has been suffering from an infirmity which has grown worse and for which a 
protracted treatment is necessary.”373 Finally, Lasuén and Soler contended that Rubí had 
contracted syphilis. He had not, as doctors in Mexico later confirmed, but the priests’ immoral 
reputation at the college made their false accusation believable.374 By January 31, 1793 Rubí 
boarded the frigate Aránzazu heading for San Blas, and ultimately back to the college once so 
eager to be rid of him.375 
 With Rubí back in Mexico, Lasuén now turned his attention to Gilí, who claimed illness 
kept him from his duties. Gilí continually burdened the Father President. The allegedly sick 
priest abandoned his post and travelled to San Carmelo and only informed his superior after he 
had spent several days there. Much like Rubí, no specific information regarding Gilí’s medical 
condition emerged. The attacks that plagued him reoccurred and Gilí blamed the climate at 
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Soledad. Lasuén confided to Pangua, “This made me sad, and I felt more sorry still for the fact 
that his sickness is always of a nature that makes it necessary for him to leave the mission to 
which he is assigned.”376 Though Lasuén once argued, rather surprisingly, that missionaries had 
the right to transfer if their assignment caused undue suffering, he understood malingering priests 
could abuse the system. He doubted that any mission in California had the climate or 
missionaries suitable for Gilí’s constitution or temperament. Lasuén saw Gilí as a failed 
missionary. Lasuén thought that neither the priest’s “mind nor his spirit is inclined to this kind of 
work. . .according to what I have seen or found out in the short time he has been in 
[California].”377 Lasuén requested that Pangua begin the process of allowing Gilí to retire early, 
but the father guardian refused, not wanting both Rubí and Gilí back at the college. 
 Lasuén now struggled to find a place for Gilí but managed to get the truth out of the man 
regarding his “condition.” In February 1793, Gilí returned to Soledad, where Rubí’s old nemesis, 
Fray García, now resided. The two men immediately clashed, though Lasuén never reported the 
cause.378 Gilí left Soledad and returned to San Carmelo, then wrote Lasuén in San Francisco. 
According to Lasuén, Gilí confessed to “an aversion to living in this country; and for this there is 
no remedy but to remove him from it.”379 The man simply wanted to leave California. Whether 
that was due to the country or his fundamental disagreement regarding temporalities, or any 
number of other factors, is unknown. Despite his Father President similarly attempting to leave 
the remote province decades earlier and therefore perhaps sympathizing with Gilí, legalities 
constrained Lasuén’s options. Dissatisfaction with the country was not enough reason to grant 
his retirement. In March, Lasuén advised Gilí to accept his new assignment at San Luis Obispo 
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and work hard there. This was his best hope for rehabilitating his reputation and receiving 
permission to retire.380 The disgruntled missionary followed the advice and eventually went back 
to Mexico in summer 1794.381 
 For Lasuén, Rubí and Gilí’s presence in California, and quarrels among the missionaries 
generally, were yet more circumstances that threatened the good name of the missionaries with 
the military, civilian colonists, and baptized California Indians. He knew that shifting the 
missionaries from one establishment to another alerted outsiders to instability within the order.382 
More than that, public disputes and feuds gave civil authorities like Neve and Fages the 
justifications needed to intervene in missionary affairs. In more populous missionary fields, 
where anonymity among the crowd existed, these issues could remain comparatively private. In 
California, where there were so few Spaniards, “everyone knows us,” Lasuén bemoaned, “and if 
you were to shout in San Francisco the echo would quickly be heard in San Diego.”383 Anxiety 
over this subject plagued Lasuén, and he admitted to Pangua that infighting between his 
missionaries continued. In September, Fray Miguel Sanchez accepted his transfer to Soledad to 
replace Gilí, but he too detested García, and let Lasuén know it. Lasuén begged Sanchez to 
swallow his pride and his distaste for the man behind closed doors, and the missionary 
reluctantly agreed.384 Though it seemed by January 1794 that Lasuén had contained the worst 
infighting between his missionaries, his days combating the padres descontentos and the 
temporalistas were not over. 
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 Though Rubí and Gilí’s quarrelsome natures kept Lasuén busy putting out fires and 
transferring his missionaries, they were not the only frustrated priests causing him problems in 
the early 1790s. Frays Alonso Isidro Salazar and Baldomero López, the first two at Mission 
Santa Cruz, also could not get along with each other. Once again, the missionaries feuded over 
mission temporalities. In August 1793, both men requested a transfer simultaneously. Salazar 
demanded his in a tirade Lasuén termed “obscure, confused, and extreme.”385 He wrote both men 
in one letter to tell them of his “great surprise” and that he had “never come upon, or seen, 
anything like this.”386 Lasuén knew that their problems stemmed from the material aspects of the 
mission and attempted to head them off. He warned them: “Bear in mind that if all your troubles 
and demands spring from the temporal affairs, there is not even one mission in which I could 
place you without imposing upon you at the same time the management of such affairs.”387 
Lasuén did admit that temporal affairs were “burdensome. . .hindrances. . .[and] a nuisance,” but 
they were not a problem for men “with true zeal.”388 In another letter to Pangua in 1794, Lasuén 
lashed out against what he perceived as their hypocrisy. “I shall observe the disposition of the 
Fathers at Santa Cruz,” he wrote, “who go keenly after temporal things, and then disclaim loudly 
against them.”389 His superiors at the college ordered Lasuén to transfer Salazar to another 
mission to separate the men and “reduce their pride.”390 By 1795, López and Salazar retired 
without serving their ten-year term in California. When they returned to Mexico, the viceroy’s 
office tapped Salazar to, ironically, report on the material prospects of California. He reported 
that the province had rich mineral wealth that remained neglected for fear of foreign prospectors. 
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He also stated that the missions received less favorable treatment than the pueblos in terms of 
commercial trade.391 Fray López, whom his peers labeled an ill-tempered hypochondriac, also 
sought a return to Mexico before his ten-year service period ended. Finally, in the summer of 
1795, Lasuén tired of López’s malingering and gave the man permission to retire. López forged a 
noteworthy career after leaving California, eventually becoming the father guardian at San 
Fernando.392 In 1799, Salazar transferred from the College of San Fernando to the Franciscan 
province in Michoacán, something many of the padres descontentos desired.  
 The temporalistas were a source of turmoil in California, but did their behavior effect the 
stability of Spanish relations with California Indians at and around their respective missions? Did 
the quarreling between the priests damage mission operations, cause potential converts to avoid 
the establishments, or increase hardships for Indians dealing with these unstable missionaries? 
Though the missionaries kept records of baptisms, population, deaths, marriages, and the amount 
of livestock and foodstuffs produced at each establishment, the numbers do not contain the 
context needed to understand the impact missionary instability had on Indigenous people. For 
example, Santa Cruz reported eighty-seven baptisms in their first four months, while Soledad 
claimed nine conversions in a similar period. Both of these missions suffered from schisms 
between their missionaries.393 Owing to a paucity of information regarding Soledad’s first 
decade, it is impossible to determine the effect of their quarrelling on the mission population.394 
More is known about Santa Cruz’s early development. Did Santa Cruz’s placement between 
preexisting missions at Monterey and San Francisco engender more Ohlone trust in Spaniards, 
accounting for the higher conversion rate? Chief Suquel’s daughters were baptized before Santa 
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Cruz’s founding and he and his wife were among the first baptized at that mission. However, this 
apparent friendliness towards the Spanish on the north coast of Monterey Bay did not spare the 
mission from attack two years after its founding. Tensions increased in the face of Spanish 
encroachment and missionary instability did not help the situation. 
 In 1793, after two years of building up a force of disillusioned mission Indians and 
hostile Ohlone people from around the San Francisco Bay Area, Charquin, a leader of the 
Quirostes band of Ohlone people and a baptized Christian, influenced an attack on Mission Santa 
Cruz. Charquin was among the first groups of adults baptized after Santa Cruz’s founding. He 
quickly escaped the mission after only eight days in the Christian life and never returned.395 His 
reason for fleeing is unknown. According to Sal, after the missionaries failed to bring him back, 
soldiers hunted for him to no avail. He even bested a squad of converted Indians sent to recapture 
him. Charquin set up camp in a spot central to Missions Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, and San 
Francisco to recruit disgruntled converts into his fighting force.396 Tensions simmered until 
February 1793, when Charquin captured two baptized Quirostes couples. He captured the 
women, Tuiguimemis and Miscamis, and sent their husbands, Uetex and Vayas back to the 
mission without their weapons.397 The Spanish military found themselves at a crossroads. Neve 
and Fages avoided direct confrontation with Indigenous forces, in a bid to keep the peace around 
the mission and presidios. They feared the capabilities of Indigenous power if fully aroused 
against them. Now, without leadership focused on stability in an era when the missionaries held 
more power in the province, the military responded belligerently.  
 
395 Informe á Gobernador interino Joaquín de Arrillaga, San Francisco Presidio, February 27, 1793, BANC MSS C-
A 55, 163.  
396 Ibid., 164. 
397 Ibid., 161 
 
 
139 
 
 The Spanish victory did not stop the Quirostes rebels from attacking Mission Santa Cruz 
on December 14, 1793. That night, a group of escaped converts and non-converted Indians 
surprised the mission guards. They wounded three guards and burned the guards’ house and a 
corral. The guards managed to fire a few shots, after which the attackers fled. Neither side killed 
anyone, and the small skirmish ended as quickly as it began.398 For the next six weeks, soldiers 
led by Sal and Pedro Amador from San Francisco searched for the attack’s leaders. During that 
time, they heard from informants that the hostilities stemmed from the missionaries involving 
themselves in local marriage arrangements. Like the Tongva people at Mission San Gabriel in 
1785, bands near the Bay Area missions bristled at the intrusion into their mechanism of political 
alliance and social mobility.399 Eventually, Spanish soldiers captured their leader, a man named 
Pella, and sent him along with a large number of Indians from Santa Cruz to Monterey for trial 
and punishment. This example, an attack on a mission within its first two years by a group 
already familiar with Spanish culture, emerged from standard missionary practice rather than the 
instability caused by infighting between Salazar and López over the mission’s temporal affairs.  
 Linking Franciscan instability directly to negative effects on newly baptized Indigenous 
Californians is difficult, but there is evidence that missionary autonomy under Roméu and 
Arrillaga produced dangerous situations, which Neve and Fages had worked to avoid. On 
October 31, 1794, the commissioner of San José, Gabriel Moraga, informed Argüello that one of 
the missionaries at Santa Clara, Fray Manuel Fernández, chased off local Ohlone people living 
around the pueblo with his aggressive proselytizing. Fernández was another new recruit. He 
arrived in California three months before Moraga’s report. Indian witnesses complained to 
soldiers, who then observed the behavior themselves, that the priest “severely threatened” 
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Ohlone men and women who refused to convert.400 Fernández flogged a man with a horse whip. 
Local Ohlone Indians feared Fernández and told Moraga that he would burn their villages if they 
did not accept baptism.401 An old man, known as El Mocho told the commissioner that 
Fernández tied him up and beat him with multiple implements. The assault left El Mocho’s 
buttocks and waist covered with wounds and rendered him unable to walk without a cane. 
Moreover, Ygnacio Castro informed Moraga that an unidentified Indigenous man warned him 
that a large force of Indians had gathered not far from San José “determined to come and kill all 
the people of the pueblo and the mission,” according to Moraga.402 It was then that he contacted 
Argüello. 
 A day later, Argüello moved to stabilize the situation brewing around San José. He wrote 
to Sal, warning that the Indians around the pueblo were mobilizing because Fernández “set upon 
them with violence to make them Christians.”403 Argüello first ordered Sal to San José, to 
determine what response the situation required. Once finished there, Sal headed to Santa Clara to 
“make the ministers understand that the disturbances provoked by the temerity and lack of 
prudence by [Fernández] are likely to result in an insurrection by the neighboring pagans.”404 
Here, Neve and Fages’ fears manifested: Franciscan hubris and abuses sparked the wrath of 
Indigenous people. In a bid to stop a disaster before it began, Argüello sent two soldiers with Sal 
to escort both ministers to Mission San Francisco, hoping it would soothe some of the local’s 
anger. Most important, Sal’s actions should not further complicate the situation. Sal completed 
his orders and informed Argüello that when he arrived in San José some men were waiting for 
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him. He persuaded them to bring their leaders to talk. The leaders, who went unnamed in Sal’s 
report, arrived and informed the soldier that they also attempted to assuage their belligerent 
warriors. He reported that no uprising seemed imminent, and that local leadership felt content. 
Sal then offered an editorial that may have come from the stiff rebuke the military in California 
received during Fages’ term. Revillagegido warned Fages and his men that if they levied any 
false charges against the missionaries, they would receive stiff penalties. Sal told Argüello that if 
Fernández punished El Mocho, he probably had a good reason.405 Argüello believed the soldier, 
and reported the facts to the new governor, Diego de Borica, including Sal’s reprimand of 
Moraga for reacting so quickly without checking the facts of the case. Argüello also informed 
Borica that he discussed the matter verbally with Lasuén, who promised to talk with Fernández 
and tell him to “moderate the zeal” of his proselytizing.406  
 The situation surrounding Fernández and the violence he employed signaled a 
transformation taking place within Franciscan ranks, one that the military was not prepared to 
confront. Fernández’s accusers did not report retributive violence, which the fathers vigorously 
defended as an important part of religious instruction, but rather violence used to coerce 
Indigenous people into accepting Christianity. This was new territory for the California 
missionaries. Additionally, this report of violence came from Castro, a pueblo commissioner. 
This may explain why the penalties for falsely accusing the missionaries of wrongdoing against 
the Indigenous population failed to stop him. Once Sal arrived and decided that the reports were 
overblown, he immediately deferred to Fernández’s version of events, as his experience taught 
him. There are many reasons leaders around San José may have preempted an attack on the town 
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and mission. Many of them probably worked on Fages construction projects a few years earlier 
and might not want to eradicate a source of material goods and wages. Fear of the Spanish 
military’s firepower is another likely reason. It is entirely possible that local leaders called off the 
attack on their own, and Sal’s determination that the event held no danger did not accurately 
capture what occurred.  
 Though no attack occurred in the late autumn 1794, the credible threat revealed the 
growing instability in California as the Spanish province welcomed its first capable governor, 
Diego de Borica, since Fages’ retirement in 1790. Though the military and missionaries alike 
admired Roméu, his health constrained his abilities nearly from the beginning of his tenure. As 
interim governor, Arrillaga never put his imprint on the region. For nearly half a decade, the 
Franciscans operated as the most prominent institution in California, with the military and its 
administrators working as their functionary, rather than as autonomous secular officials. In 
searching for a new governor Revillagegido set a high bar, writing that the next governor in 
California needed “good talent, military skill, and experience, robust health. . .prudent conduct, 
disinterestedness, energy, and a true zeal for the service.”407 The viceroy settled on Lieutenant-
colonel Diego de Borica to fill the vacancy. Borica served as adjutant-inspector of presidios in 
Chihuahua and had experience as a Spanish military officer and an administrator.408 Whether or 
not Borica could live up to his superior’s lofty expectations, he took the office in November 
1794, just after the scare around San José and Mission Santa Clara.  
 Creating and maintaining harmonious relations with the missionaries topped Borica’s 
agenda. That the missionaries in California were in the middle of a demographic shift 
complicated Borica’s task. Between 1791 and 1795 fifteen new missionaries emigrated to the 
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province, a substantial number considering that a total of twenty-six came between 1769 and 
1790.409 In the same period, the Franciscans lost ten missionaries either due to death, retirement, 
or exile to Mexico. The transition caused serious internal strife among the missionaries over 
managing the material aspects of the missions. For the first time since coming to California, 
some within the Order publicly challenged the methods used in the province. A good portion of 
those men arriving between 1791 and 1795 objected to the College of San Fernando’s stance on 
mission temporalities. These protesters sought transfer to another Franciscan province in 
Mexico. Instead, they were sent to Alta California, where the debate over temporalities became 
concrete rather than abstract. Following all of this were the disturbing reports about Fray 
Fernández and his use of violence to bring Ohlone people to the baptismal font. Managing this 
unprecedented situation became one of governor Borica’s most important tasks.  
 The period between Fages’ and Borica’s administrations represented the only time the 
Franciscans in California had little to no check on their authority. Rather than being a golden age 
or a developmental period, discontent, strife, and decline characterized the brief interlude 
between governorships.410 Mexico City’s demands for the California mission system’s expansion 
burdened both the waning College of San Fernando and the Franciscans in the remote province. 
By the late 1780s, the college was no longer the robust institution it had been when Serra, Palóu, 
and Crespí lived and worked there during the mid-century. As was the Spanish crown’s aim, the 
decades of reforms and constraints on missionary power and influence took their toll, even as the 
government expected the College of San Fernando to spearhead the colonial project in 
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California. A disconnect existed between the imperial government’s imagination of the spiritual 
conquest and the reality of the downtrodden Apostolic College of San Fernando it tapped to lead 
the invasion and occupation of California. Moreover, the warnings repeated by governors sent to 
California, that the Franciscans mismanaged both the spiritual conquest and the colony itself, 
failed to move Mexico City or Seville. The crown, the Audiencia, and viceroy approved of only 
one method for colonizing California: more missions and more missionaries, regardless of the 
situation on the ground. If the Spanish military opposed this plan too vociferously, the imperial 
government responded with a threat of heavy sanctions. Their policy of willful ignorance 
ultimately led to disaster. 
 The controversy within the California mission system regarding the management of 
mission temporalities surprised Lasuén, causing real problems for him and the missionaries he 
supervised. Just when a group of younger missionaries enflamed with ancient notions of 
evangelical poverty entered the order and older missionaries retired or died, Lasuén confronted 
the padres descontentos. No one in Mexico took the blame for allowing men like Rubí and Gilí, 
Salazar, and López, into the order; in fact, they refused to take responsibility and passed the 
problem on to Lasuén and the unsuspecting baptized Indians at Missions Soledad and Santa 
Cruz. Lasuén, to his credit, attempted to rectify the situation quickly, but bureaucratic 
indifference slowed his efforts. Lasuén’s frustration at that indifference led him to ironic 
decisions, such as using Soler’s word to exile Rubí after besmirching the physician’s reputation 
several years earlier. He and Soler likewise lied about Rubí’s syphilis to get him out of 
California. All of this served to eliminate the problem before it harmed the good name of the 
missionaries, rather than confronting the effect Rubí and the other padres descontentos had on 
the spiritual conquest.  
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 Finally, the era of missionary autonomy meant fewer opportunities for California Indians 
throughout the region, which the experience of the Ohlone people in the southern San Francisco 
Bay Area demonstrated. The Spanish imperial project required Indigenous labor to build the 
missions, remodel presidios, and labor in towns. Some leaders, like Yanonali of the Chumash, 
used their positions to protect their cultural and spiritual autonomy. Others, like the unnamed 
Ohlone leaders around San José, demanded protection from townspeople and their Indigenous 
rivals for their laborers and the women and children they left behind while working on Spanish 
projects. Since the days of Serra, Franciscans in California sought to control Indigenous labor 
and argued that working for soldiers and townspeople eroded the baptized Indians’ Christian 
teachings and should be avoided. Lasuén demonstrated these tendencies when he attempted to 
block new opportunities for Indigenous peoples’ freedom of movement and ability to get work 
away from the missions.  
This fight for control of Indian labor only worsened after 1795. Around the San Francisco 
Bay, that struggle for control, exacerbated the instability of the missionaries, heightened tensions 
between the Indians, soldiers, and missionaries and led to alliances between Indigenous peoples 
within and outside the mission sphere. These tensions, among others, and the increased 
missionary autonomy from 1791 through 1795 resulted in a mass exodus of converts in Mission 
San Francisco. It also led to bands of escaped mission Indians, along with their non-baptized 
allies, engaging in protracted armed conflict with Spanish forces in the most intense episode of 
Indigenous resistance during the eighteenth century.   
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The Crisis at Mission San Francisco, 1794-1797 
Between 1794 and 1797, Indigenous Californians living in and around Mission San 
Francisco suffered the largest and most protracted calamity since the founding of Mission San 
Diego in 1769. During these years, a series of natural and human disasters befell local Ohlone 
people. First, a failed harvest drove hundreds of men, women, children, and elders to Mission 
San Francisco, with disastrous results. Many of the newcomers died in their first months at the 
mission from a swift-acting pathogen.411 By the spring of 1795, both newly baptized Indians and 
veterans fled to escape the disease. The response of the ministers at Mission San Francisco, 
Frays Antonio Dantí and Martín Landaeta, demonstrated the results of Franciscan primacy in 
California, which emerged from the period of waning civil authority in California from 1790 to 
1794. The two priests unilaterally dispatched a squad of mission Indians to search for escapees in 
direct violation of Spanish policy in California.412 On two separate occasions, these sorties led to 
disaster. The first, in 1795, resulted in the massacre of seven unarmed converts; the second, 
occurring weeks later, provoked violence between Spanish soldiers and a coalition of East Bay 
tribes and Mission San Francisco escapees. As the process unfolded, baptized Indians sought 
assistance from the military and accused the missionaries at San Francisco of forced labor, 
starvation, beatings, and confinement in stocks and shackles for trivial offenses. Five years after 
Mexico City effectively positioned the Franciscans as the dominant institution in California after 
nullifying Governor Filipe de Neve’s 1781 reformist legal code, the priests at San Francisco had 
forged an autonomous theocracy there. It was precisely the situation that former governor Pedro 
Fages had warned his replacement, José Antonio Roméu, about.413  
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 The disaster at San Francisco was unlike any of the problems engendered by Spanish 
religious colonialism in California to date. The tumult tested the leadership abilities of both 
Father President Lasuén and Governor Diego de Borica. The crisis was not a simple case of 
misbehaving or malingering priests making life difficult for their peers and Father President 
Lasuén. Although Lasuén had successfully defended his men against accusations of cruelty due 
to a lack of evidence in the past, this time, a series of witnesses - both Indigenous and of Spanish 
decent – gave testimony revealing Frays Antonio Dantí and Martín Landaeta’s cruel treatment of 
baptized Indians at San Francisco. Governor Borica, who considered himself friendly to the 
missionaries, was aghast when he learned the scope of their violent behavior. During the two 
years Borica spent stabilizing the situation at San Francisco, his mental health deteriorated, and 
he entered a deep depression. The events at San Francisco also wore Lasuén down. The loss of 
so many Indian lives did not cause him to suffer, rather, the Indians’ and soldiers’ public reports 
denouncing his priests mortified Lasuén. He turned to the same methods he had employed to 
protect rank-and-file Franciscans in the past: cover-ups, bullying, and passionately defending his 
priests despite their violent and reckless behavior. This time Lasuén’s tactics failed, as one of 
Borica’s informants was the missionary Fray José María Fernández, who gave an unprecedented 
view inside the Franciscan order. Fernández’s whistleblowing kept Lasuén from controlling the 
narrative as he had in previous scandals.  
 In 1795, for the first time in California, a Franciscan missionary accused his peers of 
violence and cruelty against mission Indians.414 The importance of this turn cannot be overstated. 
A series of young, idealistic Franciscans began arriving in California starting in about 1790. 
Many were temporalistas, or those who venerated extreme poverty as a central tenant of the 
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Franciscan order and chafed at their management of the mission’s material aspects. However, 
Fernández found new problems upon arriving in California. He protested against the treatment of 
baptized Indians and Lasuén’s leadership. Fernández took his accusations directly to the 
governor, enraging Lasuén. Though Lasuén turned to his time-tested strategy of claiming that the 
priesthood was the victim of a vast conspiracy, that tactic now fell flat. He and Fray 
Buenaventura Sitjar next claimed that Fernández became demented after a blow to the skull.415 
Based upon the sequence of events, and Fernández’s correspondence after the fact, it appeared 
that Lasuén punished Fernández’s whistleblowing by branding him insane and exiling him to 
Mexico. Despite returning to Mexico, Fernández’s efforts were not in vain. His reports, along 
with the testimony from soldiers and Indians from Mission San Francisco, formed a credible case 
that Dantí and Landaeta were out of control, and that Lasuén appeared either unaware or 
unmoved by the damage they wrought. The disaster at San Francisco revealed, finally, and 
completely, that Lasuén would lie, slander, and obstruct investigations to maintain the good 
name of the missionaries, even when they undermined the spiritual conquest in California. 
 The troubles at Mission San Francisco during this period also illuminate a pattern in the 
missionaries that Lasuén chose to protect. After assuming the presidency in 1785, Lasuén 
protected Tomás de la Peña from murder charges and Manuel Fernández from claims that he 
used violence to coerce California Indians into baptisms. Moreover, he had shielded Pedro 
Cambón after the missionary feuded with former governor Pedro Fages, in addition to other 
priests accused of price gouging or being too harsh with baptized Indians. However, Lasuén 
refused to defend the malcontents Mariano Rubí and Bartolomé Gilí and exiled them both to the 
College of San Fernando after a brief time in California. Though those two men were 
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troublemakers for the order both in Mexico and California, their actions did not match those of 
de la Peña or Fernández. As the crisis at Mission San Francisco played out, Lasuén again found 
two of his men, Frays Dantí and Landaeta facing significant charges, such as instigating a 
massacre of baptized California Indians, forcing mission Indians to work with little or no food, 
and torturing those who resisted or escaped. Instead of distancing himself from Dantí and 
Landaeta, he, for a time, denied that there were any problems at Mission San Francisco. Instead, 
he turned his ire upon a third missionary, the whistleblower Fernández, who alerted Borica to the 
problems at the troubled mission. This pattern of protecting violent, rogue missionaries and 
ostracizing priests he found disturbing would continue through the end of his life. 
The Beginning of the Crisis 
The swift series of events leading to the disaster that engulfed Mission San Francisco 
from 1795 to 1797 began in late in 1794. The destabilization of traditional tribal cultures in and 
around the San Francisco Bay intensified after the founding of the San José pueblo, Mission 
Santa Cruz and the other Spanish outposts in the region that reconfigured Indigenous lifeways. 
Ohlone people of many tribes moved to find work, convert to Christianity, or avoid the Spanish 
invaders altogether. Spain’s colonial machinations and Indigenous responses to them formed a 
new network of Native alliances and rivalries, subsistence needs, and opportunities for the spread 
of disease. These factors coalesced in the late fall in 1794 when coastal Northern California 
suffered a loss of crops due to drought, severely affecting the region around Mission San 
Francisco. During the following winter, two hundred local Ohlone Indians came to the mission 
seeking food. The influx nearly doubled Mission San Francisco’s population.416 Several years of 
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rapid change combined with an unexpected loss of food set off a small-scale migration of hungry 
and desperate people. An unknown epidemic infecting both Missions San Francisco and Santa 
Clara in March 1795 became the spark that ignited the conflagration.417  
 After the epidemic subsided in early April, many newcomers to Mission San Francisco 
left the site and returned to their homes, prompting Fray Antonio Dantí to act. Mission policy 
dictated that baptized California Indians required permission to go on paseo, or a short trip to 
visit relatives. A group of Saclan Indians, a tribe of East Bay Miwok people, returned to their 
homeland in the hills east of present-day Oakland but failed to return when their paseo ended. 
Their failure to return caused Dantí, one of the few remaining temporalistas in California, to take 
matters into his own hands. Dantí was a Catalonian Franciscan born in 1760, who came to 
California in 1790 with Bartolomé Gilí. The Spanish military considered him a hothead. 
Governor Borica called him genio de pólvora – or explosive tempered - and even Lasuén hoped 
to avoid his “querulous” nature.418 Dantí’s temper led to a reckless decision directly opposed to 
the peace in California that Neve and Fages worked to maintain. He ordered a group of fourteen 
Christian Indians on a secret mission to search for the missing Saclans and forcibly return them 
to San Francisco.419 Dantí, revealed both his inadequate knowledge of the tensions simmering 
around the Bay after six months of hardship and dislocation, and of military tactics, when he told 
his squad to only bring ropes to tie up the truant Saclans.420 He forbade them to bring weapons, 
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“assuring them that the pagans would not be able to do any harm to the Christians,” according to 
Governor Borica’s later report.421 
 In late April, as Father Dantí’s squad prepared to cross the bay, they were unaware that 
the Saclan runaways and their allies would fight rather than return to Mission San Francisco. 
Two alcaldes, Pasqual and Rogerio, led the operation, along with three veteran mission Indians 
and nine newcomers, all hailing from the East Bay. After crossing the frigid water in small 
crafts, the squad rested for the night and continued hunting the missing Saclans the next 
morning. At mid-day on April 29, they found an empty Chaclanes village. The group split up as 
it began to rain, some staying at the Chaclanes’ village, and the others heading out into the storm, 
searching into the night. The next day, with no sleep and little rest, the mission squad arrived at a 
Chimenes town. By this time, the group had regained all it members. Unlike the Chaclanes 
village, the Chimenes town contained nearly a thousand people. Immediately upon their arrival, a 
group of men sprang from a dance house “with such force that they broke down the walls,” 
according to an eyewitness.422 While shouting “these men are our enemies,” the Chimenes fired 
arrows at Pasqual and Rogerio’s men.423 As the arrows flew, Pasqual and Rogerio ordered their 
men to flee and tried calming their assailants. They shouted that the group was unarmed and did 
not seek violence. Their words had no effect. The East Bay warriors attacked, leaving seven 
baptized Indians, unarmed and unable to defend themselves on Dantí’s orders, dead in the 
Chimenes town.424 
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 When the survivors made it back to San Francisco, Dantí reeled at the news of the 
calamity he had authored. His orders resulted in the loss of seven baptized Indians. One survivor, 
Oton, who fled as the killing commenced, informed the missionary of the slaughter. Dantí’s 
response demonstrated that Lasuén’s tactics had trickled down to the rank-and-file Franciscans: 
he immediately called Oton a liar. Oton insisted that he told the truth, and that half of the squad 
lay dead in the East Bay hills. Unable to deny the man’s emotional recounting, Dantí relented, 
but ordered Oton to cover up the secret mission. “Then be careful about what you say to any 
soldier or the commander will find out,” he warned, “Be careful to say nothing.”425 Dantí’s 
cover-up failed, as the news spread quickly through Mission San Francisco. The Spanish soldier, 
Second-Lieutenant José Perez-Fernández, later captured the mood around the mission in his 
report to Governor Borica, writing, “But the occurrence was already known to all, as the women 
were crying inconsolably.”426 
 By May 3, Dantí realized that news of the calamity had spread beyond his control and 
acted. Dantí did not first write to Lasuén. Instead, against the father president’s wishes, he broke 
the chain of command and informed Borica. Dantí wrote that the squad, made up of “old-timers 
here,” disobeyed his orders when they continued searching for the missing Saclans after finding 
the first village empty.427 Oton’s testimony to both Perez-Fernández, and later to Borica, made 
no mention of Dantí’s orders. The missionary also expressed remorse over the needless loss of 
life and admitted his “terrible transgression.” Turning sympathies back on himself, Dantí 
declared the news of the baptized Indians’ deaths “a great pain for me” and “the most abundant 
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harvest of sorrow that I could expect in my life.”428 His decision to send an unarmed group of 
men to capture escaped mission Indians, and his attempted cover-up of the resulting massacre 
demonstrated the hubris that typified the Franciscans in California since the nullification of 
Neve’s reglamento in 1787.  
 Dantí’s actions throughout the spring of 1795 are a coalescence of several tensions that 
led to the decline of the California mission system. First, his presence in California resulted from 
the 1749 royal secularization decree and the policies that followed aimed at reducing the 
numbers and influence of the mendicant orders in New Spain. Dantí was a part of the padres 
descontentos cohort recruited after 1749. Decay had set in for the Franciscan order in both 
Mexico and California. It is difficult to know how the situation at the College of San Fernando 
affected the recruits that came through it, but many of that cohort proved unfit or too unstable for 
life in California. Second, Dantí’s operation demonstrated the lack of respect the Franciscans had 
for civil authority in California. The missionaries began their feud with provincial governors and 
Spanish soldiers during Serra’s period and relations became icier after Lasuén’s ascent to father 
president in 1785. A decade later, and after a period of four years of almost total autonomy in 
California, disrespect of civil authority was embedded in Franciscan institutional culture. It 
mattered little to Dantí that the governor and viceregal government both disapproved of forcible 
recapture missions; he wanted the baptized Indians to return. Finally, Dantí’s recapture operation 
is a function of the increasing use of violence to enforce even the most basic elements of 
missionization. Franciscans had often claimed that they only resorted to punishment to correct 
serious religious or social transgressions. Dantí’s actions when combined with Fray Manuel 
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Fernández’s forced recruitment illustrate the Franciscans’ reliance on coercion to recruit new 
converts and to keep baptized Indians in the fold. 
Governor Borica’s Response 
 In the weeks following the disaster, Governor Borica prepared for the violence that he 
expected in the wake of Dantí’s ruinous plot. Only a year passed since the governor learned 
about Fray Manuel Fernández’s threats of violence near San José.429 He now had another 
Franciscan provoking Ohlone people. Though the rumors of an attack on Spanish settlements 
never materialized, Borica now had mounting evidence that missionaries were actively 
destabilizing the San Francisco Bay region and antagonizing the California Indian people there. 
He feared that the violence in the East Bay hills might trigger large-scale fighting. On May 4, he 
informed Dantí of an official investigation.430 That same day, Borica notified Viceroy Miguel de 
la Grúa Talamanca y Branciforte in Mexico City of the failed recapture operation and resulting 
slaughter. Two days later, he wrote the San Francisco presidio warning soldiers that “we should 
go about our business as though the enemy were really in view.”431 On June 6, he again notified 
the Viceroy that he had taken precautions with his soldiers who went out to various Indian 
settlements around the San Francisco Bay. He also reiterated orders to the soldiers that they must 
treat Indians respectfully as to maintain peace and tranquility. Borica instructed them to leave 
villages if any Indians demonstrated hostility, because the small patrols could be easily 
overwhelmed.432 Even as weeks went by without any attacks, Borica remained vigilant.  
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  After visiting Mission San Francisco and conducting his own interviews, the governor 
briefed the viceroy in full, revealing his plan for containing tensions in the region. The 
governor’s interrogation of Oton, the survivor from Dantí’s squad, contradicted the Franciscan’s 
claim that he had ordered the squad to search only one village for the runaway converts.433 
Demonstrating the deep Spanish distrust of Indigenous informants, Borica accepted the priest’s 
version of events. He informed Branciforte: “this tragedy must be attributed to the failure of the 
alcaldes to follow the direction of their ministers” to stop searching if the escaped mission 
Indians were not in the Chaclanes village, “according to what they told me.”434  However, Borica 
chose to believe the intelligence Oton provided regarding the Chimenes. Oton told the governor 
that they were a “rough and valiant lot…they are continuously at war with neighboring 
groups.”435 Borica looked to avoid hostilities with the Chimenes, citing their great numbers, 
martial prowess, and distance from the mission as reasons to avoid engagement. He  divulged to 
Branciforte that he feared angering the Chimenes because their territory included Bodega Bay 
“where in the course of time they could do quite a lot of harm to us as declared enemies,” by 
assisting any foreign powers, such as the Russians or the British, attempting to gain a foothold in 
California.436 Also, he reminded the viceroy that the Chimenes had not attacked “vassals of the 
king, but [only] Indians.”437 Borica sent assurances that missionaries never again would send a 
search party across the bay after escapees from Mission San Francisco. Suspecting that Lasuén 
might not comply, Borica instructed the commander at San Francisco Presidio to inform him 
immediately of any transgression.438 
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Borica’s hunch that the missionaries would not follow his orders proved correct. On July 
6, the governor learned that the San Francisco priests had sent out another squad of converts to 
hunt more escaped baptized Indians in the East Bay hills. Borica wrote to Fray Landaeta to 
admonish him and to once again warn him not to engage in such provocative and dangerous 
actions. The governor was “very uncomfortable about the matter of having sent Indians to the 
other band in spite of the instructions against it.” 439 In a veiled threat, Borica told Landaeta that 
he and Dantí would be wise to honor the agreement made between the Franciscans and the 
military regarding runaways and proselytizing with escorts. In Borica’s view, keeping the 
province safe and quiet was as much the Franciscans’ responsibility as the military’s. The two 
priests at San Francisco abdicated that responsibility when they sent Dantí’s squad into a heavily 
populated and possibly hostile area. In a less veiled threat, Borica warned Landaeta that if he and 
Dantí continued to send baptized Indians to the East Bay, his next steps would cause scandal for 
the mission. “I beg,” he concluded, “with the highest urgency and with the authority of my 
position that you absolutely refrain from dispatching Indians under any pretext to the other 
shore.”440 On July 23, he contacted Landaeta again, reminding the priest to always treat the 
Indians with patience.441 These letters, written well after the events, demonstrate the lingering 
concerns Borica held regarding the province’s peace and stability and the fragility of Spain’s 
presence in California.  
While Borica, Lasuén, and Dantí closed ranks and blamed the squad’s refusal to follow 
orders for the massacre of seven unarmed men, the Indians at San Francisco mission rejected that 
version of events. Even before Dantí’s ill-fated raid, the newest arrivals, many of whom had 
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entered the mission after the failed harvest in 1794, evidenced disillusionment with Christian 
life. After the events of April 29, what started as a trickle of people fleeing the mission turned 
into a deluge. In late summer of 1795, Fray Landaeta confided to the Spanish soldier José Perez-
Fernández that a mass exodus was underway at San Francisco. No less than 280 baptized Indians 
had abandoned Mission San Francisco by August. Even long-time mission Indians fled. 
Moreover, women and men from tribes throughout the peninsula left for the east and north bay 
shores, dramatically redrawing lines of alliance and rivalry throughout the region. Perez-
Fernández spoke to a converted man named José Miguel, who returned to the presidio with two 
other men from the East Bay. José Miguel said a runaway named Enrique was killed in that area, 
and that seven long-time converts, along with thirteen women and their children now lived in a 
village called Pucat. Perez-Fernández asked José Miguel to tell the leader of Pucat that if the 
escapees harbored there returned, the Spanish military would give them gifts and release an East 
Bay prisoner they held. For his part, José Miguel accepted his punishment for fleeing San 
Francisco, but he insisted that he not receive it “at the mission.”442 José Miguel’s motives for 
taking his punishment at the presidio rather than the mission remain a mystery. Did he not want 
to give the Franciscans the satisfaction of punishing him? Did he think that the lashing would be 
less brutal at the presidio? Whatever the reason, his request, along with the mass exodus of 280 
converts demonstrated that the Indigenous people of the Bay Area were rejecting life at Mission 
San Francisco.  
The crisis at Mission San Francisco did not mark the first time Indigenous Californians 
left their missions against the missionaries’ wishes, however, it did mark an inflection point in 
the scope and in the types of escapees. Newly baptized Indians, and even some veterans, often 
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chose returning to their homes, or another friendly locale, over continuing their lives at a 
mission. Estimates of the number of mission Indians who abandoned their mission either 
temporarily or permanently are useful but imperfect and range from between 5 per cent to 10 per 
cent during the mission period, from 1769-1834.443 Moreover, groups of mission Indians 
escaping had occurred before. In 1782, for example, Pedro Fages persuaded a group of escapees 
to return to Mission San Diego through the promise of pardons and the threat of torture.444 
Before the crisis, escapees from the missions tended to be individuals or small groups over 
longer periods or time, rather than scores of people fleeing in mere weeks.445 After 1797, this 
changed. In 1799, Spanish soldiers captured fifty escapees and returned them to Mission San 
Juan Bautista.446 In 1800, Sergeant Pedro Amador captured twenty runaways during a violent 
raid on a Saclan village.447 In 1804, the future father president of the missions, Estevan Tapís 
claimed, “fugitives are increasing and the only remedy is an immediate increase of military 
force.”448 Although these escapes from several Northern California missions may not have been 
directly influenced by the 280 who fled Mission San Francisco, in concert, these defections 
speak to an increasing dissatisfaction with Christian life. That dissatisfaction resulted from 
declining circumstances wrought by both the rapid growth of the California mission system in 
the 1790s and the violent and reckless new missionaries arriving in the region. 
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Father President Lasuén’s Response  
After nearly a month had passed, Father President Lasuén acknowledged the massacre 
and defended Dantí’s methods. Lasuén accepted his subordinate’s version of the events, 
including Dantí’s assertion that he ordered the squad to search one village and then return. 
Lasuén remained certain that Dantí’s orders protected the priest from formal accusation.449 He 
also reminded Dantí that recruiting Indians into the Christian fold worked best when they came 
to the missions on their own. He felt sending converts, particularly recent ones, to recruit new 
Indians to the missions would result in them rejecting Christian life in favor of their traditions. 
While emphasizing the free will of potential converts, Lasuén refused to unequivocally ban Dantí 
from sending out search parties. On one hand, he understood that the most successful path to 
conversion involved curious men and women approaching the missions on their own. On the 
other, he told the priest that raids might still be necessary, and that they could be successful if 
“executed on a larger scale, and [with] more suitable protection.”450 Lasuén’s continual refusal to 
prohibit recapture raids, particularly after a massacre, had immediate effects, as Fray Martín 
Landaeta, Dantí’s partner at San Francisco, sent out another squad in late June.451  
On June 15, Lasuén finally discussed the massacre with Governor Borica. He 
immediately denied Dantí’s culpability. Rather than focusing on the massacre, he emphasized his 
displeasure with Borica’s ban on presidio soldiers or mission guards escorting missionaries on 
overnight proselytizing journeys. Lasuén implored that “this assistance not be denied us so that 
we may carry out our ministry when emergencies of major importance arise.”452 He argued that 
without military protection, the missionaries’ lives were in jeopardy. Although no good 
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missionary feared for his own life, Lasuén worried  about “the vengeance that will be meted out 
to the Indians” if they killed a priest.453 He similarly expressed concern for the well-being of 
soldiers, who would be overworked, thereby undermining the spiritual conquest and threatening 
the province’s stability. In short, Lasuén took no responsibility for Dantí’s actions, nor offered 
any thanks to the governor for the services rendered by soldiers in the weeks after the April 29 
raid into East Bay Miwok territory. Lasuén’s response, one of complete denial, stood in stark 
contrast to Borica’s. The only indication of Borica’s opinion regarding Lasuén’s complaints was 
his total lack of response to them.454 
On June 30, Lasuén acknowledged the massacre to his superior at the College of San 
Fernando in Mexico City. He wrote to Fray Antonio Nogueira, the new guardian there, 
complaining of the “evil results and inconveniences” of Borica’s decision to ban overnight 
escorts for the missionaries.455 Lasuén claimed that Borica’s motive for the ban was a “chance 
misfortune that happened in San Francisco.”456 Lasuén reported that “ten or twelve” mission 
Indians went across the bay to bring back some runaways. According to Lasuén’s version, both 
Dantí and Landaeta warned the squad “strongly on no account to go beyond a certain 
ranchería.”457 Lasuén’s sanitized account bared little resemblance to the actual events. Lasuén 
assured Nogueira: “there was no risk involved in the enterprise, if only it had been carried out 
according to the instructions of the Fathers.”458 Lasuén’s account stood in stark contrast to 
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Borica’s, who reported the affair in exacting detail. Lasuén only informed the college in case 
“some recrimination be made in regard to it.”459  
While Lasuén remained quiet regarding the massacre for the rest of 1795, Governor 
Borica continued investigating the problems that caused so many baptized Indians to flee 
Mission San Francisco. He again contacted Dantí directly, who had transferred away from San 
Francisco after the massacre. Borica accused Dantí of creating living and working conditions that 
Indigenous Californians refused to accept. “Let us stop fooling ourselves,” Borica chided the 
priest, “If their lives do not improve after they come to the mission they will remain in their 
lands.”460 He also suggested that the missionaries at San Francisco “treat [the converts] with love 
by having them work in proportion to how much you can feed them.”461 His last admonition was 
instructive. A secular official – the exact type which Serra, and to a lesser degree Lasuén, had 
both repeatedly denounced as being opposed to the Indians’ well-being – reminded a priest of the 
Christian faith to feed the men, women, children, and elders in accordance with their labor.  
More Missionary Troubles around California 
During the first half of 1796, tensions between Borica and the missionaries in Northern 
California eased, but by the summer conflict between the governor and the priests again 
escalated. On May 27, Lasuén wrote an angry letter to Fray Manuel Fernández, the priest 
accused of resorting to forced recruitment of Ohlone people around Mission Santa Clara in 
1794.462 In the days leading up to the angry missive, the governor confronted Lasuén over the 
missionary’s violent reputation. According to the governor, Fernández admitted to a soldier that 
he ran down a runaway convert with his horse, knocking him violently into the mud. Another 
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Indian man hid in the bushes and fired an arrow at Fernández but missed by the narrowest of 
margins, leaving the arrow in the Franciscan’s habit. Incensed, Lasuén recorded his “great 
humiliation” at “being reproached in regard to these matters by His Lordship.”463 Furthermore, 
Borica charged that Fernández took a soldier, an Indian auxiliary, and some converts out on this 
covert mission that lasted three days and two nights. The matter of missionaries bringing soldiers 
out with them on overnight proselytizing missions remained a continuing source of tension 
between the government and the Franciscans. Lasuén refused to believe that these accusations 
were true, citing Fernández’s “intelligence enough to know that such enterprises require…a 
justifiable necessity.”464 He demanded that the priest tell him everything he knew regarding the 
situation, as formal charges were being prepared against Fernández, something that had not 
occurred since the de la Peña murder case at Mission Santa Clara in 1785.  
That same day, Lasuén wrote to Nogueira in Mexico City to prepare the father guardian 
for the military’s planned inquest. After complaining of “a government which institutes juridical 
inquires because of a simple conversation of no great importance,” Lasuén informed his superior 
that one of their priests at the very least had tried to kill a baptized Indian who fled the 
mission.465 Lasuén’s contempt of civil authority was clear, but by this point in 1796, Borica had 
enough experience in California to see a pattern of Franciscan belligerence that destabilized the 
province. At multiple missions over a year and a half, a group of newer missionaries’ 
recklessness threatened to spark conflict between Spaniards and Indigenous peoples around the 
San Francisco Bay. Borica now had a priest admitting that he committed assault, if not attempted 
murder. Lasuén adopted a stance of dispassionate indifference with Nogueira, but his tone with 
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Fernández illustrated his mounting concerns. Lasuén confirmed the widening gulf between 
himself and the governor when he informed Nogueira that Borica would not let Lasuén 
accompany him to Santa Cruz to begin the investigation. Lasuén admitted he did not know how 
this episode would end, as “some similar examples of inconsiderate haste have been observed in 
[Fernández].”466 In previous instances of this kind, Lasuén resisted admitting that any of his 
priests were guilty of wrongdoing. Borica took swift action because he had a confession. The 
governor had Lasuén on the defensive.  
During his conflict with the governor that occupied Lasuén in 1796, some missionaries 
continued pressing for retirement and fighting among themselves. In the wake of his scandal, 
Dantí repeatedly requested that the father president grant his retirement. Several of his colleagues 
did the same. Tensions brewed when no immediate word on the retirement requests came from 
Mexico City. Lasuén and the Franciscans still faced the same labor shortage that existed before 
the mission system’s expansion. There simply were not enough priests at the College of San 
Fernando in Mexico City to immediately replace outgoing Franciscans from California. Some 
missionaries, such as the aforementioned Dantí and Fray Baldomero Lopez, were “despondent” 
with life in California, according to the father president.467 Some of the missionaries’ 
unhappiness with any assignment added to these frustrations. A few Franciscans had moved from 
mission to mission, without satisfaction, as was the case with Fray Antonio Jayme. Jayme asked 
for a transfer away from Santa Cruz and Lasuén relocated him to Mission San Antonio. Jayme 
then confessed to Lasuén that he held “a thousand fears lest in that mission he would again 
become morose, become ill, and end up . . . becoming incapacitated.”468 Earlier in the year, Fray 
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Juan de la Cruz Espí also resisted a transfer to San Antonio. That mission was the home of Fray 
Buenaventura Sitjar, who was advanced in age by 1796, and a close friend of Lasuén’s. Though 
no one ever mentioned it directly, the younger generation of missionaries’ correspondence 
revealed no joy in pairing with the older stalwart. The lack of a solution pained Lasuén.  
After the accusations against Fray Fernández came to light in the summer of 1796, 
Lasuén scrambled to find pairings of men that would stabilize life at the affected missions. By 
June, two more men, Frays José de Arroita and José Calzada, both of Mission La Purísima 
Concepción, near Santa Barbara, vehemently demanded to return to the college. “Neither have I 
been able to retrain despite all my pleadings, prayers, and requests,” Lasuén wrote, “and I made 
them as forcibly as I could.”469 He admitted defeat to Nogueira, “I cannot do otherwise than give 
them permission to retire to the college.”470 These requests compelled another reshuffling of 
priests. While at Mission San Francisco in late June, Lasuén replaced Dantí with a new 
missionary, a twenty-three-year-old named Fray José María Fernández, who had just arrived on 
the frigate Aránzazu from Mexico.471 This assignment of a new priest in his most problematic 
mission engendered consequences Lasuén could not foresee.  
In July, Lasuén sent a formal retirement request for four of his missionaries, Dantí, 
López, Calzada, and Arroita to Governor Borica and to the College of San Fernando.472 The first 
three men complained of maladies that prohibited them from completing their duties as 
missionaries (though Lasuén noted López’s hypochondria and unfitness for missionary labors), 
and Arroita had completed his ten years in California. He immediately followed that request with 
another letter to the college expressing his concern that Borica would cause an “inopportune 
 
469 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 1:384.  
470 Ibid. 
471 Geiger, Franciscan Missionaries in Hispanic California, 84. 
472 Lasuén to Borica, Carmel, July 20, 1796, SBMAL C.M.D., doc 271.  
 
 
165 
 
and…noisy scene” over the requests.473 He also revealed that Frays Francisco Sánchez and 
Pascual Martínez de Arenaza had asked to retire, but that he had negotiated one more year of 
service from both of them. Despite his fears regarding Borica’s obstinance, the governor did not 
interfere with the retirements, because larger and more pressing concerns occupied his attention. 
Throughout the summer, an unrelated issue of trained artisans from Mexico coming to 
California had also increased tensions between Borica and Lasuén. Lasuén opposed baptized 
Indians working with civil elements. A new development emerged over the course of 1796. The 
viceregal government now wanted mission Indians to learn new crafts at the presidio rather than 
sending the artisans to the missions. Moreover, Borica determined that the craftsmen might 
require full-time Indian servants to complete their work. Lasuén strenuously opposed this reform. 
He argued that the governor’s plan obstructed Christian instruction and placed the spiritual 
conquest in jeopardy.474 The tensions between Lasuén and Borica over the situation with Fray 
Manuel Fernández, the crisis at San Francisco, and the imposition of the artisans had the father 
president livid. The rank-and-file priests apparently shared Lasuén’s displeasure. The artisans 
themselves complained to Borica that the priests at Mission San Carmelo refused to cooperate 
with them. The men told Borica that one of the priests, Fray Arenaza, said they would only 
comply with the viceroy’s orders, not the governor’s. Once the artisans revealed that the orders 
for servants in fact came from the viceroy, Arenaza responded: “away with you, sir. The viceroy 
does not know what goes on here.” He continued, “As to all these matters, they pertain to the 
Father president. Speak to him.”475  Realizing the gravity of this insult, Lasuén attempted to 
control the damage. “As regards my obedience, submission, and reverence for authority…of this 
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I have given proof during the thirty-three years of my ministry, some twelve of them in the office 
of president, in contact with all types of superiors from the lowly corporal of the guard…to the 
Viceroy,” he fumed in a letter to Borica.476 After calling the artisans liars, Lasuén admitted that 
Arenaza was too quick with his tongue at times, though always in service to a joke. Arenaza 
spoke with the weight of Viceroy Revillagegido’s 1787 nullification of Filipe de Neve’s 
reglamento behind him. Nearly a half decade passed since Revillagegido threatened then-
governor Fages and his men with severe penalties if they interfered with the management of 
mission Indians. Moreover, because Lasuén lived at San Carmelo, Arenaza likely spoke with the 
knowledge of the father president’s outlook in mind. Arenaza’s behavior epitomized the 
Franciscan arrogance that had so consumed Neve, Fages, and now Borica.  
In August, Borica sought to learn firsthand what Arenaza said and what the priest 
actually meant. Borica went to San Carmelo to formally investigate Fray Arenaza’s treasonous 
statement. Borica examined two witnesses. One of them claimed that when Arenaza said “As to 
all these matters, they pertain to the Father president. Speak to him,” he literally meant that the 
father president stood nearby, and the artisan should speak to him face-to-face.477 Lasuén 
reiterated that the whole episode was a joke gone wrong. When the questioning ended, Lasuén 
informed Borica that the proceedings irritated him: “I assure you, if they [the English] attack us 
their bullets will not have to be as powerful, in order to drive us from this land, as the impact of 
seeing such matters reduced to judicial formality.”478 Unbeknownst to Lasuén, more judicial 
formalities awaited him. Ten days earlier, and without the father president’s knowledge, Borica 
received a letter from the new man at Mission San Francisco, Fray José María Fernández. Its 
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contents far outweighed Arenaza’s flippant comments. For the first time in California, a 
Franciscan missionary leveled charges of abuse and neglect against his fellow missionaries.  
A Franciscan Whistleblower Emerges 
On August 11, 1796 Fray Fernández sent a secret message to Borica detailing the cruel 
treatment of baptized Indians at Mission San Francisco, prompting the governor into swift 
action. In the letter, Fernández specifically named Frays Landaeta and Dantí as the sources of the 
mass exodus of converts from the mission. Fernández claimed the Indians were deprived of 
warm meals, compelled to labor without rest, and were physically mistreated.479 After receiving 
Fernández’s letter, Borica wrote to Pedro Alberni, a new Spanish officer at San Francisco 
Presidio. He informed Alberni that Fernández and Landaeta wrote him simultaneously regarding 
conditions there. He ordered Alberni to take what Fernández said seriously, as he dealt with the 
Indians in a moderate fashion. The governor also forbade the presidio soldiers from punishing a 
mission Indian unless both priests requested it.480 Governor Fages had attempted to enact the 
same policy after a Kumeyaay man complained that a Franciscan had beaten him in 1790. He 
immediately retracted it due to Viceroy Revillagegido’s pro-missionary agenda.481 Borica’s letter 
revealed that his patience with the Franciscans neared its end. “These are the only means we can 
employ on behalf of the poor and wretched Indians who have suffered so much and continue to 
suffer at that mission,” he wrote. Moreover, “I have spoken to the person who should remedy the 
situation,” he confided to Alberni, “he has not acted with the energy that the situation 
demands.”482 While Lasuén brushed off the massacre of seven mission Indians as a chance 
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occurrence in the summer of 1795, Borica continually worked to mitigate the slaughter’s wide 
ranging consequences. In the midst of that work, a Franciscan came forward to give him the 
evidence he needed to push back against Lasuén’s indifference.  
In early September 1796, Governor Borica ordered an official investigation into the 
problems occurring at Mission San Francisco to discover precisely what drove baptized Indians 
to abandon the site en masse. Alberni led the proceedings and interviewed Spanish soldiers both 
about conditions at the missions as well as the relationship Dantí and Landaeta had with baptized 
California Indians. Raymundo Carrillo reported that the defections “can be attributed to nothing 
other than the bitterness and harshness of the fathers.”483 He stated that the two men at San 
Francisco overworked and underfed the converts and had no talent for managing people. Carrillo 
described a common occurrence at San Francisco. Men and women, driven by their hunger, left 
the mission to find food without permission from the missionaries. When they returned, he 
testified, “they were punished with numerous lashes, the stocks, the lock-up, or shackles.”484 
Carrillo continued, “And worst is that during their imprisonment, they forgot to give them 
anything to eat.”485 He reported that escapees from the mission came to the presidio telling these 
stories and asking for food. Alberni then asked Carrillo if conditions improved after a change in 
missionaries at San Francisco. The soldier replied that since Fray Fernández came to the mission 
the baptized California Indians were “content and happy” and at least five of the people who fled 
several years prior had returned.486 Carrillo suggested that if Fray Landaeta retired, and another 
man like Fernández was sent to San Francisco, many of the Indians who left would return to the 
mission. Amador also agreed that Fernández improved conditions and morale, testifying that the 
 
483 Carrillo quoted in Milliken, “Ethnohistory,” 551. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Ibid., 552.  
 
 
169 
 
new priest had “a distinct manner, love, and gentleness.”487 In his brief time in San Francisco, 
Fernández ingratiated himself to the soldiers and the Indians there and appeared poised to alter 
the trajectory of Mission San Francisco.   
Indigenous Testimony Regarding Life at Mission San Francisco  
Many of the Indigenous men who fled the missions eventually gave accounts of the 
conditions at San Francisco, with soldiers transcribing their testimony. The soldiers did not 
interview every escapee, but those who testified painted a damning picture of life inside the 
mission. Their varied grievances fell into three broad categories. The first centered on violence 
they experienced at the hands of the missionaries or their proxies. A Huchiun man named 
Tiburcio testified that he received lashings five separate times when found crying over the deaths 
of his wife and daughter. Similarly, the informant Homobono reported being beaten for grieving 
the death of his bother. Another man, Roman, fled after his wife and son left the mission to 
return to their homeland rather than face excessive whippings. Claudio left because the alcalde 
Valeriano “clubbed him every time he turned around,” and forced him to work while ill.488 José 
Manuel also reported problems with an alcalde, Raymundo, who hit his hand so hard with a cane 
that two years later it showed damage and limited movement. One man reported that both the 
alcalde Luis and Fray Dantí had beaten him with a whip, and the latter with a cane as well. Dantí 
also whipped a tannery worker named Milan when, due to a lack of food after working all day, 
left without permission to gather clams for his family. Magno also left the mission without 
permission to gather food, and Dantí ordered him stretched out and beaten. He was flogged again 
a week later when he came back late from a paseo. These men’s accounts demonstrated that 
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physical violence was commonplace at Mission San Francisco and often drove new converts 
away.489 
The other two categories of baptized Indians’ reasons for fleeing the mission were 
inadequate food and diseases. One man, Ostano, fled the mission after he lost his wife, a child, 
and his two brothers living at San Francisco. Another man named Liborato reported to the 
soldiers that his mother, two brothers, and three nephews perished from hunger, and that he 
feared the same fate. Nicolas abandoned the mission after his father passed. Patabo’s wife and 
children died, leaving him nothing at the mission. Three others, López, Otolon, and Mangin gave 
brief reports that they ran away from San Francisco because they did not receive adequate food 
from the missionaries. According to this testimony, the mission had become a tragic place where 
death was increasingly common, from both starvation and illness.490  
The testimony from twenty-three Indians who fled San Francisco painted a harsh picture 
of day-to-day life at Mission San Francisco under Frays Dantí and Landaeta. First, it verified the 
presidio soldiers’ claims that baptized California Indians escaped the mission because the priests 
withheld food. One informant, Milan, specifically mentioned being overworked and underfed, 
which soldiers’ testimony corroborated. Second, based on these accounts, violence against 
mission Indians regularly occurred at Mission San Francisco. The Franciscans claimed that they 
only used punishment to correct severe transgressions and never used more force than a father 
would against his own children.491 However, these men’s reports substantiated the French 
navigator Jean François de la Pérouse’s 1786 claim that the missionaries and their agents 
 
489 Milliken, Time of Little Choice, 292-299. 
490 Ibid. 
491 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 117. 
 
 
171 
 
punished mission Indians for “sins which in Europe are left to Divine justice.”492 In the escapees’ 
accounts, the mission alcaldes at San Francisco had free reign to punish mission workers, and 
several of the informants testified that alcalde violence drove them to flee. Rather than assisting 
the converts who lost family members – sometimes even their whole family – Dantí and the 
alcaldes punished those grieving. These reports demonstrated both that conditions at the mission 
were in fact dangerous enough to merit a mass defection, and that baptized Indians found Fray 
Fernández a welcome addition.  
 Some historians investigating the California mission system have discredited or ignored 
the testimony of those fleeing Mission San Francisco. The dean of Franciscan historians, Fray 
Zephyrin Engelhardt, O.F.M. argued in 1912 that “fear of death at periods of epidemics and the 
disinclination to work,” were the chief reasons hundreds of men, women, and children fled 
Mission San Francisco. While the former was true, the latter is an example of Engelhardt’s 
general opinion of Indigenous Californians. However, he made another claim, quoting two 
fathers at Mission Santa Cruz who wrote in 1799 about a totally separate episode. They claimed 
converts ran away due to “‘the ungovernable passion for other women. Those at this mission 
cannot entirely gratify their lust because of the vigilance of the missionaries.’”493 Engelhardt 
therefore concluded, despite seeing all of the testimony given by presidio soldiers and Indians, 
that “some complaints were made by some neophytes…because they hated work, or chafed 
under the restraint put upon their animal propensities.”494 In 1886, the early California historian 
Hubert Howe Bancroft also dismissed the escapees’ testimony, though he was more charitable 
than Engelhardt. Bancroft asserted that “the neophytes fled, not because they were flogged or 
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overworked, but because of the ravages of an epidemic.”495 In 1995, anthropologist Randall 
Milliken took the accounts seriously in his analysis of the consequences of Spanish colonialism, 
arguing that a combination of being overworked, underfed, along with physical punishment and 
disease forced baptized Indians to flee Mission San Francisco.496 For a century, the cultural 
chauvinism of early California historians and their own propensity to disbelieve Indigenous 
people obscured this testimony.  
Mission San Francisco Briefly Stabilizes  
On September 15, Borica wrote to Fernández to assure the priest that his actions were 
noble, and that the governor had no intention of maligning the missionaries as a whole. Borica 
approved of Fernández’s more compassionate approach with the baptized California Indians and 
shared his hope that Lasuén, in the face of complaints coming from his own priest, would now 
agree that Mission San Francisco needed a complete shift in its culture. “What those sad and 
unfortunate Indians have suffered awakens pity and compassion in my heart,” wrote the 
governor, revealing his frustration with his failure to ameliorate the situation. “On numerous 
occasions I have addressed the issue of their welfare, yet the situation has remained 
unchanged.”497 Despite blaming Lasuen’s inaction for the suffering of Indians at Mission San 
Francisco, the governor resisted major reforms. He feared reforms “might prejudice the favorable 
opinion that I want all the public to have of all religious men, which many of them justly 
deserve.”498 Still, while Borica, like his predecessor, considered himself a friend of the 
priesthood, he too felt compelled to correct missionary behavior when it became violent and 
neglectful.  
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The same day he wrote Fernández, Borica also wrote to Lasuén with a decidedly different 
tone. After months of indifference to the plight of the Indians at San Francisco coupled with 
Lasuén’s resistance to the artisans, Borica had stern words for his counterpart. He excoriated 
Lasuén for “lenient practices and compromises that have not served in any way to correct the 
excesses committed against the poor, pitiful Indians at Mission San Francisco.”499 Borica 
referred to Lasuén’s hope that transferring Dantí out of San Francisco would rectify the situation. 
It had not. Borica suggested that Lasuén “take rigorous measures to improve the way they are 
treated, to lessen their labor and to provide them with hot meals, or else they will be done for.”500 
This was yet another case of a governor, as both Neve and Fages had done before, urging 
Franciscan leadership to understand the connection between their treatment of baptized Indians 
and the success of Spanish colonialism in California. Borica continued, “203 deaths and about 
200 fugitives are tragedies that would outrage any superior, whether secular or monastic.”501 
Borica also tried playing to Lasuén’s fear of scandal. “Would it not be a disgrace if the settlers 
were forced to become engaged in lawsuits,” he threatened, “which would prove scandalous for 
the province?” After promising no further indulgences and demanding immediate action, the 
governor added, “it is a matter that keeps me from sleeping and has me talking to myself.”502 
Borica wanted Lasuén to understand the importance of this matter, and that he would challenge 
the order in a way no official had since 1790.  
On September 22, Lasuén wrote to José Argüello, the commander at the San Francisco 
Presidio, to acknowledge receipt of Borica’s orders and his planned implementation. The letter 
was short and written with no direct mention of the nature of that mission’s problems or the 
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ministers involved. Earlier in the month, Argüello requested that Lasuén explain the situation in 
detail, which Lasuén refused: “It is not becoming that I should describe these disputes.”503 He 
informed Argüello that the missionaries heeded Borica’s order that “the work of the Indians be 
made light; that there be moderation in punishing them; and that they be given their rations 
cooked.”504 These were no small matters. They represented some of the same types of problems 
that Neve and Fages believed plagued the missions throughout Alta California. After nearly 
thirty years of warning Mexico City that the Franciscans’ methods were outdated and that their 
arrogance was dangerous, it took the complaints of a fellow missionary to force the order to 
accept some level of reform. Even then, Lasuén denied that there were deep, systemic problems 
in the system. He merely agreed to abide “what the Lord Governor wishes,” as he wrote to 
Argüello.505 
Four days later, Lasuén wrote to Borica to follow up with the governor about the changes 
implemented at San Francisco. Lasuén’s tone had a discernable shift. Well over a year since the 
massacre in the East Bay hills and months after more than 200 Indians fled the mission, Lasuén’s 
mood matched Borica’s bleakness for the first time. Unlike many letters written to governors 
during his time as father president, which were often haughty and imperious, Lasuén’s 
correspondence after arriving in San Francisco revealed a tired, aging man. He confided that he 
came to the mission to “remedy an evil,” which was a “painful effort.”506 Acknowledging 
problems in a way that he had not done previously, Lasuén apologized for his earlier reactions 
when confronted by Dantí and Landaeta’s destructive actions. Lasuén now admitted “passion 
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took over, Sir; it was given complete sway.”507 He then made a stunning confession about his 
mismanagement of the situation: “When [that passion] met with an obstacle, it sought to 
overcome it by methods and means it well knows how to devise.”508 Lasuén responded to the 
crisis in San Francisco early-on by blaming the massacre on Dantí’s squad, dismissing the 
massacre as a chance occurrence, and behaving as though the whole affair was of little 
consequence. This represented Lasuén’s standard procedure in times of crisis, and yet here, after 
a decade in his role, he admitted that his defense of the missionaries in his charge amounted to 
blind passion trying to bludgeon down any perceived obstacles. Rather than the bombastic 
stubbornness Lasuén typically offered, after observing life at Mission San Francisco, his words 
contained remorse.  
 Lasuén continued, addressing the long-term problems at the mission, and detailing his 
proposed solutions. “I am not trying to make saints out of the fathers who have been in charge of 
this mission,” he conceded, “They may have gone to extremes in disciplining.”509 However, 
Lasuén insisted that he had never witnessed any abuses nor had any been reported to him. 
Lasuén could not deny that the two priests overworked Indian laborers to get projects done 
quickly, conceding that “much of it was forced labor.”510 Landaeta promised Lasuén that the 
laborers would now have their workloads reduced. They also served hot food to everyone at the 
mission and waited for more cauldrons to arrive from Mexico to insure this remained the case. 
Although Lasuén’s letter was conciliatory, he refused to agree that the men and women who fled 
the mission did so because of abuse from the ministers. Instead he claimed that no abuse 
occurred, but rather the fear of the illness that broke out in March 1795 caused so many to leave 
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at one time. Nevertheless, Lasuén agreed with Borica’s contention that kindness and love would 
draw baptized California Indians back to the mission. Lasuén instructed Fernández and Landaeta 
that converts should visit their ranchería if the missionaries noticed someone seemed in poor 
spirits or health and allow them to stay there as long as they needed. Lasuén lastly asserted that 
he always worked to avoid public scandals and had no desire for lawsuits brought against the 
Franciscans by settlers or the governor, for “what chance has a poor Father Lasuén against a 
señor like Don Borica?”511 Lasuén had never been so contrite, perhaps signaling that he now 
realized there were times when his priests crossed the line from stern religious teachers into 
cruelty and abuse. On October 2, Borica responded and apologized for his previously harsh tone 
and explained that the changes Lasuén had instituted at San Francisco pleased him. It appeared 
that the two men found a path forward and both desired positive change at the beleaguered 
mission.512 
On November 2, a full month after writing his emotional letter to Borica, Lasuén wrote a 
quite different letter to Father Guardian Nogueira at the College of San Fernando to update his 
superior on the situation in California. He proclaimed that he had “returned from San Francisco, 
a place to which I was obliged to go because of the gravest and most trying problem I have ever 
faced in all my life.”513 Rather than detailing the terrible circumstances at the mission, Lasuén 
preformed a remarkable about-face, declaring “the Reverend Fathers Fray Diego García and Fray 
José María Fernández had plotted with fanatical zeal to expel Fray Landaeta from that 
mission.”514 Moreover, according to Lasuén, “The Indians joined in the conspiracy and the 
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officers of the presidio, Alberni and Arguello joined it or tended that way.”515 The father 
president accused the soldiers of collecting “different unbecoming incidences” from their peers 
and Indians regarding Landaeta and Dantí and “giving them the appearance of cruel, enormous, 
and monstrous crimes.”516 García was the same missionary that once quarreled with Rubí and 
Gilí earlier in the decade, and was not one of Lasuén’s favorite subordinates. He suggested that 
“a strict and rigorous silence be observed…until an occasion arises to withdraw Father Diego 
from the country, without making any reference to this affair.”517 Less than a week after writing 
Borica with humility and sadness, Lasuén had fully recommitted to conspiratorial logic and 
propensity for cover-ups. First, he unequivocally backed the accused priests, as he had with de la 
Peña, even with credible evidence and testimony suggesting serious wrongdoing. Second, he 
resorted to accusations of conspiracy against the order rather than admitting he knew that the 
priests had engaged in neglectful and cruel behavior. Third, he made no mention of the changes 
that he had recommended to Borica, or that the priests at San Francisco engaged in forced labor 
practices. Instead, he only wrote that “everything ended in a peaceful solution and to the 
complete satisfaction of the governor.”518 Lasuén did not directly lie to Nogueira. Rather he 
omitted the most relevant aspects of his settlement with Borica. Perhaps he believed that distance 
from the college would hide his misdirection. 
Lasuén’s letter demonstrated his belief that he could maneuver out of any situation using 
the same tactics he employed in previous scandals. He refused to acknowledge that the disaster at 
San Francisco differed from the other problems during his tenure. When he responded to the de 
la Peña affair, Lasuén knew the accusers’ witnesses were shaky and could be broken in cross 
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examination. When he lied about Gilí’s syphilis, he had the physician, Soler, willing to engage in 
a conspiracy to remove a priest no one wanted in the province. This time however, at San 
Francisco, the problems were multifaceted and well known by people in and around the mission. 
No one could deny that Dantí made a terrible, fatal decision that led to a massacre of seven 
unarmed men who had crossed the bay on his orders alone. Furthermore, that Landaeta sent 
another squad out weeks after Dantí’s demonstrated not only Lasuén’s complete lack of control 
at San Francisco, but also the disregard those two missionaries had for civil authority. Baptized 
Indians escaped the mission and went to the presidio, knowing they had broken the Franciscans’ 
rules and could be punished, in order to get food and to tell the soldiers what transpired at the 
mission. What Lasuén labeled as conspiracy was merely an investigation into rapidly 
deteriorating circumstances.  
A Second Mission Squad Invades the East Bay Hills 
The situation at San Francisco stabilized for both the Ohlone people living there and the 
Franciscans managing the mission into the first months of 1797, but another controversy erupted 
that summer. On June 21, Lasuén transferred Fray José de la Cruz Espí from Mission Santa Cruz 
to San Francisco, following the missionary’s repeated requests to retire back to the college.519 
Landaeta, still stationed there, also petitioned the father president to reassign his friend to San 
Francisco. While some of the converts who fled the mission in 1795 had returned, at least thirty 
former mission Indians remained in the East Bay. With Frays García and Fernández no longer 
stationed at San Francisco, Landaeta and Espí decided once again to form a search squad to 
capture and return the escapees. They did so in direct defiance of Governor Borica, who had 
banned the practice after the Saclans massacred Dantí’s squad. On June 20, Raymundo, another 
 
519 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 2:34; Geiger, Franciscan Missionaries in Hispanic California, 
76. 
 
 
179 
 
alcalde at the mission, led his group of thirty men across the cold waters of the San Francisco 
Bay in small craft to hunt town the missing baptized California Indians.  
On the orders of the missionaries at San Francisco, Raymundo and his squad sought not 
to persuade the baptized Indians to return to the mission, but rather to kidnap them. The group 
quickly found some escaped men, women, and children in three different Cuchillones villages. 
Many of the residents were off at dances, and members of the mission squad worried that the 
Indians harboring the runaways would return from the dances and foil their raid. Raymundo and 
his squad quickly grabbed several escapees and attempted to force them on their small boats. 
Some of the escapees fought with the raiders long enough that their Cuchillones allies discovered 
the scene and attempted to frighten Raymundo. Most of the mission raiding party made it back to 
their boats with the captives. As opposition gathered, Raymundo decided to return to San 
Francisco immediately. During the melee, a storm had rolled into the East Bay, and the rain 
deteriorated their watercraft beyond the point of usefulness. However, the raiders found a village 
willing to supply them with materials to construct new watercraft. Raymundo and a few others 
returned to Mission San Francisco first, with the rest of the raiders trickling back in over the next 
several days.520 To Raymundo, Landaeta, and García, the recapture raid in the East Bay was a 
success. They returned some runaways and suffered no casualties. For the long-term stability of 
Spanish-Indigenous relations around the Bay though, the raid was a dangerous act of 
belligerence.  
One escaped mission Indian, Bibiano Guitchu, a Cuchillon man who lived among the 
Huchiuns for nearly two years before Raymundo’s raid, later detailed to Spanish soldiers the 
anger these kidnappings engendered among some Indigenous groups in the East Bay. Guitchu 
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reported that he observed Raymundo and his raiders while hunting seals along the shore. Had he 
been armed at the time, Guitchu claimed he would have shot the hated alcalde on the spot. He 
was not alone in this, as many of the mission Indians forcibly returned to San Francisco testified 
that alcalde violence had caused many of them to flee. Guitchu then yelled at the group, shouting 
that his friends would “tie up and hang” Raymundo specifically.521 He ran for his weapons at 
about the same time his fellows returned from their dance. By the time Guitchu reached the 
shore, Raymundo and the rest of his group had already fled and searched to find passage back 
across the bay.  
Two other Cuchillon men, Lajus and Oquema, also testified that they attempted to kill 
some of the mission raiders. Lajus told his interrogators that when he heard about Raymundo and 
his squad, he immediately set off after them. He intended to kill as many as possible. Like 
Guitchu, by the time he arrived at the beach, the group had fled. Oquema testified that when he 
and his brother learned of the raiding party, they gathered their weapons and made their way to 
Raymundo’s position. They arrived before the raiders had yet moved on, and Oquema’s brother 
fired arrows at the group. Oquema was armed with a spear and machete, but the mission squad 
was mostly in the water and out of his range. Both men freely admitted to their presidio 
interrogators that they wanted Raymundo’s blood. Their responses demonstrated the dwindling 
patience some people living across the bay experienced in the face of unceasing encroachment 
into their lands and conversion of their people. The series of raids ordered by missionaries who 
ignored government edicts served as flashpoints for the East Bay groups, such as the Saclans and 
Cuchillones. Anger of this type is what Neve and Fages had worked to avoid, fearing that an 
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alliance of Indigenous Californians inflamed by missionary arrogance would threaten Spain’s 
survival in California. 
On June 27, several days after Raymundo’s group returned from the East Bay, Fray 
Fernández wrote a letter to Governor Borica expressing his anger at his fellow missionaries. He 
charged that Frays Landaeta and García attempted to cover up the failed expedition, as Dantí had 
in the summer of 1795. According to Fernández’s account, José Argüello at San Francisco 
Presidio discovered the squad’s existence after Raymundo and his men returned. He confronted 
the two priests, asking for their version of events. Argüello waited twenty-four hours without 
their reply and then sent his own report to Borica. Fernández vehemently denied having 
knowledge of the raid and wrote “if I had been consulted, such an absurdity would not have been 
carried out, for I know…that the fugitive Indians harbor bad feelings toward Raymundo.”522 
Furthermore, the priest claimed that the reason many of the baptized Indians fled the mission was 
not only due to being overworked, but also because of Raymundo’s harsh punishments. 
Fernández’s claim underscored Indian informants’ testimony regarding abusive alcaldes. He 
argued that Landaeta plotted with Fray García because he was unaware of the many tensions at 
play between the Christian Indians at that mission and the tribes in the Easy Bay. Landaeta did 
not include Fernández in the plan because he would have reported it to the soldiers or the 
governor immediately. Fernández concluded with a withering critique of Father President 
Lasuén, without mentioning his name, writing, “Had I been listened to last year, everything 
could have been resolved. But I was not.” He continued, “I was considered an imposter, a 
troublemaker. I was accused of becoming entangled with secular elements who had sinister 
goals.”523 Unlike so many of the previous scandals when Lasuén charged Spanish soldiers and 
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Indians of conspiracy against the Franciscan order, Lasuén now accused his own priest. No 
comparable situation had occurred in the California mission system to date.  
Fernández’s letter to Borica remains important because it shed new light on the manner in 
which Lasuén defended his priests. He leveled a conspiracy charge at Fernández despite 
corroborating evidence coming from Spanish soldiers and baptized Indians at Mission San 
Francisco that Dantí and Landaeta were harming the Indians there. His assertion that Fernández 
plotted against Landaeta cannot be true, based on the preponderance of evidence at hand. That 
Lasuén only made this charge to his superior at the college, while refusing to “make saints” out 
of Dantí and Landaeta when corresponding with Borica reveals his duplicity.524 Therefore, the 
two-year crisis at Mission San Francisco is key to understanding Lasuén’s willingness to lie, 
bully, and obfuscate when the men in his charge faced accusations of wrongdoing, whether or 
not they were guilty. Furthermore, because he used these same tactics throughout his tenure 
when missionaries were charged with physical abuse or other wrongdoings, Lasuén’s entire 
history in this arena must be called into question.  
In the midst of the unravelling situation at San Francisco, Lasuén took the time to 
eliminate the possibility of Fernández’s continued whistleblowing. Throughout his tenure, 
Lasuén strove to maintain the good name of the missionaries. Above all else, he chafed at his 
men going public with their disputes or breaking the Franciscan chain of command by notifying 
a governor of their internal problems. Fray Fernández broke protocol several times in his brief 
time in California, but this last letter went too far for Lasuén. On July 8, Lasuén wrote to Borica 
to request Fernández’s immediate retirement, along with three other missionaries. Fernández had 
not yet reached his ten years of service, but Lasuén concluded that “ever since he came to this 
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province a year ago he has been suffering from attacks that render him entirely unfit for this 
ministry.”525 Fernández indeed complained of feeling unwell in his scathing letter to Borica, but 
he gave no indication of a desire to leave California. In fact, on June 29 Fernández wrote: “I 
dedicate what little health I have left and shall expend it to help them [the mission Indians] until 
not one drop of blood is left in my veins.”526 Those were not the words of a man seeking 
retirement days later. Lasuén learned a valuable lesson in the episode with Rubí and Gilí and 
applied it here. He knew the Franciscans in California had a reputation for malingering and 
hypochondria, and with the help of a pliant physician he could use health as a means to exile 
problem missionaries from the province. He successfully removed Fernández, who returned to 
Mexico in September 1797.527 Lasuén banished the first missionary who revealed awful 
conditions within the mission system from California before he could cause more problems. It 
was not the last time Lasuén declared one of his priests medically unfit for duty as a result of 
whistleblowing.  
The Spanish Military Intervenes   
On June 29, a few days after Raymundo’s raid, rumors of an attack on the newly founded 
Mission San José began to surface.528 Mission guards heard that some Huchiuns planned to strike 
at the Indian workers in and around the mission. Mission Indians, led by alcaldes, had invaded 
Huchiun lands and attempted to forcibly remove people and families the Huchiuns protected. 
The Spanish presence around the Bay Area had expanded since 1790 due in large part to the 
assistance of Indian labor, and in the case of the alcaldes, a group of baptized Indians willing to 
enforce Spanish religious and political mores through violence. Without their help, Spanish 
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colonial projects and further expansion were impossible. Attacking Indian workers made 
practical sense for the Huchiuns, as well. They were easier targets than the well-equipped 
soldiers and direct attacks on laborers might send the message to others that allying with the 
Spanish came with great risks. On July 3, additional reports of people from the East Bay hills 
planning to attack the new mission reached its guards. A few days later, the rumors intensified 
enough that Lieutenant Amador went to Mission San José to investigate.529  
Unlike the situation in 1794, when rumors circulated about an attack on the pueblo of San 
José, Amador found the new reports credible and necessitated military action. A baptized Indian 
named Tilomeno told Amador that Indians beyond the missions engaged in serious infighting 
regarding providing labor for the Spanish. Saclans from the East Bay, one of the groups that 
participated in the massacre in 1795, warned an unnamed group near San José not to get 
involved with the Spanish. The Saclans told this group that they would kill everyone involved, 
including the Franciscans and soldiers. The leader of the pro-Spanish group told the Saclan 
attacking the soldiers would be folly, as they were well armed and rode horses. While the 
aggressors continued to make their threats, the unnamed leader told the few baptized Indians 
watching the altercation that he and his people would come to the mission and help them, 
causing the Saclans to angrily withdraw. Amador took this very seriously and wrote to Borica to 
inform him that “many rancherías are joining together. They are manufacturing arrows.”530 He 
connected the dots for Borica, informing him that the Saclans who came to give the warnings 
hailed from the village that committed the massacre against Dantí’s squad. The results that 
Borica feared from that ill-fated mission were now becoming a reality.  
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Aside from the fallout from the kidnappings and incursions ordered by the Franciscans at 
Mission San Francisco, Indigenous raids on Spanish livestock in the same areas also increased 
tensions. In early July, unnamed Indigenous peoples from the Santa Clara area killed some 
Spanish horses. Borica ordered Amador to punish the horse killers. Amador agreed that such a 
course “was necessary to set the pagans straight.”531 There was a lesson in this small event, in 
Amador’s estimation. “I think the same is necessary with…the Saclans,” he confided to Borica, 
“because they have the idea that we fear them.”532 The soldier lost faith in diplomacy, which in 
his eyes only emboldened the East Bay tribes. His words and recommendations arose from a 
desire to end the threats, rumors, and livestock deaths happening in an area allegedly under 
Spanish control. He offered advice to Borica, writing, “In case you decide to cut the threads of 
the malignant cancer which these pagans are spreading…I would consider myself the least of 
your representatives.”533 Over the last two years, Borica sought to calm the tensions simmering 
in the region to avoid large-scale bloodshed. He took a long view, as he hoped to keep relations 
between the Franciscans and Indigenous Californians harmonious. Indigenous labor and general 
participation were integral to Spanish success in California. Without their assistance and 
cooperation, Spain’s presence in California was at best temporary. Therefore, Indigenous anger 
and frustration remained first in Borica’s concerns. That focus caused him to lose sight of his 
own men’s growing frustrations with the governor’s inaction. In the end, a large coalition of 
Indigenous warriors attacking one of the missions in Northern California did not set off the 
largest Spanish military action of the eighteenth century. Rather, the anger of his own troops at 
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Borica’s adherence to diplomacy with people they considered savages stoked the Spanish 
soldier’s desire for a fight.  
On July 10, Borica conceded to Amador’s advice and ordered a military operation into 
the East Bay to apprehend the Saclans responsible for the 1795 massacre. The Spanish military 
lacked the necessary active-duty troops to engage the Saclans and other tribes in the East Bay, 
and therefore called on retired soldiers and two civilians to send an appropriately sized unit into 
hostile territory. Additionally, Borica ordered Amador and his men to capture and return any 
baptized Indians they found while in the field. The governor separated himself from his 
predecessors Neve and Fages with his willingness to forcibly capture Indigenous Californians 
who fled the missions. Although he tasked the unit with bringing back the Saclans and the 
escapees, the governor wanted to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. He knew that the 1795 massacre 
partially caused 280 Indians to abandon Mission San Francisco later that summer. Amador’s 
forces walked a thin line between bringing back their targets without causing new reasons for the 
converts to flee back to their homelands.534  
On July 13, Amador and his men began their search for the runaways and Saclans in the 
Easy Bay. The following evening, they came upon the Saclans’ village and set up camp, satisfied 
they went undetected. In the morning, the Spanish force attacked the village, beginning the 
largest skirmish between Spanish and California Indian warriors in the eighteenth century. 
Amador followed Borica’s orders, yelling to the Saclans that they did not want to fight; they only 
wanted the mission Indians to return. The Saclan warriors then opened fire on the Spaniards with 
a volley of arrows that killed one horse and wounded two others. The Spanish soldiers 
immediately responded, and a two-hour battle ensued. Within the village, the Saclans had 
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prepared for a Spanish attack, creating defensive structures, which Amador later praised for their 
effectiveness. During the fight, most of the non-combatants in the village fled unharmed. When 
the skirmish ended, seven of the defenders were dead, while the Spanish suffered no casualties. 
Amador and his men realized what they thought was one large town was actually three villages 
that sat near each other. The Saclans fled to the other two villages and the Spanish captured them 
without a fight. After the first battle, Amador repeatedly shouted that they wished no harm, and 
indeed, no more blood was shed that day. From the first two villages, the force captured thirty-
two Saclan and baptized men, women, and children. Before they set off for the next target, 
Amador set free the Saclans who were not involved with the 1795 massacre. They encountered 
another large group of Saclan defenders and briefly clashed with them, causing one causality. 
With that they travelled towards a Cuchillones village and camped far enough away not to be 
noticed in the dark of night.535 
The next morning, Amador and his men once made themselves known to the 
Cuchillones. As their warriors prepared for a defense against the Spanish invaders, Amador 
ordered their interpreters to inform the defenders that the Spanish meant no harm, and only 
looked to return Christian Indians to their mission. The interpreters shouted that fighting only 
occurred the previous day because the Saclans shot first. This time, the Spanish message worked, 
and the Cuchillones warriors laid down their weapons without violence. With hostilities ended, 
some men from both tribal groups gave up the location of the rest of the runaway baptized 
California Indians and the Saclan fighters from 1795.536 The Spanish forces kept their promise 
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and no more fighting occurred as they prepared to take their now large contingent of captives 
back across the bay.  
On July 18, Amador and his men returned to Mission San José with their quarry. The 
soldiers captured eighty-three escaped men, women, and children during their operation, a huge 
portion of those who fled in 1795. Additionally, they brought back nine Saclans and Cuchillones, 
all facing trial for their roles in the attack on Dantí’s squad in 1795 and Raymundo’s from June. 
Amador also brought back some unconverted children as hostages to maintain the peace between 
the East Bay tribes and the Spanish. The soldier reported to Borica that he told the parents to 
send the children willingly, not out of fear, and was proud that they came voluntarily. It is 
impossible to know the veracity of his report, as his sizable unit had killed eight warriors in less 
that twelve hours, a considerable number in the eighteenth century. Amador informed Borica that 
he had failed to apprehend the leaders of the group they clashed with days before, because “they 
are very haughty Indians. It is not easy to make them confess, either by persuasion or by severe 
force.”537 Whether Amador referred to the severe force used in the fight at the first village, or to 
torture that occurred after, is unclear, but this detail undermined the idea that East Bay parents 
gave up their children without fear. From the Spanish perspective, the operation was a success. 
They rounded up scores of escaped baptized Indians, captured their Saclan targets, and 
demonstrated their military force in one mission. For the East Bay tribes and the escaped 
converts, the Spanish round up was an unmitigated disaster. The Spanish killed eight warriors 
and overran their defenses without much trouble. They had refused to bow to the Spanish for two 
years, but in the end, Spanish forces overcame their resistance.  
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On August 9, the Spanish held a military trial for the accused East Bay men. Borica 
judged all fourteen of the accused guilty, despite some of them claiming to have no knowledge 
of or involvement in the two separate episodes in 1795 and 1797. One man, Potroy, a baptized 
Indian and the leader of the Chimenes that massacred seven mission Indians, received a 
punishment of seventy-five lashes on three separate occasions, one year in shackles, and would 
receive no wages for his labor. Borica sentenced another man, Caguas, to fifty lashes on two 
separate occasions. Four other men received twenty-five lashes one time, and the remaining nine 
would spend time in shackles or stocks, some for as long as eight months.538 Though several of 
the sentences involved torturous physical punishment, Borica did not order any of the men 
executed, though likely because the accused had not killed any Spaniards. He continued his 
policy of avoiding bloodshed between the Spanish military and Indians unless his men were 
under attack. The Saclans, Chimenes, and Cuchillones only defended their homes and families 
from three separate invading forces and the rumors of an attack on missions or the pueblo of San 
José never materialized. Borica’s sentencing acknowledged those facts while demonstrating 
Spanish power in the region. With that, the two-year crisis came to its conclusion. 
 The crisis that engulfed Mission San Francisco from 1795 through 1797 is the most 
important episode for understanding the decline of the mission system as a result of decades of 
inconsistent Spanish imperial policy and growing missionary opposition to any reforms from 
secular sources. Unlike the other scandals that occurred after 1785 and the transfer of power 
from Junípero Serra to Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, the San Francisco disaster generated 
testimony from multiple sources, including Franciscan missionaries. Some missionaries 
eschewed their chain of command and wrote directly to governor Borica, whether it came as a 
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confession, as in the case of Antonio Dantí, or to alert the governor to a host of problems at the 
mission, as in the case with José María Fernández. This gave Borica unprecedented access 
behind the scenes at the mission and an advantage that his predecessors Neve and Fages never 
enjoyed. Furthermore, unlike previous incidents, hundreds of mission Indians were involved in 
the problems at San Francisco, and some of them could tell their stories to soldiers without the 
fear of intimidation by the Franciscan missionaries or the alcaldes. Even father president Lasuén 
partially admitted to the systemic issues at the mission, and implemented a few reforms meant to 
improve conditions. Finally, the soldiers serving at Mission San Francisco and the nearby 
presidio stood their ground when giving reports or testifying about missionary behavior. These 
factors combined to present a clear picture of missionary culture gone wrong at San Francisco.  
 More than a decades’ worth of allegations of mistreatment or neglect of mission Indians, 
disregard for Spanish soldiers, and insubordination leveled at the Franciscans were echoed in the 
events at San Francisco. Although this does nothing to prove that those cases were true, the 
manner in which Lasuén’s typical defense of his missionaries unraveled is instructive. He 
immediately attempted to defend Dantí and Landaeta despite clear evidence of wrongdoing. 
Only when he could not bully or outmaneuver Borica did he admit that the Ohlone people at San 
Francisco were overworked and underfed. Furthermore, there remained incontrovertible proof 
that the father president deceived Father Guardian Nogueira at the College of San Fernando 
about Fernández and García conspiring against Landaeta. His letter accusing those missionaries 
of a plot against the minister at San Francisco came on the heels of his correspondence with 
Borica, which was the closest Lasuén came to admitting that some of his missionaries were out 
of control. Because Lasuén attempted once again to construct a web of secular conspiracy 
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against the missionaries as a defense against wrongdoing, only to have that assertion proven 
false, all previous scandals in which Lasuén used these tactics must be reconsidered.  
 Adding to the premise that Lasuén could not control his missionaries, or that he even 
emboldened their arrogance, were the circumstances of Frays Miguel Fernández and Arenaza, at 
missions Santa Cruz and San Carmelo, respectively. At the very moment the priests at San 
Francisco sent squads of Christian Indians on raids to capture escaped converts, Fernández again, 
for the second time, was accused of using intimidation and violence to coerce Indians into 
converting to Christianity. Lasuén was so upset he did not bother to offer a denial, and bitterly 
rebuked Fernández. And Fray Arenaza’s alleged joke, that the viceroy had no power in 
California and that the father president ruled supreme in the region came at the worst possible 
time and place. Not only was it treasonous, but Arenaza was at San Carmelo, Lasuén’s home. 
The idea that Arenaza had dozens, if not hundreds, of conversations with Lasuén is not without 
merit. That these two episodes occurred simultaneously with the events at San Francisco speaks 
to a culture of institutional arrogance in which the Franciscans imagined themselves beyond 
reproach in California. Franciscan attitudes and behaviors that their adversaries labeled 
arrogance entered full bloom after the nullification of Neve’s legal code for governing the 
province in 1787. Borica believed that arrogance led to the crisis at Mission San Francisco. 
 Though the situation at San Francisco stabilized after the summer of 1797, Father 
President Lasuén contended with new problems among his missionaries - growing out of their 
treatment of Indians both within the mission system and without. In August 1797, Lasuén again 
faced a whistleblower within his ranks. Fray Antonio de la Concepción Horra, known commonly 
as Fray Horra, followed in the footsteps of Fernández and leveled a devastating series of charges 
against Franciscans in California. He revealed systemic issues throughout the entire mission 
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system. Horra’s accusations forced Lasuén to draft what became the grandest defense of the 
California mission system ever crafted. It remains the deepest view into the culture of the 
Franciscans and inadvertently undermined much of their rhetoric regarding their love of the 
Indians in their care.  
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Refutation of Charges, 1797-1803 
 The period from mid-1797 through 1803 were the last years of Father President Fermín 
de Lasuén’s life. They were also the most trying. The problems he wrestled with during the crisis 
at Mission San Francisco did not fade in its aftermath. Rather, they gained momentum, owing in 
large part to an unexpected newcomer to California, a priest named Antonio de la Concepción 
Horra. Fray Horra was another Franciscan in California with alleged behavioral, physical, or 
mental problems. In 1797, once Lasuén came to believe Horra was insane, he quickly sent the 
priest back to Mexico.539 Months later, the New Spain’s viceroy, Miguel José de Azanza Alegría, 
demanded an explanation for the exile, prompting Horra to write a lucid, damning account of the 
innerworkings of the Franciscan missions in California.540 Because Horra was the second 
missionary in California to raise concerns regarding Franciscan management of the colony, and 
the second to be branded insane while doing so, the viceregal government in Mexico City 
determined to investigate the function and management of the California mission system.  
Horra’s denunciation of the Franciscans in California, coming in 1798, and the 
government’s responses to it in Monterey and Mexico City marked a turning point for the 
perception of the missions. Horra charged his brothers with shocking degrees of mismanagement 
and misconduct. His accusations ranged from ecclesiastical lapses, to abusive punishments, and 
naked greed. The charges mirrored those many Spanish soldiers and nearly all of California’s 
governors leveled at the order. Unlike those previous critiques, this condemnation came from a 
priest inside the order and could not be dismissed as inter-institutional animosity. Horra’s 
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indictment also covered far more of the Franciscan enterprise than what Fray José María 
Fernández had documented at Mission San Francisco two years prior. For the first time in thirty 
years, a viceroy demanded answers regarding the management of the missions and empowered 
the governor in California to find them. On December 3, 1798, Governor Diego de Borica 
produced a questionnaire for his officers that responded to Horra’s charges and asked for their 
observations of missionary conduct. When those responses reached Viceroy Azanza, he decided 
that the Franciscans needed to answer for them. Lasuén produced a lengthy defense, titled 
Refutation of Charges, with 130 points in response to Horra’s complaint. Lasuén’s Refutation 
remains the most thorough examination of the mission system’s innerworkings to date.541  
This chapter details Horra’s letter, the charge of insanity against him, Borica’s 
questionnaire, and Lasuén’s Refutation. This final phase of Lasuén’s presidency served as a 
microcosm of his entire tenure, offering an unprecedented window into his leadership style, his 
outlook on Indigenous Californians, and the means he employed to maintain the good name of 
the missionaries. Horra’s mental state can never be proven, yet much of the existing 
documentation mirrored the questionable actions Lasuén took to remove Bartolomé Gilí and 
Mariano Rubí from California in 1794. While the truth is unknowable, the lucid, poignant, and 
damning letter Horra wrote after returning to the College of San Fernando in Mexico City 
undermined Lasuén’s and Fray Buenaventura Sitjar’s claims that he suffered a mental 
breakdown. Whether mentally ill or not, Horra’s letter profoundly affected Franciscan California. 
Likewise, the questionnaire Borica crafted in response homed in on the problems civil leaders 
battled while governing California with the Franciscans. Despite some officers contradicting a 
 
541 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 2:194-234. 
 
 
195 
 
few of Horra’s claims, they confirmed enough that the viceregal government moved to act. 
Mexico City demanded answers from Lasuén. 
Completed in 1801, Lasuén’s Refutation remains a critically important document for 
understanding the innerworkings of both the Franciscan missions and the attitudes of the 
missionaries towards California and the Indigenous people who had lived there for millennia. 
Although the first father president, Junípero Serra, wrote extensively on mission functions, he 
never matched the systematic delineation of Lasuén’s Refutation. He covered almost every phase 
of mission life in his defense. Lasuén addressed the work demands, spiritual teachings, sexuality, 
clothing, eating habits, and resistance to colonization of baptized California Indians. Certainly, 
Lasuén’s male, Catholic, and Spanish sensibilities distorted his representations. Nevertheless, 
that is exactly the document’s value. Using it to gain an authentic understanding of Indian 
peoples’ lives would be folly. However, employing it as a lens through which to analyze 
Lasuén’s presidency is useful. This is significant because Lasuén’s earlier reactions to scandals 
were shrouded in mystery and well-managed obfuscation. The Refutation lifted that veil. The 
Refutation reflects backwards on the scandals and tumult covered throughout this dissertation 
and sheds new light on questions that lingered about de la Peña, the temporalistas, and Mission 
San Francisco, amongst others. It does not paint a positive portrait of Lasuén or the Franciscans 
and their relations and understanding of California’s Indigenous peoples. In fact, it ensured that 
successive governments continued to press the order to explain its methods and outcomes in 
California. 
Fray Horra’s Sanity in Question 
Sometime in early August 1797, Father President Fermín de Lasuén learned that a 
missionary, just recently arrived in California, had reportedly gone insane. The afflicted man, 
 
 
196 
 
Fray Antonio de la Concepción Horra, was born in San Martín de Rubuales, Spain in 1767, 
making him one of the youngest Franciscans in California. He entered the order in 1784 and 
came to Mexico eleven years later in 1795. Horra spent two years at the College of San Fernando 
in Mexico City before transferring to California.542 Lasuén assigned Horra to the newly 
established Mission San Miguel Arcángel with one of the oldest Franciscans in California, and 
good friend to the father president, Fray Buenaventura Sitjar. Sitjar was born in Mallorca, Spain 
on December 9, 1739 and arrived in Mexico in 1769. He arrived in California in 1771 and was 
the cofounder of Mission San Antonio, just outside modern Monterey County.543 Sitjar revealed 
Horra’s concerning behavior to Lasuén less than a month after the young missionary’s arrival. 
The experienced monk thought the situation so grave as to forego writing the father president. 
Instead, he travelled over 100 miles from San Miguel to San Carmelo to inform Lasuén 
directly.544  
 Sitjar told a frightening tale of Horra’s mental state. He reported that Horra suffered a 
total nervous breakdown shortly after landing in California, and that his condition hindered the 
mission’s chances to both recruit and maintain relationships with newly converted Salinan 
Indians who lived in the area. Horra raved like a maniac, according to Sitjar, and his unstable 
behavior drove some baptized Indians from missions San Antonio and San Luis back to their 
homes. Sitjar himself avoided being alone with Horra for any length of time, as the young 
priest’s outbursts so frightened him. Moreover, according to Lasuén and Sitjar, Horra raved so 
intensely that well-armed veteran Spanish soldiers, wearing leather armor, were “terrified and 
perturbed.”545 Lasuén took Sitjar’s report seriously and contacted Governor Borica, informed 
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him of the situation, then requested that he call Horra to appear in Monterey, even if that meant 
bringing the afflicted missionary in chains. Lasuén hoped the governor would consent to send 
Horra back to Mexico for treatment.546 Rather than using force though, Lasuén wrote Horra and 
asked him to travel to Monterey for “a certain errand.”547 Unaware of the reason for the 
invitation, Horra complied and travelled to Monterey. 
  Lasuén’s response to one of his newest priests apparently losing his mind stood in stark 
contrast to his response to Fray Tomás de la Peña’s earlier breakdown. In that case, Lasuén 
evidenced concern for the missionary, who faced murder charges.548 He met with the accused 
missionary more than once to fully understand both the charges and to ascertain the status of his 
mental health. A decade later, Lasuén followed a different course. He never met Horra to observe 
the man’s condition. Instead, he wrote a letter to Governor Borica expressing his sorrow at 
Horra’s fate.549 Lasuén again refused to observe him when Horra went to Monterey to meet with 
the governor. The only information Lasuén possessed regarding Horra’s faculties was Sitjar’s 
word. On this scanty evidence, he had the priest quickly removed from the country.  
 Though the turn of events surprised both Borica and Horra, the governor eventually 
acquiesced to Lasuén’s demands. Back in July 1797, Borica had met the young monk shortly 
after the foundation of San Miguel yet failed to notice anything unusual about him. However, he 
later confided to Lasuén that perhaps he met Horra during a lucid moment.550 Borica allowed 
Horra to write Lasuén before the governor made his final decision regarding his status. Based on 
that letter, it is unclear if Horra knew exactly why he went to Monterey or why Lasuén removed 
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him from the province. Horra wrote that “by word of mouth” he heard that Lasuén sent a third 
missionary to San Miguel, and through similar means Horra learned of Lasuén’s request that he 
meet with Borica. He did so “without raising any objection – for I am a son of obedience, and 
have always accustomed myself to obey the least suggestion of my superior, blindly, as the 
saying goes,” Horra later wrote to Lasuén.551 After telling Lasuén that he would embark for 
Mexico whenever they received word, Horra wrote that he was “suffering from a serious chest 
affection, as I told the governor. There is nothing else that occurs to me at the moment, except to 
pray that god may keep Your Reverence for many years.”552 Horra’s letter indicated his 
ignorance regarding returning to Mexico, or that it pertained to his mental state. On September 2, 
1798, after hearing Sitjar’s account, the governor signed off on Horra’s return to Mexico.553 In a 
fitting coincidence, Horra took the same ship back to Mexico as José María Fernández.554 Both 
of California’s only Franciscan whistleblowers were exiled to Mexico at the same time, each 
having been labeled insane. 
Fray Horra’s Accusations 
 On July 12, 1798, after nearly a year of silence, Fray Horra wrote a letter to viceroy 
Azanza that rocked the governments and Franciscan order in both Mexico and California.555 
Azanza, only viceroy for two months, demanded to know why, with California always desperate 
for missionaries, a priest returned so quickly to Mexico. In his letter, Horra leveled the most 
serious charges against his brothers in the distant province than anyone since former governor 
Felipe de Neve in the early 1780s. Fray Fernández’s withering critique from just a year before 
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paled in scope. Whereas Fernández’s accusations focused on two individual missionaries going 
rogue in a single mission, Horra’s letter attacked the entire Franciscan order in California, 
starting with the leadership of Father President Lasuén and his trusted allies, such as Fray Sitjar. 
Horra also confirmed tactics Lasuén and his allies used to cover up abuses in the past: Horra 
insisted that Lasuén branded him insane, like Fernández, to undermine his credibility.556 
 Although only one of many charges detailed in Horra’s letter, his accusations recounting 
Franciscan abuses against the Indigenous population generated great interest. Horra joined a long 
list of those who came to California through Mexico and alerted officials about problems in the 
missionaries’ treatment of Indians. Accusations of Franciscan cruelty occurred through every 
stage of the mission period in the eighteenth century. In 1771, only two years after Mission San 
Diego’s founding, Pedro Fages issued the first salvo against missionary malfeasance.557 In the 
mid-1770s, the short-term governor, Fernando Rivera y Moncada, made himself a pariah among 
the Franciscans in California for challenging Junípero Serra’s methods. For Neve, exposing the 
missionaries’ abuses and dramatically reforming the system proved a key issue of his 
administration. As governor from 1775 to 1783, Neve pulled no punches, comparing the 
Indigenous Californians in the mission systems to slaves.558 Fages’ repeated clashes with the 
missionaries over abuses has been documented throughout this work.559 Governor Borica 
experienced the repercussions of Franciscan abuses more than any other governor in the 
eighteenth century, including the entire arc of the Mission San Francisco crisis. Among the 
chaos, violence, and death that resulted from that disaster emerged an unlikely voice joining the 
chorus of mission detractors, a fellow Franciscan, Fray José María Fernández. In his letter, Horra 
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confirmed what accusers before him had claimed: “The manner in which the Indians are treated 
is by far more cruel than anything I have ever read about.” As Horra recounted, the baptized 
Indians “are severely and cruelly whipped, placed in shackles, or put in the stocks for days on 
end without receiving even a drop of water.”560 Charges similar to these circulated for decades. 
The potentially damning new development was that they came from a missionary, not a secular 
rival.  
 Horra echoed many governors’ complaints about the missionaries’ imperious nature and 
greed. He informed the viceroy that the veteran missionaries “do not even provide the [newly 
founded missions] with the most basic items to sustain ourselves for the first year, even though 
the older missions have thousands of head of cattle and horses.”561 According to the disgruntled 
monk, veteran missionaries refused transfer to a newly established mission, knowing that their 
first years there would be bereft of material advantage. He detailed several specific cases of 
miserly behavior. First, when he and a group of priests arrived at Mission San Francisco the day 
before Easter, “they refused to give us wine to celebrate even though as I had heard it they had 
spent 200 pesos on a barrel of liquor.”562 Similarly, some artisans, new to California and 
despised by Lasuén, travelled the long distance from San Diego to Monterey. After arriving at 
San Carmelo, the missionaries refused to feed the artisans’ families or even give them cabbages 
after their journey. In Horra’s account, the missionaries also refused to feed Spanish soldiers.563 
He then confirmed one of Fages’ most bitter complaints about the missionaries: that they charged 
the military whatever they felt for food, rather than adhering to official prices. “If the purchaser 
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challenges them,” Horra penned, “they tell him to go and buy what he wants from the governor. 
The sailors are excellent witnesses of this practice because they observe it every year.”564  
 While he spent much of his letter to the viceroy describing systemic issues within the 
missions, Horra’s most passionate accusations targeted the long-time veteran of the California 
mission system and Lasuén’s good friend, Fray Sitjar. Sitjar by this time was fifty-nine years old 
and had worked in California since January 1771.565 By all Spanish metrics, Sitjar was a 
successful missionary, whom his fellow Franciscans held in esteem. At the time of his death in 
1808, he baptized some 3,400 California Indians and raised over 4,000 cattle and 10,500 sheep. 
Sitjar also wrote a manuscript detailing some of the vocabulary of the Mutsun language.566 Yet 
Horra used this interest in Indigenous languages as his opening salvo against Sitjar. He reported 
that Sitjar taught the new converts Christian doctrine in their own language, defying the King’s 
laws.567 To twenty-first century sensibilities, this marks Sitjar as something of a progressive for 
his era. At the time, however, this practice offended the Catholic faith.  
Teaching the gospel in native languages was not the only insult to the faith that Sitjar 
committed. The dissident priest accused Sitjar of a host of ecclesiastical transgressions. Some 
were familiar impeachments, which went well beyond Sitjar and California. Horra, for example, 
repeated the oft-made accusation that Franciscans baptized people who had little to no Catholic 
training, thus inflating baptismal numbers. Of Sitjar, in particular, Horra claimed that he 
“baptizes them without teaching them the very explicit and essential information that one needs 
to comprehend to receive this holy sacrament.” Horra further explained that Sitjar did this to 
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augment early baptismal numbers for newly founded missions. 568 Indians who received quick 
baptisms often left the mission after a few days and were rebaptized, sometimes after many 
years, “a practice which occurs daily,” Horra contended.569 Horra confronted Sitjar about these 
issues and threatened to notify the government in Mexico of his misdoings if they continued. 
What happened next, at least in Horra’s account, set off a chain reaction that prompted Sitjar’s 
questioning of his sanity and his eventual exile from California. “His anger was so intense that 
he burst out with many offensive words against Our King and his ministers.”570 Sitjar’s 
indignation was not surprising, as charges of inflated baptismal numbers dogged the Franciscans 
in the Americas for centuries. 
As Spanish colonization of the Americas began in earnest during the sixteenth century, 
the Franciscans reported extraordinary numbers of baptized Indians as the supposed results of 
their efforts. As early as 1524, immediately following Hernán Cortes’ conquest of Mexico, 
Franciscans claimed to baptize one million Nahua. Five years later, the missionary Fray Pedro de 
Gante boasted of 14,000 baptisms per day.571 In 1531, the Franciscan general chapter announced 
250,000 Indians had received the holy waters (a Spanish translation of the chapter’s report 
claimed 1 million).572 In 1540, the Franciscan chronicler Toribio of Benavente, commonly 
known as Motolinía, claimed that the order had baptized 6 million individuals.573  
These claims met with much skepticism from the other missionary orders. The 
Dominican missionary and colonial critic Bartolomé Las Casas denounced hasty Franciscan 
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baptisms as lacking proper religious instruction and the necessary materials.574 Motolinía 
admitted that adults were given only brief instructions before receiving the water, with friars 
essentially convincing the Indians that these rites were meaningful. Members of the other 
missionary orders and Pope Paul III denounced the Franciscans’ focus on numbers over religious 
awakening.575 The Frist Council in 1555 specifically mandated that “no priest or monk 
administer the sacrament of baptism to any adult except he be sufficiently instructed in the holy 
faith.”576 Even Serra in the early period of colonizing California taught his missionaries that 
baptism meant immediate conversion, and each conversion represented another victory in the 
spiritual conquest.577 The Franciscan zeal for immediate conversion remained an issue they 
contended with throughout their time in the Americas. Their efforts to convert as many Indians 
as quickly as possible in the face of consistent, though mild, opposition to the practice speaks to 
how deeply imbedded it was in their missionary endeavor. 
While Horra’s charges in totality painted a damning picture of life in and around the 
missions, Fray Sitjar’s ecclesiastical lapses represented the sharpest departure from earlier 
complaints from civil authorities. Borica and Fages, particularly the latter, placed pressure on the 
Franciscans to reform spheres that overlapped with their secular responsibilities. Neve was the 
last governor who inserted himself into the inner affairs of the missionaries, and Mexico City 
repealed his reformist legal code after interpreting it as an overreach, or even a power grab. The 
two later governors warned Mexico City that some missionaries’ actions hindered the spiritual 
conquest, but they went no further. Fray Horra observed no such constraints. And like the 
temporalistas that came before him, Horra had not lost faith in God, the church, or even the 
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Franciscan order itself. The specific actions of Franciscans in California, such as the hasty or 
double baptisms, teaching the gospel in Indigenous languages, and beating the baptized Indians 
prompted him to worry for Spain’s conquest of California.  
Aside from his revelations regarding the inner workings and flawed culture existing 
within the Franciscan missions, Horra also described his harrowing final days in California. 
After their explosive argument, Sitjar left San Miguel for San Carmelo and told Lasuén that 
Horra became violently mad. “Without bothering to make an inquiry or even listen to me, that 
Priest [Lasuén] believed him and proceeded against me in the most tyrannical manner that one 
can imagine,” he wrote.578 Lasuén ordered Fray José Miguel to go to Mission San Miguel to 
collect Horra. In his description of that event, Horra claimed Miguel “constantly spoke to me and 
treated me like I was insane” and refused to tell Horra why he must go to Monterey.579 When 
Horra tried to escape, Miguel insulted and struck Horra repeatedly, a claim he asserted two 
mission guards could confirm.580 Miguel beat Horra on his journey so badly that he fell ill. The 
physician at the presidio treated Horra, adding a second corroborating witness that he offered the 
viceroy.  
This version of events stands in stark contrast to the version Lasuén gave to the interim 
Father Guardian, Pedro Callejas, at the College of San Fernando.581 On September 28, 1797, 
Lasuén wrote that “I wish to report that Father Fray José de Miguel brought Father Fray Antonio 
de la Concepción to Monterey in a happy mood and without any difficulty, and without further 
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incident.”582 When he finally heard from Lasuén, in writing rather than face-to-face, Horra was 
shocked when Lasuén only asked how long he had been mentally ill. Lasuén then ordered Horra 
back to the College of San Fernando.583  
Horra vehemently defended his sanity, suggesting that multiple witness believed him, yet 
still participated in the charade. He stated that his lucidity confused his peers once he returned to 
the college. Lasuén informed them that he sent a missionary who suffered a mental breakdown 
and required their care. The leadership at the college told Horra that Lasuén’s letter ordering him 
to Mexico was the only information they received about his condition and the situation. 
However, in his short time back, Horra heard the other missionaries discussing a second letter 
Lasuén wrote confiding to the father guardian that he believed Horra went insane. “Everyone is 
talking about this at the College,” he wrote, “Everyone is confused about this false charge since 
they have observed…no change or deviation in my behavior.”584 He added that Borica similarly 
did not agree with the accusations. Although Borica confided to Horra that he both believed the 
priest was of sound mind and that Lasuén’s actions were illegal, he refused to get involved in 
ecclesiastical disputes. As a favor to the priest, Borica signed a document confirming Horra’s 
sanity. When Horra produced that document along with others in an attempt to prove his 
soundness of mind, he claimed that the father guardian and the elders’ council “paid no attention 
to me and kept my three reports.”585 Despite all of the turmoil Horra lived through during his 
ordeal, he wished to remain part of the Franciscan order and requested that the viceroy grant him 
a transfer to the Franciscan province in Michoacán, “which in my opinion seems the most 
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reformed,” he stated. 586 Horra moved back and forth between the College of San Fernando and 
the college at Querétaro until 1803. A year later, he received permission to move back to Spain, 
settling in Castile.587  
Horra’s letter to the viceroy began a chain reaction that reverberated from Mexico City to 
the provincial capital in Monterey. For the first time, the viceregal government demanded 
explanations from all involved. Both Lasuén and Borica responded to Horra’s charges to a 
degree not seen in California since the invasion in 1769. For his part, Governor Borica sent a 
thorough questionnaire to all four of his presidio commanders, with fifteen questions crafted to 
understand daily life at the California missions. Azanza also demanded a response from Lasuén, 
who composed a lengthy, expansive, point-by-point defense of every charge Horra made against 
the Franciscans in California. Of the two documents, Lasuén’s became more significant over 
time, as he provided the most intimate view of the inner workings of the California mission 
system ever produced. Regardless of historical stature, both documents proved to be informative 
not just as snap shots of the missions at the close of the eighteenth century, but because they 
represented a paradigm shift. From that time forward, the missionaries in California continued to 
face serious questions regarding the nature and effectiveness of their work until the end of the 
mission period in 1834.588 
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Borica’s Questionnaire  
Governor Borica had already laid the groundwork for further investigations of missionary 
problems in California with the new viceroy before Horra’s letter. Just weeks into office, Azanza 
contacted Borica seeking information about Mission San Francisco. Specifically, he asked 
Borica about baptized California Indians and if the problems they experienced were now 
corrected. Borica assured his new superior that conditions there had dramatically improved. 
“Since the month of Oct 96 [sic] they are given three hot meals a day they are not whipped or 
mistreated as before, and they assign work to the Indians more prudently,” Borica reported. He 
sidestepped taking credit for the changes at San Francisco but made it known that Father 
President Lasuén was not behind the improvements either. Instead, Borica told the viceroy that 
Fray Fernández motivated the changes. According to Borica, Fernández was “filled with 
sensitivity and love and a strong obligation to his Indians,” and was known for his “continuous 
disputes with his partner Fray M. Landaeta, to desist from the old method and follow another 
path more humane and rational.” Unfortunately for all involved, Fernández “had to retire to his 
college last year due to madness.” 589 It seemed Borica had little confidence that Lasuén would 
find another priest to fill Fernández’s role. 
At the end of July 1798, Viceroy Azanza faced a problematic situation in the remote yet 
strategically significant province of Alta California and realized that no one in Mexico City 
understood the situation there. Within the last two years, missionaries at San Francisco narrowly 
avoided starting full-scale war with several Ohlone tribal groups living around the San Francisco 
Bay. In addition to misreading inter-tribal rivalries and stoking those tensions, there were 
beatings, starvation, and forced labor. Then, the person most responsible for stabilizing the 
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situation within the mission itself reportedly went insane immediately following the reversal of 
fortune. Within weeks, another Franciscan emerged challenging the management of the missions, 
and he too went insane. Yet both men steadfastly denied these accusations. Moreover, upon their 
return to Mexico both were lucid and in full control of their cognitive functions. Ten years 
passed since Viceroy Juan Vicente de Güemes Pacheco de Padilla y Horcasitas, the second 
Count of Revillagigedo, threatened that any California governor who meddled in the affairs of 
the Franciscans faced condemnation and a loss of rank and privileges.590 The mood in Mexico 
City had shifted since that time. Azanza ordered Borica to investigate the California mission 
system, requiring the commanders of the presidios to record everything they knew about its 
innerworkings.591  
 Borica created a list of questions for the presidio commanders that interrogated the 
Franciscans’ institutional culture in California. The questions themselves were reactionary and 
spoke to the specific claims made in Horra’s denouncement. The first five of the fifteen 
questions probed the veracity of Horra’s claim that Sitjar and some of the other missionaries’ 
actions hindered the spiritual conquest in California. Borica asked if the gospel was taught in 
Spanish or in Indigenous languages; if their religious instruction remained rigorous and 
thorough; if the converts were required to speak Spanish, or merely permitted to; if the converts 
were allowed to go back to their homes whenever they chose; and did evidence of rebaptism 
exist? The next five questions focused on the baptized Indians’ living conditions at the missions. 
Did the missionaries provide sufficient hot food for the baptized Indians; did they have proper 
clothing for all seasons; what type of lodgings existed, particularly for young, unmarried women; 
 
590 See chapter three of this dissertation.  
591 Diego de Borica’s questionnaire quoted from Archivo General de la Nación, Provincias Internas Legajo 219, 
Expediente 14, p. 9-11, translated in Beebe and Senkewicz, Tensions among the Missionaries in the 1790s, 27-
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how many hours of work did they perform in a single day and were pregnant or nursing women, 
the elderly, and the young required to work; and what sort of diversions and activities did the 
Indians at the missions get to enjoy when not working? The next two focused on punishments 
administered at the missions. Were baptized California Indians punished for going to the pueblos 
or the presidios, even during their free time; what specific punishments did the Franciscans mete 
out; was there any distinction as to age or sex, or the specific offense; did the padres have their 
own shackles, chains, stocks, and jails, or did they use the soldiers’ equipment? The final three 
questions focused on the missionaries’ wealth. The government wanted to know if the 
missionaries adhered to the official price list when selling animals, agricultural products, or other 
goods produced at the missions; did the missionaries buy expensive liquor and spirits for their 
own private use separately from what the government sends them; and finally, how much hard 
currency existed at each mission, presidio, and how much was in control of the synod in 
Mexico?592 Borica’s questionnaire represented the first thorough accounting of the missionaries’ 
actions since they came to California in 1769. Despite a series of governors alerting an 
unconcerned government in Mexico City to the problems growing in the province, no one 
investigated. However, in the second half of 1798, the combination of the near ruin of Mission 
San Francisco and two whistleblowing padres became the tipping point against viceregal 
indifference.  
 The presidio commanders’ responses varied based upon their locations and the specific 
padres and missions they knew. All four agreed that Horra falsely claimed that the baptized 
Indians could leave the missions for an indeterminate amount of time. The rules were the same 
throughout the mission field. Indians sought permission from the priests to go visit their families 
 
592 Borica, Expediente, in Beebe and Senkewicz, Tensions among the Missionaries in the 1790s, 27-30. 
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for a specified amount of time on paseo. If they did not return in the agreed upon time frame, the 
missionaries formed search parties and punished the truants. The commanders’ responses 
regarding intensity of punishment and the offences that prompted it were embedded in the 
questions about how baptized Indians spent their free time. All four men agreed that the 
missionaries did not approve of Indians working in either the presidio or the towns and the 
Franciscans punished both offences. Felipe de Goycoechea, the commander at Santa Barbara 
confirmed that “Christian Indians at these missions are not allowed to have any contact with the 
gente de razón, [or people of reason, their term for the Spanish population] but also any Indian 
who even during his free time associates with soldiers is deprived of food and punished.”593 He 
replied that Indians were “made to somewhat suffer” if they helped a soldier that taught them 
skills such as making shoes or clothing for themselves or to sell.594 The four men also mostly 
agreed that the missionaries did not follow the price list, and that they had no way to know how 
much money the priests had tucked away.595 
 Although the respondents did not have much knowledge about the alleged ecclesiastical 
issues, their answers did offer confirmation that inappropriate levels of punishment were the 
norm around the California mission system. The Franciscans claimed since the time of Serra that 
they only punished baptized California Indians at the missions in the manner that a loving father 
would his misbehaving children.596 Serra and Lasuén both were forced to admit that in some 
specific cases certain missionaries may have gone too far in disciplining mission Indians, but 
 
593 Goycoechea to Borica, Santa Barbara, December 14, 1798, BANC MSS C-A 10, 70-79, quoted in Beebe and 
Senkewicz, Tensions among the Missionaries in the 1790s, 32. 
594 Ibid. 
595 Ibid. 
596 During the murder investigation of Fray Tomás de la Peña Lasuén wrote “I pointed out to him that perhaps by 
giving an ear pulling, a punch, a rap on the head, or a slap with the hand it would be possible to give, now or in 
the future, an occasion…for similar false charges…And so, he should refrain from such action, even though such 
punishment is commonly given by the most indulgent fathers to their own sons,” in Lasuén, Writings of Fermín 
Francisco de Lasuén, 1:117. 
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these cases were anomalies rather than the norm.597 Additionally, Franciscans also argued that 
they only punished severe transgressions, whether against civil law or Christian teachings. The 
testimony of the commanders offered a different picture. Taken as a whole, the examples given 
show a regime more concerned with containing individual liberty than punishing actual crimes. 
Men and women on their paseo who spent extra time with their families were hunted down and 
punished. Franciscans responded to California Indians fraternizing with soldiers and 
townspeople by withholding food. Learning new skills or looking to make a living on their own 
terms also provoked Franciscans to violence. Again, the commanders confirmed older reports 
regarding punishment. Since the earliest days in the missions, civil authorities alerted the 
government in Mexico City to the cruelty and abuse perpetrated by missionaries in California. 
Even visitors like Jean François de La Pérouse reported that the Indians were beaten for offenses 
that were left unpunished in Europe. Although the commanders could not confirm hasty baptisms 
or other ecclesiastical lapses, their responses in no uncertain terms solidified the fact that 
physical abuse for mundane actions occurred frequently at the missions.  
Fray Sitjar’s Letter  
By the end of December 1798, Father President Lasuén heard whispers regarding the 
government’s investigation into Horra’s claims and began preparing a defense. To Lasuén’s 
frustration, the governor played the situation close to his chest. In the spring, Lasuén wrote a 
letter to Martin Lull at the College of San Fernando that “some days ago I spoke about this to the 
governor in an effort to bring to light if he had been asked for some report regarding the 
remonstrance of the Father in question [Horra].” He continued, “but I found out nothing. He told 
me nothing. He merely tried to make me see that he was in favor of the retirement of this 
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religious.”598 Once again, Lasuén responded unilaterally to a serious situation. This time, he 
railroaded Horra out of California in such a haphazard manner it caught the attention of the 
viceroy. With the specter of a formal investigation into Horra’s charges, Lasuén requested that 
his longtime friend and Horra accuser, Fray Sitjar, make an official statement confirming the 
exiled missionary’s mental state. On January 31, 1799, Sitjar responded with a long letter 
recounting the worst manifestations of Horra’s alleged madness.  
 Sitjar’s account of Horra’s mental state was sprawling and filled with lurid details. “On 
the very day he arrived,” wrote Sitjar, Horra “was already demonstrating unequivocal signs of 
who he was and what one could expect from such a subject.” Lasuén was there that first day and 
dined with the two priests. Throughout dinner, Horra went on and on about a point Sitjar failed 
to mention, causing Lasuén to demand that Horra cease his argument. Sitjar wrote that he “paid 
close attention to his facial expression and his body movements. It looked as if he wanted to 
strangle Your Reverence.” The next night, Sitjar claimed that Horra confessed his desire to do 
something to Lasuén that would have “resounded throughout the land.” Horra, according to 
Sitjar, then proceeded to flail, beat his chest, and rant so much he nearly foamed at the mouth. 
This scene took place 100 paces from the guard house, in Sitjar’s estimation. Horra concluded 
his first night at San Miguel by screaming that the missionaries in California were tyrants, again 
and again. None of this caught the attention of the mission guards.599 
Sitjar continued recounting tales of Horra’s violent temper. Horra, Sitjar alleged, became 
enraged when served a meatless dinner. He ordered Sitjar to whip the Indian servant, and Sitjar 
calmly convinced him that this particular instance required patience. Horra refused to relent and 
according to Sitjar, manipulated a soldier into lashing the Indian the next day. Sitjar reported an 
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instance of Horra threatening to kill an Indian man with a knife or a lance because he thought the 
man insulted him in his native tongue. Horra later boasted about it to the mission guards, who all 
got a good laugh at the Indigenous man’s expense. Another time he whipped a young boy with 
his cord so hard that Sitjar heard it ten paces away. Sitjar believed that Horra’s violent outbursts 
drove converts away from San Miguel, particularly those from other missions who came to help 
with the new establishment’s founding. The older man recalled a time when another new 
missionary, Fray Antonio Peyrí, expressed no surprise to hear that Fray Horra wanted to attack a 
man with a knife while angry. Sitjar saved the worst of the allegedly insane priest’s behavior for 
last. According to the older priest, one day, Horra leapt up and shouted for all the world to hear, 
“This afternoon I am going off with a boy and I am going to order him to fornicate.” Sitjar 
replied, saying, “Father, I do not intend to pardon you for those or similar, serious crimes.”600 
Sitjar added that soldiers heard Horra’s declaration and others around the mission. 
 Sitjar continued his chronicle of Horra’s alleged madness. Horra’s condition not only 
caused him to attack people verbally and physically but manifested in his religiosity as well. At 
one point, Horra gave a sermon on the Franciscans’ role in California as teachers and judges. 
Sitjar did not expound on the sermon, but emphasized that Horra waved his hands frantically, 
urging everyone to pray together. Horra then claimed that he possessed three royal decrees in his 
trunk that could prove he knew the king’s orders for missionaries. Sitjar asserted that this sermon 
drove some recently baptized Indians to leave the mission and to stay away for some time. In a 
similar vein, Sitjar wrote, “I also noticed he would begin to pray for long periods of time and for 
no reason.” Moreover, Sitjar claimed that he sometimes found Horra excessively praying, 
“swelled up like a toad.” Another incident had Horra praying over a cross on the day of the 
 
600 Sitjar quoted and translated in Beebe and Senkewicz, Tensions among the Missionaries, 34, 35, 37, 40.  
 
 
214 
 
Assumption of Our Lady so zealously he appeared to wrestle it. He also chanted prayers 
repeatedly and in a bizarre manner, enough that it caused Sitjar to observe him “with deliberation 
and concern.”601  
 Sitjar’s description of Horra’s alleged insanity requires intense scrutiny for several 
reasons. First, it was the sole piece of evidence used to discredit a member of the Franciscan 
order who alerted the government to serious systemic issues in the missions. Moreover, this was 
the second case of Franciscan leadership in California labeling a whistleblower insane within a 
span of several months. Since the onset of Lasuén presidency, there were multiple instances 
when he falsified medical conditions to rid himself of problematic missionaries. Conversely, in 
the case of de la Peña, Lasuén used flagging mental health as a shield for a priest who faced 
murder charges. When coupled with the many cases of both hypochondria and malingering noted 
by Lasuén throughout the 1790s, understanding the veracity of Sitjar’s claims is of paramount 
importance. A related but different aspect that requires scrutiny was the way Sitjar’s letter and 
Lasuén’s instantaneous acceptance of its accuracy reflected on previous scandals and his 
management of them. Of all the major problems outlined in this dissertation, the cases of Frays 
Fernández and Horra gave the best glimpse behind the Franciscan curtain precisely because the 
accusers were themselves Franciscans. Between 1769 through 1795, there was no other case that 
allowed this view into the mechanics of relations between missionaries. The importance of this 
lens cannot be overstated. Finally, Sitjar’s letter offers an opportunity to understand the role of 
violence within the mission system. Sitjar allegedly witnessed extreme threats and acts of 
violence, which, if true, expose the ubiquitous nature of violence in the California mission 
system. 
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 Sitjar’s first accusation against Horra was that he admittedly fantasized about killing 
Lasuén with his bare hands. In the venerable priest’s telling, Horra rambled on about subjects he 
deigned not to share in his letter. After Lasuén admonished him, Horra looked at his superior 
with such murderous rage that Sitjar read it on his face. Then, the following evening, Horra 
reportedly insinuated he nearly killed Lasuén to Sitjar, one of Lasuén’s oldest friends, and then 
raved and screamed. All of this took place roughly 100 paces from the mission’s guard’s 
quarters. If these events actually occurred, they raise several questions. First, why did the guards 
not hear the tumult and if they did, why did they not respond to it? There is no record of the 
mission guards contacting any presidio and reporting that a priest loudly proclaimed his desire to 
murder Lasuén. If the guards did not hear it, why did Sitjar not raise concern? Why did he not 
write to Lasuén that his life may be in danger? If he did, and the record is lost, why did Lasuén 
never write to Borica or to the College of San Fernando? Even if Borica, Lasuén, and Sitjar 
decided to keep the threats quiet, Lasuén would have reported the situation to his superiors at the 
college. Furthermore, based on the manner in which Franciscan leadership dealt with serious 
issues prior to this occasion, this inter-institutional silence would represent a significant break 
from precedent. It is difficult to discern a viable reason Borica and Lasuén would allow a 
dangerous man to continue operating freely at San Miguel.   
 Sitjar’s letter also contained multiple accounts of Horra indiscriminately punishing 
converts at Mission San Miguel. He reportedly whipped a boy with his cord, ordered another 
baptized Indian whipped for his own mistake, kept a lance under his bed, and threatened to stab 
another man with a knife. All of these incidents happened at indeterminant times and intervals. 
Of all of Sitjar’s claims, these are the hardest to unpack. As demonstrated throughout this 
dissertation, from the earliest days of the missions through to 1799, when Sitjar wrote his 
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account, Franciscans punished Indigenous Californians to levels described as cruel and abusive. 
It is entirely possible that Horra took part in this culture of abuse. If this was the case though, 
there is again no paper trail to prove it. Mission guards and presidio soldiers often noted 
particularly abusive missionaries. Even after Revillagigedo’s proclamation that soldiers falsely 
accusing Franciscans of abuse would be met with stern repercussions, the men still reported 
cruelty to their superiors. Borica obsessed on the subject, as his questionnaire demonstrated. The 
bulk of Horra’s concerns focused on Franciscan management of the missions, only briefly noting 
their treatment of Indians. Borica’s questionnaire reflected his concerns and investigated 
conditions converts endured under the missionaries. Why did the governor not know about a new 
missionary behaving so violently? Finally, there was Sitjar’s accusation that Horra openly 
bragged about his desire to rape a young boy. Twice Sitjar wrote that Horra exclaimed his 
various desires loud enough for guards and others to hear. As with all of Sitjar’s other claims, 
there exists no backchannel communication about this incident. Why did no one write about or 
act against Horra’s violence until after his peers exiled him and he denounced the California 
Franciscans? 
Sitjar’s final accusation, that Horra loudly proclaimed his intent to force himself on a 
young Indian boy, is troubling whether true or false. There were stories passed down from 
witnesses and victims of Franciscan sexual abuse in the missions, such as a Chumash man’s 
account detailing an unnamed priest at Mission San Buenaventura’s routine sexual abuse of 
Chumash girls.602 And though it was not explicitly rape, in the early 1820s at Mission Santa 
Cruz, a missionary reportedly had sexual relations with baptized Indian women, which caused a 
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great scandal in the surrounding area.603 Although these two incidences were wholly separate and 
come much later in time, they remain instructive for Sitjar’s accusation. First, they prove that 
there were cases of sexual encounters between Franciscans and Indian people, ranging from rape 
to unethical sexual liaisons. Second, they demonstrate that such relations were known, and, at 
times, documented. There is no other corroborating testimony in the case of Horra, despite 
having allegedly made his ugly boast in front of several people, according to Sitjar. Yet again, 
there is no evidence of Sitjar telling anyone about Horra’s dangerous and potentially destructive 
words. Finally, there is the odd placement of the accusation in Sitjar’s letter. It comes at the end, 
long after he finished recounting examples of Horra’s violent behavior. Sitjar already moved into 
a description of Horra’s last days at San Miguel and his transit to Monterey. Then, just before he 
signed his letter came the story about Horra’s plan to sexually abuse a young boy. All of these 
questions about Sitjar’s letter point to the document’s possible lack of credibility.  
 There are two ways to interpret the silence surrounding Horra’s alleged violence and 
assassination threats. The first is that Sitjar’s claims are simply not true. Of all the witnesses 
Sitjar placed in these scenarios, not one came forward to report a murderously insane missionary 
who randomly beat baptized Indians and raved to such a degree that battle-hardened mission 
guards were terrified. It also fits within a larger pattern of Franciscan challenges to accusations 
against them. Serra and Lasuén both, against a host of varied charges, countered with false 
equivalency, claiming their accusers were as guilty as the Franciscans.604 Typically, they 
deployed this tactic against meddling soldiers and governors. Sitjar’s letter contained examples 
of this pattern that will be discussed below. Therefore, the letter questioning Horra’s sanity was 
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another link in a growing chain of evidence demonstrating Franciscan leadership’s reliance on 
cover-ups and fabrication of evidence to manipulate the outcomes of unfriendly investigations.  
 The second interpretation is no less damning. The total inaction from all sides in the face 
of a homicidal, violent missionary speaks to the ubiquitous nature of violence in the California 
mission system. According to Sitjar, mission guards either ignored Horra’s behavior, laughed 
with him or at him, depending on the situation, or were afraid of him. Sitjar claimed that Horra’s 
violence disturbed him yet failed to alert anyone to it. Even Fray Peyrí, a younger missionary of 
Horra’s generation, only felt sad resignation about Horra’s violent temper upon hearing that a 
fellow priest of the Catholic faith wanted to stab an Indian to death. That none of this warranted 
investigation or even mention would be a dire condemnation of everyday life in the missions. 
Franciscan leadership in California spent time and energy rigorously defending their practices 
and insisting that episodes of cruelty were the exception and not the norm. Yet, taken at face 
value, Sitjar, a man who had been in California for nearly the entirety of the mission period, 
provided testimony possibly describing the profoundly callous and violent nature of Franciscan 
missions.  
 Sitjar also attacked Horra’s claims that he witnessed the older priest commit serious 
ecclesiastical transgressions. He did so by employing false equivalence, suggesting that Horra 
engaged in strange acts of religiosity. Of the issues Sitjar raised regarding Horra’s mental health, 
this charge rings the hollowest. The Franciscan order widely practiced self-flagellation and other 
means of mortification of the flesh to achieve the Christ-like life of their founder, St. Francis of 
Assisi, deep into the nineteenth century.605 The founder of the California mission system, 
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Junípero Serra, practiced extreme versions of self-flagellation. Serra whipped himself with 
chains, wore a burlap undershirt with wire woven into it to create barbs that pulled at his flesh 
when he walked, burned himself, and then tore off the burnt skin as it healed. The leadership at 
San Fernando may have thought that Serra went further than “the prescribed regulations of the 
college,” but that did not stop them from allowing him to lead the Spanish colonization efforts in 
California.606 Therefore, Sitjar’s unease with the intensity and longevity of Horra’s prayers 
seems out of place with typical manifestations of Franciscan religiosity. In fact, it situates Horra 
among his younger generation of Franciscans coming from Spain through Mexico who sought a 
return to a more orthodox understanding of the order’s values and place in Catholicism. 
Viceroy Azanza Demands Answers 
 By September 1799, Azanza processed Borica’s questionnaire and his soldiers’ replies 
and ordered a response from the Franciscans. The viceroy contacted Father Guardian Lull at the 
College of San Fernando and tasked him with reviewing the presidio commander’s replies and 
answering them. Lull in turn requested that Father President Lasuén respond to the charges.607 
During the previous thirty years, distance and necessity shielded the Franciscans in California 
every time a governor accused them of mismanagement. Imperial Spain simply did not have the 
plan or the resources to radically alter its course in California. The spiritual conquest was, in 
theory, the most cost-effective form of colonization Mexico City had on the eve of the nineteenth 
century, so it was imperative that it did not fail.608 Spain did not have the military power to 
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conquer distant California. After a 1781 Quechan revolt wiped out the overland road from 
Mexico to California, settlers could not easily get to the distant province. Inspector General 
Gálvez’s choice in 1768 to use missionaries to pacify California had painted Mexico City into a 
corner. Spain depended on the Franciscans in California. Therefore, Horra’s situation was 
unusual enough that it commanded the government’s attention in an unprecedented manner. 
Azanza needed to know the truth about the remote province, and Lasuén would provide the 
answers.  
 Lasuén began preparing his defense in late 1798, though he still faced many other issues. 
After thirty years, the problem of staffing the missions remained a constant burden, particularly 
after two recent arrivals returned to Mexico, both allegedly due to insanity. 609 Moreover, the 
missionaries who were in California continued to behave in a manner that transgressed 
Franciscan norms. Rumors reached Lull at the college that some Franciscans went about dressed 
in secular garb. Lasuén assured the father guardian that the practice had escaped his notice and 
vowed to become more vigilant about rooting it out.610 The old contest with the military over 
sending squads of baptized California Indians out to capture escaped converts also reemerged 
during this time. Lasuén argued that missionary-led expeditions “have always been very helpful 
both in general and in individual cases.”611 Lasuén omitted the violent actions of Fray Fernández 
several years before at Mission Santa Cruz, for which he intensely reprimanded the priest in 
writing. Finally, two more Franciscans, Frays Agustín Merino and Benito Catalán, suffered 
mental breakdowns.612 Lasuén weakened under the pressure of Borica’s questionnaire and his 
rebuttal amid all of the other problems he faced. In an unusual turn, Lasuén complained to Lull 
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about Governor Borica’s “annoying delays” and a letter from the Bishop of Sonora that proved 
to be “a very annoying document.”613 Lasuén’s frustration came through in his correspondence.  
 In September 1799, Governor Borica abruptly retired due to health concerns, causing an 
unforeseen change in civil leadership in California at a crucial time. Unbeknownst to anyone but 
his officers, in April, the governor petitioned Azanza requesting medical leave. His superiors 
processed and granted the request in June and the news finally made its way to California that 
fall.614 Borica’s time as governor was perhaps the most tumultuous the region experienced in the 
eighteenth century and would be until after the emergence of the Mexican Republic in 1824. 
Like the governors who came before him, Borica rode a thin line between ensuring the success 
of Spain’s colonial project and treating the Indigenous peoples’ whose homelands Spain invaded 
with some measure of respect and dignity. As detailed in the previous chapter, he worked to 
ensure that the Spanish population did not unnecessarily provoke or harm Indigenous people 
throughout his tenure. In an ironic turn, Borica was less confrontational with the Franciscans 
than his predecessors yet was the first California governor to force the government in Mexico 
City to concede that problems existed with the order’s management of the province. 
Unfortunately for Borica, his retirement did not halt his illness and he died in Durango, Mexico 
on July 19, 1800.615 The same man who served as interim governor after Fages’ retirement, José 
Arrillaga, again took the role. Arrillaga’s previous stint was marked by his lack of involvement 
with the missionaries and their machinations. Regardless of Arrillaga’s abilities and inclinations, 
the process set in motion by Borica and Azanza continued.  
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 At the start of the new century, Lasuén struggled to both manage a missionary field bereft 
of labor and prepare his refutation of Horra’s charges. On January 2, he wrote to Lull at the 
college, apprising him of the trying times in California: “I can hardly recall a time in many years 
in which I was so busy,” he wrote. He indicated that he had finally seen Horra’s list of 
accusations, though he evidenced knowledge about them months before. Although he called the 
priest’s charges a “shock” and a “misfortune,” Lasuén felt confident that Horra’s accusations 
would come to nothing. “Much that we had to fear in these charges is removed precisely by the 
character of the accuser,” he observed, adding his “hope in God that we shall be able to refute 
and rebut them.” Lasuén’s word choice is telling. First, he clearly suggested that the Franciscans 
had something to fear in Horra’s charges. Second, Lasuén indicated that he was sure the charges 
would not stick because of Horra’s alleged madness, not because they were false. He also 
promised Lull to slow his men’s requests for retirement as there were no missionaries in Mexico 
ready to come to California. However, there were four retirements already approved, which 
placed additional strain on the mission system. The pressure that Lasuén faced at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century led him to self-pity: “As for myself, when do I retire? Alas, poor me!”616 
 That same month, Lasuén corresponded with Viceroy Azanza regarding his previous 
efforts to block Christian Indians from learning artisanal skills from mechanics sent from 
Mexico. Lasuén had to tread lightly with the viceroy on the subject of the mechanics. Part of 
Horra’s “dossier of charges” included the missionaries punishing baptized Indians who learned 
new skills outside of the missions. This had also been an issue in the early years of Borica’s 
tenure. This time, the viceroy intervened directly in California’s governance. Azanza requested 
that Lasuén create a system in which Indian people could learn new skills while not impeding 
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their Christian education. In response, Lasuén repurposed the logic he employed when Borica 
asked for the same thing years earlier. “They are neophytes,” Lasuén informed the viceroy, “and 
when removed from the missionaries and made independent, they forget much of what they 
learned.” Additionally, Lasuén admitted that baptized Indians preferred tasks that removed them 
from the missions or allowed them to work on their own and complained that soldiers knew this 
and took advantage of it. In Lasuén’s reckoning, this led to neophyte discontent with life at the 
missions and caused them to flee from their Christian teachings. Lasuén failed to recognize how 
this reflected on life in the missions. He favored constantly monitoring Indian students, a system 
in which “the missionaries are careful to select only the most docile youths to take part in the 
project – although in this regard there is not as a rule much room for choice.” The only other 
option, in Lasuén’s estimation, was to free up the missionaries from all their other tasks so that 
they could keep a watchful eye on the Indian’s training. Finally, he informed Azanza that the 
viceroy’s plan would lead to “very serious inconveniences.”617 Lasuén believed he already faced 
enough of those.  
 Through the late spring and early summer of 1800, Lasuén’s correspondence with Father 
Guardian Lull took a strange turn, indicating that the pressure of Horra’s accusations, the need 
for a defense, and the mounting requests for retirement from the missionaries had a significant 
effect on him. Sometime in March, Lasuén received word from Lull at the college that he grew 
impatient waiting for Lasuén’s answer to Horra’s charges. Despite writing to Lull in early 
January about the shocking misfortune of Horra’s letter, even going so far as to suggest there 
were things to fear from it, in both April and May, Lasuén claimed no knowledge of the letter or 
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its contents.618 On April 3 he wrote to Lull, “Since I have no knowledge of what the accusations 
are, it is impossible for me to answer them.”619 On May 2, he wrote the following to his superior: 
“I have heard a rumor that a mail has been lost, and perhaps that was the fate of documents, or 
the copies of documents, containing the charges of Father Concepción and the reports that the 
governor and officials presumably sent to me.”620 Finally, on September 10, Lasuén confirmed 
with the new father guardian, Fray José Gasol, that he had received Horra’s letter.621  
Lasuén’s insistence that he did not know the contents of Horra’s letter raises several 
questions. If true, why did Lasuén profess to know the “dossier of charges” in his January 
correspondence? Why did Sitjar write a long letter about Horra’s sanity that clearly mirrored the 
charges in the exiled missionary’s report? At that point in 1799, Horra was already back in 
Mexico for nearly a year. Also, Lasuén knew of Borica’s questionnaire and had written about 
that in a previous letter. Was Lasuén lying to his superior at the college? His accounting of the 
situation, that he had somehow missed a packet of mail containing all the necessary information 
regarding Horra’s charges, does not add up. Lasuén usually became perturbed when forced to 
defend the missions. He also despised missionaries going to the civil government to complain 
about problems the father president felt should remain in-house. Perhaps something he wrote to 
Lull on April 3 revealed how he truly felt about the proceedings. “The result, I am convinced, 
will be in our favor; or at least it will make clear how utterly unnecessary was this crude and 
insulting appeal to civil authority in order that whatever is amiss may be corrected.”622 Lasuén 
 
618 On January 2, 1800 Lasuén wrote to Lull the following: “Finally there came to Your Reverence, like a shock, the 
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felt deeply angry and perhaps thought the defense that Lull, Gasol, and Azanza required was 
beneath him. Nevertheless, he could not avoid answering Horra’s charges.  
 On September 14, 1800, to further develop his defense of the mission system, Lasuén 
sent a circular to his men throughout California informing them of the larger situation and 
requesting their assistance. Lasuén forwarded Borica’s questionnaire and the answers the 
commanders returned. He also notified them that the military’s inquiry sprung from a “digest of 
charges preferred against us before the central government by a brother of ours.”623 While their 
initial response to the charges might cause “horror and indignation,” Lasuén asked that they 
instead report everything they knew “with the greatest simplicity, modesty, and meekness.” 
Lasuén worried that the constant infighting he and his fellow Franciscans experienced 
throughout the 1790s might show itself in this opportunity to air priestly grievances. He 
reminded them that they were Franciscans first and men second, because in Lasuén’s estimation 
the last two major scandals got out due to inside leaks. This time, Lasuén collected the 
missionaries’ information and compiled it himself. His would be the final word.624 
 By late October, crafting the Refutation had taken a toll on Lasuén. With increasing 
regularity, he became more like the young monk in California who refused to accept his fate on 
the extreme edge of Catholic civilization. He complained bitterly: “And now, poor me, what am I 
to do in regard to the Father Concepción [Horra] problem, with so much to write, so many 
summaries to make…and so much to arrange in such a fashion that it will not give offense, and 
yet be equal to the occasion,” he confided to Gasol.625 On December 9, he wrote to Gasol that 
“the whole thing is a patent calumny concocted by men who were either prejudiced or ignorant 
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of the facts. May God forgive them all.”626 It even appeared as his mind meandered in the face of 
his enormous task: “I began this letter using a large script and lines far apart with the intention of 
writing very little, and in the end, I have to crowd things so as to make the paper suffice.”627 
Refutation of Charges 
 Finally, in July 1801, after months of labor, Lasuén completed his Refutation of Charges; 
a work that started as a defense against Fray Horra’s accusations but became a justification for 
the mission system’s existence. The document was sprawling, with 130 sections each relating to 
direct charges contained in Horra’s letter, Borica’s questionnaire, and the presidio commanders’ 
responses. Lasuén used the opportunity to answer some of the long-standing questions that past 
California governors had raised about the Franciscans’ management of the missions and the day-
to-day experiences of the Indians living within them. Lasuén’s Refutation provided a clear view 
inside the California missionary field and into the inner workings of Lasuén’s values and 
decision-making processes. More than a century after its creation, it still fulfills Azanza’s request 
to document the missions’ functions and to explain, to a degree, how the California missions 
took their particular shape by the end of Lasuén’s time as president. At no other point in his 
tenure did Lasuén express his personal values and goals for the missions so plainly. Lasuén never 
wavered in his belief in the morality of Franciscan ends and means. He was proud of what the 
order created in California and was therefore unafraid to document some of the most damning 
aspects of Franciscan colonialism precisely because he considered them normal and appropriate. 
In short, Lasuén felt so sure of himself and the order that he was not afraid to write it all down.  
 Lasuén began his Refutation of Charges with a defiant tone, stating that that task came as 
the unnecessary result of the viceregal government believing men who wanted to damage the 
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Franciscans and their missions. He first targeted the late governor, Borica. Although he always 
demonstrated fairness with Lasuén and the missionaries, even following the crisis at Mission San 
Francisco, Borica was a military man, and they were the most consistent enemies the Franciscans 
had in California. Lasuén considered Borica’s questionnaire to be an antagonism that sprung 
from his removal of Horra from California. Lasuén also argued that the original source that 
prompted the Refutation was an insane man. According to Lasuén, Horra’s removal to Mexico 
should have been an open and shut case had Borica not sent out his questionnaire and Horra not 
written a letter to the viceroy after arriving back at the college. It appeared lost on Lasuén that 
the viceroy himself had requested both documents.628 
 Adopting another well-worn defensive position, Lasuén argued that everything that 
transpired after Horra’s departure was unnecessary because he followed procedure and that 
Borica himself had observed Horra’s mental state. “His lordship took greater pains than did I to 
show that the measures taken were not only desirable but necessary,” Lasuén stated.629 He 
claimed that Borica confirmed Horra’s boastfulness and propensity to display his strength; that 
he carried a pair of pistols in a trunk; Horra’s tyrannical approach with the soldiers; and that 
Horra even held target practice competitions with the soldiers and a group of “gentile” 
Indigenous men. Lasuén believed these were the actions of someone who “was mentally 
incompetent or had suffered from some very serious mental upset.”630 This description of 
Horra’s personality is crucial for understanding Lasuén’s version of insanity or mental 
breakdown. The actions he attributed to Horra do not necessarily indicate an unsound mind. 
While they were not the expected behaviors of a good missionary, they did not include the 
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ravings that appeared in Fray Sitjar’s description of Horra. For Lasuén, Horra’s insanity 
manifested in actions unbecoming of a Franciscan. Lasuén could only conceive of a missionary 
engaging in such behavior if they had gone mad. It is a telling insight into Lasuén’s 
understanding of both deviant behavior and mental illness.  
 Lasuén undermined Horra’s credibility by countering some of the claims the priest made 
about his last days in California, while unintentionally confirming them. Specifically, Lasuén 
denied that Fray José Miguel struck Horra repeatedly on their way to Monterey and that he 
became ill from the effects of Miguel’s violence. Lasuén insisted that Horra remained silent 
regarding any abusive treatment. Similarly, he claimed that Horra never mentioned it to Borica, 
either. If he had, according to Lasuén’s logic, Borica would have included it in the following 
passage in his report to the viceroy: “If we are to believe the soldiers who escorted them Fray 
José de Miguel treated Fray Antonio de la Concepción very harshly, and even tried to run him 
down with his horse, just because he fell behind a little.”631 Lasuén noted that this was “the only 
incident that is specified” despite the quotation confirming that Fray Miguel physically abused 
Horra, and may have tried to kill him, on their trip to Monterey. Continuing, Lasuén suggested 
that Fray Miguel’s violent actions were justified because “he had in his charge one who behaved 
as he was demented; and everyone knows that this kind of diseased mind can as a rule be 
managed only by appeal to force.”632 This was another bombshell from Lasuén. If this 
represented his view on the appropriate means to handle the mentally impaired, especially 
considering his view that mental illness shows itself through people not behaving in an 
appropriate manner based on their station, it raises many questions regarding the Franciscans’ 
philosophy of punishing Indians in the missions. With this attempt at discrediting Horra, Lasuén 
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inadvertently corroborated Horra’s claim that he was physically abused during his trip from 
Mission San Miguel to Monterey, then brushed it off because violence was the best means to 
deal with the mentally ill. 
 Lasuén then attacked Horra a final time. If Horra was so negatively affected by his exile 
to Mexico, Lasuén argued, he had the opportunity to appeal the decision before he left 
California. There were two physicians along with Borica when Horra embarked for Mexico and 
“it would have been natural for him to have consulted the latter as to how my previous report of 
his indisposition could best be disproved. This he did not do; instead, he set sail.”633 It angered 
Lasuén that a missionary with “so many blotches on his good name” could make slanderous 
accusations and that the governor could use it to begin a “rigorous investigation of our conduct 
and our administration.”634 Still, he painted himself as compliant: “but this is what was done, and 
I am ordered to give my views about it, and I am proceeding to do so in accordance with 
instruction.”635 
 Lasuén finished his preamble by admitting defects in the system existed while still 
asserting that maintaining the good name of the missionaries remained more important than 
understanding the gravity of the problems. “At the outset I admit that defects exist, and 
inevitably so; but not one is in the category of a crime, not one is beyond the normal, not one 
remains uncorrected once it is recognized, and if any are permitted it is but to avoid greater 
evils.” He also assured the government that no defect ever became a rule, or normalized, and it 
that it would be unreasonable to consider the behavior of one or two priests representative of the 
whole. His management of the system, in his estimation, “is undertaken in such a way that short 
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comings will be kept at a minimum.” Moreover, when one or two problems occurred, Lasuén’s 
preferred remonstration came in the form of a “charitable correction [rather] than by a blatant 
accusation.” Lasuén considered the entire affair unseemly, and he reiterated that he participated 
only because he always followed orders. It was a masterful redirect from Lasuén - to admit there 
were missionaries who acted outside of the norms of religious instruction. According to him, 
these deviations were to be expected but did not define the order in California. Lasuén knew the 
Refutation contained troubling revelations and rewrote the narrative from the start. 636 
 Lasuén then began the defense in earnest, addressing the material concerns raised in 
Horra’s accusations. In the matter of the baptized California Indians’ clothing, Lasuén admitted 
that at Mission San Buenaventura converts received new clothing once every two years. While 
this concerned Lasuén, he was certain that no other mission handed out clothes at such a long 
interval and that the priests at Ventura felt the Indians from that area “had a certain neatness and 
cleanliness about them” and therefore did not require new clothes as often as other California 
Indian groups. He addressed the rumor that a similar situation occurred at Mission Santa 
Barbara. The presidio guards reported that the converts got new clothes once every two years and 
that they collected the old clothes. Lasuén argued that the clothes could not physically last two 
years, that they literally fell apart before then. Why then, he mused were there not hundreds of 
naked Indians and piles of old clothes to be found? And, he continued, if the soldiers could not 
be trusted to make such elementary observations, why should they be trusted at all? In two 
paragraphs Lasuén admitted the existence of a problem at one mission, while claiming that the 
identical problem was physically impossible at another.637  
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 Feeling that he had made his case about the clothing, Lasuén turned to the accusation that 
Fray Sitjar conducted Mass and other religious ceremony in the language of the local Indians 
whom he instructed. He recounted a story in which Fray Miguel Pieras specifically told him 
Sitjar never recited Christian doctrine in the church in any language other than Spanish. The 
same missionary told him that Sitjar prepared California Indians for baptism in their own 
language. When compared to the tenacity with which the Franciscans in California protected 
their generally medieval outlook on religion, it would be truly remarkable if in this one area they 
sought to enact progressive reform. It was so remarkable in fact, that Sitjar was the only priest in 
California that did so in the eighteenth century.638  
 Lasuén next moved to Sitjar’s baptismal practices, and whether or not he rushed baptism 
and had to rebaptize certain converts who left and forgot their initial lessons. Lasuén asserted 
that to his understanding, no Indian received a baptism unless they had undergone eight days of 
teaching and, generally speaking, most had a month of instruction. He reminded the government 
that no one was a better judge than missionaries regarding when someone was properly prepared 
for baptism. Lasuén flatly denied that rebaptism occurred in the missions. He did admit there 
were three official cases among some 27,000 baptisms where it happened, but he insisted that 
those were unusual. “All the natives make it plain,” he wrote “that the unlawfulness of rebaptism 
had, thank God, been impressed on them as deeply as old Christians.” Considering that Lasuén 
spent the bulk of his Refutation reminding the government how easily converts forgot Roman 
Catholic teachings, or rejected them outright, it is unusual that in this particular instance he 
adulated the strength of their training and convictions.639 
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 Lasuén continued rebutting the material aspects of Horra’s charges, turning to the amount 
of food available at the missions. First, he denied that Indians did not sell some of the food they 
raised for themselves. There existed a system of exchange, based on Chumash shell currency, 
and they often used their proceeds to buy Spanish grains, like barley. Despite that, he observed 
that many converts still preferred their native foods to what the missionaries offered. “The 
former is free and according to their liking, and the latter prescribed, and not according to their 
liking,” he confessed. Lasuén’s disgust with both the Indians’ love of freedom and the 
proceedings again became evident. “Here, then, (and it cannot be otherwise) lies all the loss and 
harm which can be imagined or said to have befallen these natives through Christianity,” he 
penned. Lasuén held the Indians in contempt for their ingratitude for the gifts of food and 
industry the Spanish offered them.640  
 Lasuén wrote at length about the core problems that he considered inherent to the 
Indigenous way of life and the difficulties missionaries faced while indoctrinating California 
Indians. Before the Spaniards arrived, he argued, all California Indian people disregarded “the 
law of self-preservation which nature implants in us,” and were therefore incapable of “providing 
for what is indispensably necessary for existence.” Before the missions, Lasuén argued that 
California Indians knew nothing of comforts. Yet he contradictorily believed that “they enjoy life 
as long as they can sustain it with ease, and without having recourse to what they regard as 
work.” It was a startling revelation from Lasuén. He could not recognize non-European work 
regimes and the comforts they produced, even when describing them. Furthermore, according to 
Lasuén, California Indians knew no industry other than making bows and arrows; they did not 
cultivate the soil and gathered food in a manner “which differs little from that of the lower 
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animals.” For the first time in all of his years of writing, Lasuén revealed his opinions of the 
people in California. “Here then we have the greatest problem of the missionary: how to 
transform a savage race such as these into a society that is human, Christian, civil, and 
industrious. This can only be accomplished by denaturalizing them.”641 
 The previous passages provide a clear window into Lasuén’s mentality. They 
demonstrate both the extreme levels of cognitive dissonance and propensity for obfuscation that 
were hallmarks of Lasuén’s logical faculties and leadership style. On the one hand, he believed 
that the baptized Indians abhorred rebaptism as unlawful. On the other he described them as 
beasts of the field who lacked basic humanity. With total conviction he claimed that people who 
occupied California for millennia had no sense of self preservation and practiced no industry that 
might sustain them beyond their immediate needs. Lasuén lived and worked among the Chumash 
people for years. As previously noted, Spaniards praised and admired the Chumash for their 
watercraft, their currency-based economy, and their towns with hundreds of thatch structures and 
streets.642 His accusations totally discounted the Kumeyaay and their crops and management of 
the land, also long observed by the Spanish.643 Similarly, it ignored the hundreds of millstones 
that existed in the Ohlone-speaking people’s lands around the San Francisco Bay.644 Lasuén 
knew of these Indigenous achievements and practices. Yet he chose to willfully ignore all of 
them in a bout of anger over Indigenous people’s preference for their traditional foods. In all of 
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his writings, rarely is Lasuén so plain in his biased selection of evidence or in his willingness to 
lie to protect the mission system.  
 Lasuén continued describing the missions’ food delivery systems and philosophies. He 
explained that access to food could not be standardized across all missions because each 
establishment had varying levels of natural abundance and agriculture with which to feed its 
population. If, for example, a mission ran low on food for its laborers, the missionaries asked 
volunteers to gather food in surrounding areas. If one mission had the coin or other goods to 
trade, it would procure food from another with a surplus. While ignoring that just a few years 
earlier at Mission San Francisco, missionaries had purposefully withheld food as punishment and 
refused to serve hot meals, Lasuén did concede “it cannot be denied that among missionaries 
some are more generous and liberal in meeting the needs of their wards, just as in the case of 
good parents in a family.”645  
 Despite making a case regarding the difficulties in feeding large populations, Lasuén 
stopped to editorialize, making assertions that revealed his meager understanding of Indigenous 
Californians as a whole and even less about specific groups. “They are helped to the best of our 
ability,” he wrote, “nothing is kept from them, and despite that they run away.” He argued that 
notwithstanding baptized California Indians’ access to better material conditions than their 
“pagan” counterparts, their “untrained nature” and “affinity for the mountains” caused otherwise 
happy California Indians to flee the missions. He gave an example of a sick person, whom the 
missionaries excused from Mass and received special food in addition to regular rations, yet still 
left the mission to go home without permission. When they returned feeling better, Lasuén was 
incredulous that the unnamed person remained hungry. The unidentified California Indian 
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responded that the food at the mission proved difficult to eat when ill, and that they needed to eat 
fish rather than atole. Lasuén assured the viceroy that the missionaries provided alternatives 
when people requested them. Lasuén then shared a remarkable observation. He wrote that a few 
men who got “hungry” (original quotations) asked permission to go to the mountains to gather 
for a week. With some annoyance, Lasuén suggested “if one were to give you a young bull, a 
sheep, and a fanega of grain every day you would still be yearning for your mountains and your 
beaches.’ Then the brightest of the Indians who were listening to me said, smiling and half 
ashamed of himself, ‘What you say is true, Father. It’s the truth.’”646 Lasuén failed to grasp the 
meaning behind this person’s words 
This unnamed Californian’s brief, poignant statement encapsulated why Spanish 
colonization failed there. The many California Indians who came in contact with the missions 
eventually realized that for all their promise of technology and eternal peace in the Christian 
heaven, Spanish culture was not superior to their own. If given the opportunity to reject it 
without fear of reprisal, they would gladly do so. Rather than gleaning that from the “brightest 
one’s” statement, Lasuén attempted to use it as proof of their lack of humanity. “In the light of 
this, anyone can see whether or not complaints of this kind made by the Indians have a right to 
be considered by the authorities as accusations against the missionaries,” he concluded.647 For 
Lasuén, anyone who would choose the mountains and beaches over the missions had no right to 
complain about what they found at the latter.  
 Lasuén continued his assault on Indigenous humanity, attacking their gender roles, 
painting men as tyrants, and arguing that women were less likely to run away from the missions. 
“In their native state they are slaves to the men, obliged to maintain them with the sweat of their 
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brow,” he insisted. According to Lasuén, upon returning from a night of care-free carousing, 
Indian men (he does not name a group or a person in this passage) will beat their wives to the 
point of death if no food awaited them. Moreover, in Lasuén’s experience, women never 
complained about their work and rarely ran away, and if they did, it resulted from male 
influence. Unfortunately, some women succumbed and “often fall like the Israelites into the 
weakness of ingratitude.” Lasuén attacked these women’s character. “For them, not even the 
food of heaven…could…overcome the longing for grosser foods purchased at the price of cruel 
labor in the heartless slavery of Egypt.” He then noted that nothing the Franciscans provided 
stopped Indigenous men from pining for the “brutal” life they once knew. “It was free and it was 
lazy. Who can keep them from murmuring after it?”648 
 After constructing single Indian women as paragons of virtue, Lasuén described the chief 
method for maintaining that virtue: the monjeria. Since the start of the mission period, the 
Franciscans had dormitories known as monjerías, or nunneries, constructed to isolate single 
women from the predations of male California Indians and Spanish soldiers.649 To properly 
contextualize Lasuén’s statements, it must be noted that several observers of the Franciscan 
missions from both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries painted dire pictures of life inside the 
monjerías. As the French navigator La Pérouse recounted back in 1786, every night the 
missionaries “take care to secure all the women whose husbands are absent, as well as the young 
girls above the age of nine years, by locking them up.”650 In his response to Lasuén’s call for 
assistance with his Refutation, Fray Estevan Tapís at Mission Santa Barbara wrote that women 
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were flogged, shackled, and placed in the stocks for days within the monjeria walls. Another 
observer in 1824 wrote, “These dungeons are opened two- or three-times a-day, but only to allow 
the prisoners to pass to and from the church. I have occasionally seen the poor girls rushing out 
eagerly to breathe the fresh air, and driven immediately into the church like a flock of sheep, by 
an old ragged Spaniard armed with a stick.”651 Finally, the monjerías were unsanitary places 
where the restrictive air flow and cramped quarters could spread disease with alarming 
swiftness.652 
 Lasuén’s description of the monjerías bared little resemblance to those of outside 
observers. “All possible care is taken so that nothing will be prejudicial to their health. It has 
actually been determined that death occurs but rarely among those who observe this rule of life,” 
he argued, adding that those who escaped for the mountains died far more often than anyone in a 
monjeria. Moreover, “at this present time it is the best room the mission has, except for the 
Church.” Finally, he knew that the monjerías achieved their goals because “the girls and 
spinsters [who live in them] . . .  go outside the mission, but they do so less frequently than the 
married woman,” who were not locked up at night.653 It is difficult to know if Lasuén’s 
description of women and the frequency with which they escaped the missions at all reflected 
reality. 
 Lasuén also spent much of the Refutation denying the charge that his missionaries 
overworked the converts as a rule. As was the case throughout the document, Lasuén included 
his own prejudices against Indian work regimens and habits. He claimed that across the missions, 
converts only worked five to six hours a day during the summer and four to five hours during the 
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winter months. In addition, he noted that a visitor to any one of the missions would only ever see 
up to half of the population working, due to some receiving a paseo, or being ill or malingering, 
as “the healthy are clever at feigning illness.” Lasuén flatly denied, knowing full well the 
problems that occurred at Mission San Francisco, that Indian people were forced to work at the 
missions. “If they work, nobody goads them on. They sit down; they recline; they often go away 
and come back when it suits them.” No one gave them tasks they could not finish in their normal 
working hours, “and if they would overcome a little of their laziness, or be a little more active, 
many could finish in the morning the work of a whole day,” he wrote.654  
Lasuén, dug in to undermine the credibility not only of Indian workers, but of the 
presidio commanders. He asserted that the soldiers took advantage of Indian labor. “It is not 
natural for the commandants to be so extremely sympathetic,” he maintained. Lasuén reported 
that the Indians worked under an overseer at the presidio who drove them hard from dawn until 
dusk. And when the soldiers were unhappy with an Indians’ work ethic, they allegedly yelled at 
them and cursed the missionaries under their breath, claiming “the Fathers” were to “blame for 
your laziness.” Lasuén did not report how he heard what soldiers muttered under their breath at 
the presidio.655  
 Lasuén used his discussion of Indigenous labor to launch an attack on Indian 
motherhood. He insisted that expectant and nursing mothers had their work reduced and were 
never physically punished. Like the other Indians, he claimed that women in this condition 
worked harder trying to avoid labor than engaging in the minor tasks the missionaries assigned 
them. He continued, “one is likely to meet one of these expectant mothers in the company of her 
young swain; but it is she who is weighed down like a mule with fish or shellfish.” Before 
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moving on, Lasuén savaged the character of Indian mothers. He claimed it was “not unusual” 
that when a new mother’s baby cried too loudly she “abandons what she had been doing for the 
entire day . . . leaving her infant in charge of someone else, or locked in.”656 Worse than alleged 
child abandonment, Lasuén accused some mothers of infanticide. “Knowing full well the 
inhuman crimes these Indian women so often commit . . . how they commit abortion, and are 
guilty of suffocating their infants,” he reported, “we employ for their correction all the care and 
vigilance  . . . a matter of such importance demands.” According to the Franciscans, the only 
thing an expectant mother brought to the missions was five years of additional problems for the 
missionaries.657 
 Lasuén’s anger towards Indian women who engaged in sexual relations was evident in 
the difference in descriptions he gave of the girls in the monjerías and those who were pregnant 
or give birth. Considering the level of ignorance he demonstrated throughout his fifteen years as 
father president regarding Indigenous Californians’ customs, traditions, and habits, Lasuén’s 
interpretation of new mothers abandoning their children for the day does not have credibility. 
Similarly, though there were known cases of Indigenous mothers in the missions aborting their 
pregnancy, there is only one documented case of infanticide in eighteenth century California, and 
many rumors and overreactions by the Franciscans in the nineteenth century. Moreover, there 
exists much scholarship demonstrating that groups facing genocidal conditions around the world 
have turned to infanticide to save their children from a world they believe has no future.658 
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Lasuén’s Catholic worldview caused him to distort these situations and inhibited his 
understanding of them as signs of people facing significant cultural and physical decline at the 
hands of a lethal colonial regime. He also manipulated the truth about the one case of infanticide 
on record in California during the eighteenth century to punctuate his screed against Indian 
motherhood.  
 After his digression about the inadequacies of Indian mothers, Lasuén returned to his 
consideration of the parameters of Indian work, particularly as it connected them to soldiers. 
“There is not a single mission from San Diego to San Francisco in which any Indian was ever 
punished simply because he associated in his free time with a soldier,” he declared. He clarified 
that he did not refer to those who were “notoriously vicious, or those who solicit for evil 
purpose, or those whose background is especially suspicious,” although he failed to identify who 
made those judgments. Similarly, mission Indians did not require permission to go to the 
presidios on feast days. In fact, according to Lasuén, since the earliest days of the mission 
system, one could find all manner of Indian workers at the presidio, both men and women. They 
learned no skills there other than learning how to waste more time, which, in his own words 
earlier in the Refutation, was something in which they were already well-versed. 659 
 This particular topic, Indian men and women choosing to work at the presidio over the 
missions, bothered Lasuén for nearly a decade. He previously fought with both Fages and Borica 
over it and only deigned to approve it when the government in Mexico City demanded that 
baptized California Indians learned new skills. Again, he spat back at the commanders’ 
responses to Borica’s questionnaire, in which one of the men wrote about a system of 
 
Book: Essays on Southern Character and American Identity, John Mayfield and Todd Hagstette, eds., 
(Columbia, 2017); James Kelly, “Infanticide in Eighteenth Century England,” Irish Economic and Social History 
19 (1992), 5-26. 
659 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 2:211-212. 
 
 
241 
 
punishment the Franciscans instituted for Indians seeking work at the presidios. “Note that this is 
referred to as no less than a system,” he wrote. “This would not only be a disgraceful form of 
avarice but a refinement of envy. As for the existence of a system: may God forgive those guilty 
of so infamous a calumny…there is no such system; there is no such usage; there is no such 
thing.”660 Although the notion that it was common practice to punish Indians who sought work 
elsewhere, clearly offended him, Lasuén conceded, once again, that there were in fact instances 
when it occurred. “Sometimes, it is true, we discipline an Indian. . .when a missionary, after 
assigning him to a particular task find him missing. . .doing the same thing or something else. . 
.at the presidio.”661 It is difficult to ascertain the truth of the matter, because Lasuén offered so 
many qualifiers to cover any instance of punishment that occurred.  
 Lasuén then took up the charge that the Franciscans granted too much liberty to the 
converts and allowed them to come and go as they pleased. He argued that stopping them was 
nearly impossible due to the call of the wild that they could not ignore. Moreover, he complained 
that families of baptized Indians were a troubling obstacle, as they constantly fought to keep their 
kin from returning. “We have to remember that the majority of our neophytes are so attached to 
the mountains that if there were an unqualified prohibition against going there, there would be a 
danger of a riot,” Lasuén warned. He referred to a Kumeyaay rebel who reportedly participated 
in the attack on the mission in 1775 because “Seeing all the gentiles were being baptized, and 
that as a consequence there would be no one” left living in their village.662 Once more, Lasuén 
failed to perceive the meaning behind this statement. The Kumeyaay attacked San Diego not 
because they were lonely, but from a fear that invaders destroyed their way of life. He 
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concluded, asserting that Franciscans often gave in to the desires of the converts, so as to not 
exasperate them and foment rebellion. 
 To this point during his rumination on labor in the Refutation Lasuén had not referred to 
the crisis at Mission San Francisco. Although he eventually acknowledged those events, he did 
not, as he might have, use the episode to demonstrate how Franciscans rectified problems when 
confronted with them. The issues at San Francisco, which included forced labor, purposeful 
withholding of food, limiting freedom of movement, and indiscriminate punishment were the 
same as those he spent so much time refuting. Here was an opportunity to prove Franciscan 
missionaries were capable of change and improvement. However, he chose to omit the truth: that 
the priests there sent armed men to chase down Indians who fled the miserable conditions there; 
that Borica forced them to make sure that Indians received appropriate food and that at least 
some of it was served hot; that Indians were whipped, and placed in the stocks and shackles to 
such a degree that it caused many to flee.663  
 Although he sidestepped the problems at San Francisco, Lasuén did spend the bulk of the 
Refutation on one issue that dogged the Franciscans throughout their time in California: their 
physical punishment of Indian men and women who converted to Christianity. In the process of 
“denaturalizing” Indigenous Californians, Lasuén, like Serra before him and Franciscan 
historians who followed, steadfastly defended their right to physically chastise baptized 
California Indians.664 “It is but natural…that we have the authority, the right, and the opportunity 
to correct and discipline them for their own good,” he argued. Lasuén cited Serra’s 1773 victory 
in Mexico City that allowed the “management, control, punishment, and education of baptized 
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Indians” as the unchanging precedent that should shield the missionaries from criticism of their 
methods, which he outlined for the viceroy.665 
 Decades after Serra had done it successfully, a second Franciscan leader in California 
struggled to convince civil authorities in Mexico City of the necessity of the various means the 
priests used to control and punish religious transgressions. First, Lasuén reported that on most 
occasions when an Indian faced the lash, they required soldiers’ involvement in the proceedings. 
This ended when Governor Neve found the practice objectionable and forbade his men to assist 
the Franciscans in whipping Indian men and women for religious offences. Lasuén also 
explained that the stocks were employed to stop offenders from fleeing the mission to escape 
their punishment. However, the charge that women were often placed in stocks required 
additional clarification. “In Santa Barbara . . . in that very mission and no other, are the stocks 
used for women,” he conceded. Because that form of punishment had been used there since the 
mission’s founding, he argued that there was no reason to reform the practice. Additionally, he 
remarked that if women were punished at Santa Barbara they were shackled, taken into the 
monjeria, and flogged by another woman. The commander at the nearby presidio likened the 
system to a dungeon, to which Lasuén protested: “He could just as well have called it a scaffold 
or a place of execution. God bless us!” Lest too bleak a picture emerge, Lasuén noted that around 
all eighteen missions, Indians outside the missions warmed to the Franciscans when they saw 
how kindly they treated baptized California Indians. This was particularly true at San Francisco 
according to Lasuén, where “in recent days…one hundred and thirty suddenly presented 
themselves for that purpose.” For Lasuén, this answered all questions outsiders raised regarding 
the severity of punishment at the missions, and specifically it “rendered null the hard and cruel 
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dictate, sentence, or opinion which asserts: ‘The treatment generally given to the Indians is very 
harsh, and that accorded to them at San Francisco is actually cruel.’”666 
 Finally, he could no longer ignore the crisis at Mission San Francisco. In his typical style, 
Lasuén minimized the scope and intensity of the disaster, calling it a “senseless and noisy 
outbreak,” based on “fanciful charges of cruelty.” He reported that he “convinced the governor 
that this was nothing but a vindictive plot in favor of an unjust claim.” Lasuén argued that when 
hundreds of Indians fled the mission in 1796 “not one ran away through fear of work or 
punishment, but solely in terror of the . . . deadly epidemic.” The testimony California Indian 
men and women who fled the mission offered emphatically refuted Lasuén’s argument. 
However, as he demonstrated during the de la Peña affair, Lasuén discounted all Indigenous 
testimony out of hand.667 Finally, he argued that Borica never made an official pronouncement 
about the crisis, which “is the most conclusive proof the entire affair was without foundation, or 
had nothing but a weak and contemptable bias…in the final analysis it was found to be a 
fraud!”668 
 Throughout his time as father president, Lasuén demonstrated a cynical approach to 
defending his mission field and missionaries, using varying degrees of obfuscation and outright 
falsehoods to maintain the good name of the missionaries; however, his interpretation of the 
events at San Francisco may be the ugliest moment of his tenure. That he held Mission San 
Francisco up as a model of missionary success while ignoring the forced labor, beatings, 
starvation, and priests forming posses to capture escapees, finally, irrevocably, demonstrated that 
Lasuén would lie in the face of unimpeachable evidence to protect the Franciscan order. Even 
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more damaging for Lasuén’s credibility, because years before he went on the record and 
admitted to the failure of that mission, all of these problems were well-known by the soldiers in 
San Francisco, Borica, and the government in Mexico City. His utter disdain for Indian 
testimony allowed him to cling to the notion that the mass exodus resulted from an outbreak of 
disease. While the sickness played a role, there was enough evidence that many left the mission 
because of the violence of the missionaries and the alcaldes. Lasuén’s attempted subterfuge was 
as ill-conceived as it was damning of his leadership. It revealed his defense of the missions, and 
all of his responses to the scandals during his time as father president, as untrustworthy at best, 
and total distortions of reality at worst.  
 Feeling confident that he had proven every charge made against missionaries as a 
fabrication born of conspiracy and hatred for the order, Lasuén expounded on the “gentle way” 
Franciscans in California punished transgressions. “Here are the aborigines whom we are 
teaching to be men, people of vicious and ferocious habits who know no law but force, no 
superior but their own free will, an no reason but their own caprice,” he explained. Furthermore, 
“they look on their own most barbarous and cruel actions with an indifference foreign to human 
nature, and death is their customary way of avenging injuries,” Lasuén claimed. He deployed a 
series of Spanish prejudices to create an image of the California Indian for the government in 
Mexico, despite it flying of the face of well-known truths regarding Indigenous life in California. 
“They are a people without education, without government, religion, or respect for authority, and 
they shamelessly pursue without restraint whatever their brutal appetites suggest to them…such 
is the character of the men we are required to correct, and whose crimes we must punish,” 
Lasuén concluded. Trusting that he had constructed the true image of California Indian people as 
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deserving of the lash, he moved on to discuss the types of correction the Franciscans 
employed.669  
 “It is obvious,” Lasuén began, “that a barbarous, fierce, and ignorant country needs 
punishments and penalties that are different from one that is cultured and enlightened.” 
Additionally, if converts showed signs of recidivism, the punishments intensified, to break 
through their animal nature. Despite his lurid construction of Indigenous people as wild animals, 
Lasuén assured the government in Mexico City that patience was the Franciscans’ key precept. 
When patience did not suffice to correct aberrant behavior, they turned to stiffer penalties. If a 
priest thought a baptized Indian deserved a lashing, he argued they were never permitted to give 
more than twenty-one strokes, “no matter how grave or enormous the offence,” and that no blood 
should be drawn, or bruises given. For the most egregious criminals, the missionaries sought the 
assistance of the presidio, sending them there for punishment. This was ineffective according to 
Lasuén, because the soldiers “let them spend the time in relaxation, and they come out more 
insolent than before.” He then concluded, remarking, “The system here expounded is the system 
observed . . . it . . . is normally very mild.”670 
 Finally, after Lasuén attempted to demonstrate that Indians were “savages” who only 
understood force, he addressed long-standing charges of Franciscan cruelty. He admitted that the 
missionaries were not monolithic and that some may have been heavier handed than others. Was 
there the possibility that from time to time a priest might “fall a victim to uncontrolled passion,” 
while having a baptized California Indian flogged? Lasuén conceded this might be true, but 
because the stress of managing the missions weighed heavily upon them, accidents of this type 
were to be forgiven. “So, I do not deny that there ever was or ever will be an instance of 
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harshness or even some threat of cruelty,” he wrote. Lasuén shared a story to demonstrate the 
care the missionaries took in punishing offenders. He spoke with an unnamed missionary about 
pulling baptized Indians’ ears and slapping their heads. They agreed it was appropriate because 
parents and teachers employed the same punishments. This same missionary, who Lasuén 
described as mild and wise, later hit a man who called him a liar over the shoulder with a stick 
hard enough to break it. Lasuén did not reprimand the priest because he reported the incident to 
the father president in tears. That tale of a missionary losing their temper over an insult and 
beating the man with a stick until it broke was the last bit of evidence Lasuén gave regarding the 
punishment of Indians. He believed it proved his point that missionaries were mild, stable men 
who rarely crossed disciplinary lines.671  
 After his dissertation on the punishment of baptized California Indians in the missions, 
Lasuén turned to Horra’s charges regarding the Franciscans’ commercial transactions with the 
presidio. He announced that in the five years of Borica’s term as governor, he never reproached 
Lasuén for failing to follow the official price list for goods generated at the mission. Much as he 
had with his defense against punishments, Lasuén wrote of several instances where soldiers 
engaged in questionable business arrangements. He complained that the soldiers bought cows for 
low prices at the mission and sold them off to townspeople for a large profit, and that they would 
pay prices for an average cow, but then would make off with one of higher quality. Lasuén 
suggested the previous example demonstrated how some of the confusion over prices originated. 
When the missionaries noticed the soldiers’ alleged scam, they would ask for a higher price, and 
the soldiers complained that they had already agreed on the lower amount. In his conclusion, he 
asserted once more that the charges made against the missionaries obfuscated the true villains: 
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“the more exact and searching and rigorous the inquiry, the more unsullied will the missionaries 
emerge, and we shall see the accusers in the role of the guilty.”672 
 Throughout the Refutation, the father president continued to push the point that had 
Horra, an insane man in Lasuén’s estimation, never made his accusations against the 
Franciscans, the commanders would have never spoken up and his defense would be 
unnecessary. He argued that Horra had “no reason to hold or even dream what he reported” and 
that no singular instance of flogging had ever caused as much disturbance as his letter.673 Despite 
his alleged insanity Azanza, Borica, and the presidio commanders took Horra seriously. Even 
more troubling for Lasuén was that “the commanding officers in the matter have shown undue 
subservience to the officer above them.”674 He insinuated that the soldiers had little will of their 
own and simply repeated what senior officers reported. If one among them wanted to do the 
missionaries harm, it would be a simple matter to get the men in his command to corroborate his 
claims. Lasuén repeated the idea that this entire affair was essentially a witch hunt, started by an 
insane missionary and perpetuated by the military that was their continual adversary. He believed 
there was no merit to the exercise. Thus, he concluded the document. 
 Father President Lasuén’s Refutation of Charges was not the last time Lasuén needed to 
defend missionary practices in the last years of his life and tenure. In June 1802, word reached 
California that Mexico City debated a new missionary reform. Officials there wondered if 
baptizing and instructing new converts in their own villages and allowing them to remain there, 
rather than compelling them to move to the mission, represented a superior system to the one 
currently in place. Lasuén balked at the idea and reminded the father guardian at the College of 
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San Fernando of the massacre that took place on the Colorado River in 1781 to demonstrate the 
dangerous potential of this reform. He took up his well-worn argument that California Indian 
people could only truly learn the Christian faith in the isolated communities of the missions.675  
 To Lasuén, the presence of their friends, families, and traditional culture would always 
tempt the recently baptized to give up the faith. Lasuén argued that elders and parents were 
incapable of teaching their children anything “conducive to rational, social, and civil life. 
Everything is taught to them by the missionaries.” This need to justify the missions’ existence 
yet again, only a year and half after the Refutation revealed the depths of Lasuén’s frustrations. 
“What anxieties! What disappointments! What vigilance! What anguishes of mind! What labors 
day and night for the missionaries! What liberties! What excesses! What irregularities! What 
ignorance! What disorders!” he exclaimed to Gasol. It was an outburst unlike any other in his 
correspondence, veering into the realm of treason. He regained his composure and continued to 
give evidence that supported his belief that no Christian instruction was possible outside of the 
mission confines.676 
 Lasuén’s response to reforms suggested in 1802 was the last time he defended the system 
or to respond to a scandal. Though problems still arose during the last year of his tenure, none 
matched the level of Horra’s accusations. The missions retained their traditional form, and few 
reforms were enacted until the emergence of the Mexican Republic in 1824. However, it was not 
Lasuén’s Refutation that staved off new challenges for more than two decades. During the first 
decade of the nineteenth century there was no California governor akin to Borica, Neve, or Fages 
who challenged the Franciscan missionaries and their management of the province.  Moreover, 
in 1808, Napoleon’s army invaded Spain, effectively ending the reign of Spanish monarchs in 
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the process.677 For sixteen years after that invasion, the Franciscans, despite all challenges to 
their authority during Lasuén’s tenure, became the preeminent institution in California.  
 Fermín Francisco de Lasuén died at 2:00pm on June 26, 1803. He lived thirty years in a 
land that he never accepted as his home. The last eighteen of those years were spent leading two 
generations of men tasked with protecting and expanding the invasion of California and the so-
called “spiritual conquest” of the people who lived there for millennia. His legacy is marred by 
the cynicism, moral certainty, and unquestioned institutional loyalty that undergirded his policies 
and judgment during his eighteen years as president. He was an intelligent man and a fine writer, 
but he was a leader of limited vision and capability for the position he reluctantly inherited after 
Junípero Serra’s death. He left California more violent, contentious, and ripe for epidemics and 
famine than when he entered. Moreover, he obstinately fought against any reform from the 
secular government that might have mitigated those changes. He saw every attempt at reform as 
a direct attack on the Franciscan order and challenged every accusation against his men with all 
the force of will he could muster, whether they deserved it or not. Lasuén’s tenure as president, 
and more specifically, his responses to the increasing hostility and tumult produced by his 
missionaries and their form of religious colonization, firmly entrenched these calamities as 
features of the California missionary field until its ultimate demise in 1834.   
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Conclusion 
This dissertation began with the premise that Spain’s colonial agents engineered a human 
catastrophe through their management of the California mission system that produced tens of 
thousands of fatalities, waves of disease, and significant cultural loss in California Indian 
communities. While California mission founder Junípero Serra’s tenure as father president set 
these processes in motion, it was his successor, Fermín Francisco de Lasuén who intensified 
them. Under Lasuén’s leadership, the deleterious effects of missionization accelerated and 
diversified. Despite a series of escalating crises, beginning with Fray Tomás de la Peña’s murder 
trial, and concluding with the crisis at Mission San Francisco, civil authorities in Mexico City 
continued to support the Franciscans in California. That support led to disaster for California 
Indians. 
During Lasuén’s term as father president, from 1785 to 1803, a range of disparate figures, 
such as royal governors, military officers, rank-and-file soldiers, California Indians, and even 
Franciscan missionaries all attempted to alert Mexico City to the myriad issues plaguing the 
colony to no avail. Rather than investigating these accusations, a series of viceroys requested that 
the Franciscans in California defend their actions. Lasuén always met that task, and the imperial 
government always accepted his defense. Even after the crisis at San Francisco and Lasuén’s 
Refutation of Charges, the royal government allowed the California missionaries to continue 
their management of the colony without reform or reproach. Spain had limited options in taking 
and holding California other than the Franciscan missionaries from the College of San Fernando. 
Spain did not have the troops to conquer California Indians by force. After the 1781 Quechan 
uprising against two Spanish outposts on the Colorado River made bringing large amounts of 
colonists to California impossible, converting the region’s Indigenous population to Roman 
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Catholicism became their only option. Imperial rivalries with Russia and the English caused 
Spain to initiate a colonial project they could not maintain, outside of deploying an anachronistic 
form of religious colonialism that had largely fallen out of favor. Instead of closely monitoring 
the missionaries’ management of the colony, the royal government allowed the Franciscans in 
California to operate with near total autonomy.  
Just thirty-six years before Lasuén became father president, the circumstances in 
California might have seemed impossible. As part of the Bourbon Reforms, the Spanish crown 
deployed policies, such as the 1749 mission secularization decree and limits to the age and 
numbers of new missionaries, specifically crafted to erode the power and influence of 
missionaries throughout the Americas. These policies intentionally pushed the Franciscan order 
into a steep decline in both numbers and competency. During the same period, the Crown 
emphasized new approaches to managing the areas of its American empire where Amerindians 
heavily outnumbered Spanish colonizers. Civil government became more important than 
missionaries, and administrators considered towns and commerce as more humane paths toward 
integrating Indigenous peoples into Spanish society. This, of course, demonstrated the flawed 
logic of passive conquest as Spanish soldiers and colonists living in Spanish pueblos also 
committed depredations against Amerindians. Colonialism is a destructive force, regardless of 
the terms and approaches applied to the process.  
 The invasion of California forced Spain into an untenable position. The 1749 
secularization decree and the policies that followed embodied the modernizing impulse at the 
core of the Bourbon Reforms. The royal government and its administrative-military apparatus 
had lost faith in Franciscan missionaries’ abilities to convert and manage new Indigenous 
populations and to economically develop the empire’s most remote territorial claims. As the rest 
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of Spain’s American empire adopted new political and social forms, California became an 
exception – the last bastion of a medievalist Franciscan worldview doggedly opposed to 
reform.678 New Spain’s viceregal government only further entrenched that worldview when it 
made California’s Indian population wards of the Franciscans in 1773. From that point forward, 
Franciscan leadership took literally the mandate that only they had the jurisdiction to manage 
baptized California Indians. When New Spain’s appointed administrators, the royal governors, 
pushed back against Franciscan management of California, the missionaries dug in and rejected 
all constraints to their authority. A pattern emerged: civil authority in California identified 
aspects of Franciscan management they deemed harmful to Spain’s goals in the province and 
attempted to adopt new policies, only to have officials in Mexico City or Spain overrule them. 
Each time this happened, the Franciscans felt increasingly secure in their position and in their 
superiority to the local royal governors. 
 Beginning in 1790, this combination of distance, autonomy, and a new generation of 
missionaries unprepared for the realities of life in the remote Spanish province led to dangerous, 
lethal conditions for Indigenous Californians. Throughout the decade, missionaries increasingly 
engaged in forced religious recruitment, intentionally starved baptized California Indians, 
inflicted punishments that amounted to torture, and sent out squads of mission Indians to 
recapture baptized California Indians who had fled the missions. Moreover, some of the younger 
missionaries brought instability and chaos with them from the College of San Fernando in 
Mexico City. Two of these missionaries boasted that they carried weapons to California, while 
others balked at their older peers’ practices and refused to work peacefully. By 1798, Lasuén’s 
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discontented missionaries and their near-constant infighting overwhelmed him. He spent much of 
his last years searching for combinations of priests who could get along well enough to manage 
the missions without causing disgraceful tumult. He never solved that problem. 
 Lasuén’s presidency was a turning point, not only for California Indians, or the mission 
system, but for all of California history. Despite his intelligence, passion for the Franciscan 
order, and decades of experience, the role of father president of the California mission system 
proved to be too big for Lasuén. The desire to protect his missionaries from any critique 
consumed him. It became the obsession of his tenure. Lasuén’s provincial focus obstructed his 
view from the larger, systemic issues that the Franciscan order developed in California. When he 
took the office of father president in 1785, bad blood already existed between the Franciscans 
from the College of San Fernando and the Spanish civil government in California. Rather than 
accepting that the missionaries’ obstructionist tendencies towards reform caused some of the 
problems they experienced in the modernizing Spanish empire, Lasuén took reform efforts as 
personal attacks. Lasuén imagined that enemies beset the order on all sides.679 These attitudes 
caused him to privilege maintaining the good name of the missionaries over all other concerns. If 
missionaries remained loyal to him, he defended them in cases of any wrongdoing, sometimes 
despite their own confessions. If their behavior became annoying, or if a missionary broke the 
chain of command and petitioned the governor for assistance, Lasuén exiled them to Mexico 
while labeling them insane, or syphilitic. As the California mission system expanded in size, 
geographic scope, population, and problems, Lasuén crafted an insular agenda, and let imagined 
conspiracies determine his course of action. The results, in terms of discord, violence, and death 
speak for themselves.  
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The critique of the Franciscan missionaries offered in this dissertation does not imply that 
there was a qualitatively better approach the Spanish could have taken to hold California. The 
key intervention this dissertation provides is a deeper understanding of two aspects of Spain’s 
colonial project in California. First, it sheds light upon the political and administrative processes 
that led the California missions to take their specific shape. Second, it gives a clearer picture of 
the Franciscan missionaries in a key transitional period in the history of California’s mission 
system. The former matters because understanding the nature of catastrophes like that which 
occurred in California allows us to critically examine our past and more clearly account for those 
who made the missions so destructive, even if they are long dead. The latter matters because of 
the place that the California Franciscans still hold in the state’s firmament of cultural heroes and 
the ongoing veneration that European colonizers still receive in many parts of the Americas. 
While this dissertation focuses on Spain’s invasion of California in particular, it illuminates the 
dark nature of colonialism and the manner in which many European-descended citizens 
throughout the Americas still embrace stories describing colonial endeavors as human progress. 
 The story of colonialism as human progress still wields powerful influence in California. 
Beginning in 1888, the California missions became a prominent symbol of California’s pre-
United States past. Amid a campaign to lure land-hungry Midwesterners to California with the 
promise of cheap real estate and a climate capable of curing health issues, civic boosters 
discovered an effective marketing gimmick: California’s romantic Spanish history. In 1946, the 
journalist Carey McWilliams, who coined the term “Spanish Fantasy Past,” explained the 
fantasy: “the Spanish residents of Alta California, all members of one big happy guitar-twanging 
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family, danced the fandango and lived out days of beautiful indolence in lands of the sun.”680 
The idea of the loving, gentle Franciscan missionary tutoring the naïve, childlike California 
Indians in the ways of Christianity completed this idyllic fantasy. Like so many aspects of 
California’s past, the Spanish Fantasy Past camouflaged the violence and profound trauma that 
Spanish colonialism had imposed on Indigenous Californians from the historical memory. Once 
this process began, historical critiques of the California missions were “largely forgotten and the 
Franciscan version of the Indian was accepted at face value,” McWilliams wrote.681 Lasuén 
would have approved of the Spanish Fantasy Past carrying on his legacy. The mythology surely 
maintained the good name of the missionaries.  
 The Spanish Fantasy Past remains a part of California’s identity in the twenty first 
century due to the labors of journalists, artists, policy makers, and historians. Nineteenth-century 
journalists such as Charles Lummis and Charles Nordhoff first perpetuated the Fantasy in 
fanciful stories and travelogues.682 Artists like Edwin Deakin and William Keith’s late 
nineteenth-century hauntingly beautiful paintings of the California missions evoked a romantic, 
bygone era. Perhaps the most sturdy of the Fantasy’s earliest foundation stones was Helen Hunt 
Jackson’s 1884 wildly popular novel, Ramona, detailing a star-crossed love between a California 
Indian girl and her half-Indian suitor.683 In the 1930s, historical activist Christine Sterling fought 
to restore Los Angeles’ Olvera Street and turned it into a festive marketplace more at home in 
 
680 For more on the economic and social factors behind California’s construction of the “Spanish Fantasy Past” see, 
Mike Davis, City of Quartz (New York, 1990), 22; Carey McWilliams, Southern California: An Island on the 
Land (Salt Lake City, 1973), 22.  
681 McWilliams, Southern California, 23.  
682 Martin Padget, “Travel, Exoticism, and the Writing of Region: Charles Fletcher Lummis and the ‘Creation’ of the 
Southwest,” Journal of the Southwest, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), 421-449, Charles Nordhoff, Nordhoff’s 
West Coast: California, Oregon, and Hawaii (London, 1987), 148-154. 
683 Helen Hunt Jackson, Ramona (New York, 1884).  
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contemporary Mexico than in Spanish-era California.684 Beginning in the 1920s architects 
embedded this romanticized Californian aesthetic in architecture during both the Mission 
Revival and Spanish Colonial Revival periods, enshrining a vision of a pleasing, romantic 
Spanish California past that never actually existed.685 Policy makers did their part in forwarding 
the Fantasy as well. In 1923, the California State legislature mandated that public schools teach 
the state’s history to elementary-aged children. The state instructed teachers to pay special 
attention to California’s colonial founders and pioneers, including Junípero Serra. During the 
Great Depression, educators required California’s children to enumerate Fray Serra’s good 
qualities and formulate a plan to incorporate them into their own lives.686 This curriculum birthed 
the sugar-cube mission diorama project that remained ubiquitous in California’s elementary 
schools until 2016 when legislators recommended that educators abandon it.687 Despite this, the 
fourth-grade mission-building project continues. Even historians contributed to the fantasy’s 
romanticized view. Regarding Serra, Herbert Eugene Bolton, the founder of Borderlands 
History, argued: “His humanity as well as his zeal found exercise in a fatherly interest in the 
children of the wilderness and in efforts to teach them innocent games and pleasures in the place 
of some of their native amusements which were less moral.”688 Out of this confluence came a 
pervasive image that persists in many corners to this day: that of the kindly, paternalistic 
 
684 William D. Estrada, “Los Angeles’ Old Plaza and Olvera Street: Imagined and Contested Space,” Western 
Folklore 58, no. 2, “Built L.A.: Folklore and Place in Los Angeles” (Winter, 1999), 107-129; Phoebe S. Kropp, 
California Vieja: Culture and Memory in a Modern American Place (Berkeley, 2008); Michelle M. Lorimer, 
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Architectural Historians 26, no. 2 (May, 1967), 131-147; Harold Kirker California's Architectural Frontier, San 
Marino, 1960; Arthur B. Benton, "The California Mission and Its Influence Upon Pacific Coast Architecture," 
Architect and Engineer 24 (February, 1911), 35-75; George C. Baum, “The Mission Type,” in Henry H. Saylor, 
Architectural Styles for Country Houses (New York, 1919); George Wharton James, In and Out of the Old 
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missionary lovingly passing on the precepts of Roman Catholicism to immoral, backwards 
California Indians.  
 Despite most serious scholars discarding this image in the twenty-first century, the 
imprint of the Spanish Fantasy Past remains ubiquitous today. Schools, public parks, streets and 
highways, professional and amateur sports teams, and businesses of every character are named 
after California missionaries like Lasuén and Serra, or the missions themselves. Some California 
towns and cities, such as Santa Barbara and San Juan Capistrano, dedicate their entire civic 
identity to the missions from which they derive their names. For over 100 years, Californians of 
multiple generations have embraced a colorful, romantic history that bears little resemblance to 
the lived past of Indigenous Californians and their Spanish and mestizo colonizers. Most of this 
rested on the assumption that Europeans would inevitably introduce civilization to North 
America’s west coast and that the Franciscans used love and patience to propel California 
Indians into modernity.689 
The Spanish Fantasy Past also granted the Franciscans a status for which Lasuén fought 
during his time as father president. Based on his term alone, it was a status that they never 
earned. This status is embodied in the canonization of Junípero Serra. Serra’s reputation is more 
controversial in the wake of Pope Francis’s 2015 decision than at any time since his feuds with 
Spanish administrators. Serra’s elevation to sainthood is the culmination of several historical 
processes. Foremost among them are Roman Catholic historians’ hagiographies. From Palóu’s 
1787 biography to the work of twentieth-century Franciscans such as Engelhardt and Guest, or 
the Roman Catholic historian Maynard Geiger O.F.M., a host of men prepared Serra for 
 
689 Guest, “An Inquiry into the Role of Discipline,” 22; Bancroft, History of California, 1:578; For nineteenth-
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canonization. California Indian people and many contemporary historians challenge Serra’s 
positive image. News of Serra’s canonization sparked demonstrations from Indians throughout 
the state, including a Tataviam mother and son who walked to all twenty-one missions, a 650-
mile journey, in protest. California Indians repeated a simple refrain, “He was not a saint.”690 
The controversy surrounding Serra’s canonization reveals the lasting power of the mythology 
surrounding the California missions.  
 The events detailed in this dissertation help to unravel that mythology. The Franciscans 
working in California between 1784 and 1803 do much of the unravelling themselves with their 
deeds. Consider some of the worst examples of missionary behavior presented in the preceding 
chapters. It is inarguable that sometime before 1786, Fray Tomás de la Peña pulled a boy’s ear so 
hard it bled and that he struck an agricultural worker in the head with a cane. Ten years later, at 
the same mission, Fray Manuel Fernández flogged Indian men and used the threat of burning 
villages to the ground to coerce Ohlone people to accept baptisms. Antonio Dantí and his partner 
Martín Landaeta withheld food from laborers at Mission San Francisco. Dantí also sent a 
squadron of unprepared and unarmed mission Indians to kidnap escapees from Mission San 
Francisco, leading to a massacre of seven of them and to the largest confrontation between the 
Spanish military and California Indians in the eighteenth century. Despite overwhelming 
evidence and the confessions of the perpetrators, Lasuén denied any of these events took place.  
 The Franciscans in this dissertation also unravel the mythology surrounding the 
California missions with their words, particularly the words they used to obfuscate problems 
within the order. Dantí attempted to cover up the massacre in the East Bay hills before the 
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situation spiraled out of his control. Lasuén repeatedly twisted reality or lied to governors and 
even his superiors at the College of San Fernando when it suited his purpose. He referred to the 
massacre in the Easy Bay as a “noisy disturbance.” Lasuén once remarked that no Indian ever 
received more than twenty-one lashes for punishment, when most Franciscans cited twenty-five 
lashes as the typical punishment, and the documentary record contains examples of California 
Indians receiving hundreds of lashes.691 He intimated that he remained unaware of Fray Horra’s 
charges against the order weeks after referring to them in a letter. He labeled the two 
missionaries who broke ranks and revealed dangerous patterns of behavior in the missions insane 
and exiled them to Mexico. He and the physician, Soler, fabricated a syphilis diagnosis to 
remove the problematic missionary Rubí from California. Throughout his tenure as father 
president, Lasuén employed fabrications, cover-ups, and lied when he sought to maintain the 
good name of the missionaries. Lasuén’s actions while father president were not those of the 
mythological, loving Franciscan. 
 Lasuén also unraveled the mythology surrounding the California missions with his 
descriptions of California Indian people. His characterizations had little to do with the actual 
human beings surrounding him in the missions. Rather, they were the products of his 
presuppositions regarding “Indianness.” In his Refutation of Charges, Lasuén wrote that 
California Indians as a whole were “people of vicious and ferocious habits who know no law but 
force…they look on their own most barbarous and cruel actions with indifference foreign to 
human nature…they are a people without education, without government, religion, or respect for 
authority…such is the character of the men we are to correct, whose crimes we must punish.”692 
In the same dehumanizing paragraph, Lasuén accused (with no evidence provided) Indian 
 
691 Lasuén, Writings of Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, 2:221; Bancroft, History of California, 2:345. 
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mothers of strangling their infants or having abortions, then chided other California Indian 
mothers for keeping their infants with them while working in the fields, which caused the women 
to work less than expected.693 These contradictions were not isolated cases. Throughout his 
Refutation, Lasuén characterized California Indians as sub-human brutes who must be 
“denaturalized” in order to become human.694 
 Franciscan actions and words continued defying their romanticized image through the 
end of the Spanish period. After 1800, cases of Franciscan abuse came to light as baptized 
California Indians increasingly resisted missionary violence. In 1805, at Mission San Diego, a 
man named Hilário threw a rock at one of the missionaries there. The governor, José Joaquín de 
Arrillaga, sentenced Hilário to be “kept in prison, where on nine successive feast days… he shall 
be given twenty-five lashes. On the other nine Sundays he shall be given thirty-five or forty 
stripes.”695 In 1811, also at San Diego, a Kumeyaay Indian cook, Nazario, poisoned Fray José 
Pedro Panto after the missionary ordered the cook to receive 124 lashes in a twenty-four-hour 
period.696 In October, 1812, a group of baptized California Indians at Mission Santa Cruz 
assassinated Fray Andres Quintana as revenge for his use of a horsewhip tipped with iron.697  
Meanwhile, Franciscans continued to denigrate California Indian people in official 
communications with civil officials in Spain. In 1815, when asked about the history and 
traditions of the baptized Indians at Mission San Luis Obispo, Fray Antonio Rodriguez wrote, 
“Their traditions are imaginary, preserved among the men and these are without letters and these 
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are so touchy that they cannot pronounce the name of one dead.”698 That same year, Fray Narciso 
Duran at Mission San José insisted “They should be looked upon as perhaps the most pitiable, 
backward, and uncultivated Indians in all America.”699 In a two year span, a new father president 
of the California missions, Fray Mariano Payeras, made two statements that best characterized 
the Franciscans’ willful ignorance to the terrible consequences mission life had on California 
Indian people. In 1818, when proposing a site for a new mission, Payeras described California 
Indians living freely in what is now the San Joaquin Valley as “a republic of hell and a diabolical 
union of apostates.”700 Then in 1820 he wrote of mission Indians, “They live well free…but as 
soon as we reduce them to a Christian community…they decline in health, they fatten, sicken 
and die.”701 Though not intended to be a comprehensive accounting of all the acts of cruelty in 
the California missions between 1810 and 1821, these events were not the isolated acts of 
deviant Franciscan behavior. As Payeras’ confirmed at the end of the decade, the missions 
became more contentious, more violent, and more lethal.  
 Problems of the sort that led to Spain’s 1749 mission secularization decree such as 
Franciscans living in luxury, having concubines, and failing in their religious commitments, 
continued through the end of the Spanish period in California in 1821. In 1815, Fray Vicente 
Francisco de Sarría, in a new position as prefect of the California missions, wrote a pastoral 
regarding the spiritual duties of the Franciscan missionaries in the province. He reminded the 
priests of their obligation to strictly follow the rules of their order, and not to neglect annual 
religious exercises. Sarría also suggested that their management of mission temporalities should 
not distract them from their spiritual obligations. Two years later, after touring some of the 
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California missions, Sarría again chastised the missionaries. He had found some living in large, 
luxurious quarters that were not the “cells of poor evangelical toilers.”702 Some of the California 
Franciscans engaged in relationships with women that could cause scandal if discovered, much 
like those in Peru in the 1740s. Payeras too admonished the missionaries that year, informing 
them of their spiritual obligation to the Spanish-speaking population in California. In 1820, the 
father guardian at the College of San Fernando wrote to the missionaries in California that 
reports had reached Mexico City that Franciscans in California rode in carriages and lived lives 
of idle luxury. The Franciscans either burned the carriages or scrapped them for parts.703 Thirty 
years after the temporalistas came to California, shocked at lives their Franciscan brothers lived 
in the remote province, Franciscan leadership acknowledged the institutional culture that 
privileged material comfort over mendicant traditions in the California missions.  
 These preceding examples both demonstrate that the consequences of Franciscan cruelty 
and autonomy intensified after Lasuén’s presidency, and that twenty-first century California 
mission scholars must take them seriously. For over a century, mission defenders either ignored 
Franciscan abuses or claimed these accounts were exaggerations. While father president, Lasuén 
maintained that nearly every charge of cruelty or avarice was an exaggeration or falsehood. 
Historian Francisco Altable argued that Gaspar Portolá’s 1777 admonition of Fray Palóu for 
being insubordinate and despotic was “a gross exaggeration to impress” civil authorities in 
Mexico City.704 In 1912, Engelhardt responded to the testimony of those who fled the appalling 
conditions during the crisis at Mission San Francisco: “Thus, complaints were made by some of 
the neophytes at all the missions because they hated work, or chafed under the restraints put on 
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their animal propensities. If they discovered a willing listener, their tales would be 
correspondingly embellished.”705 Bancroft referred to the same testimony as “the pretended 
motive of the fugitives,” though he conceded that in some cases, complaints of ill treatment may 
have been true.706 Finally, in his 1989 apologia regarding the role of discipline in the California 
missions, Francis J. Guest wrote: “it does not seem that the punishments…aroused much 
resentment or damaged the reputation of the friars for charity and compassion.”707 
 What changes might occur in California mission scholarship if historians privileged the 
testimony of California Indians and other eyewitness to missionary cruelty, arrogance, avarice, 
and obstructionism or considered the Franciscans and their defenders’ rebuttals the 
exaggerations? Over the last three to four decades, some scholars have begun a shift towards this 
perspective. The primacy of California Indian experiences within and beyond the missions is a 
methodological turn that rejects the antiquated notions of European civilization’s cultural, and 
racial, superiority and the once seemingly self-evident truth that the colonizer’s version of 
history contained accurate representations of the lived past. This turn represented a crucial step 
away from the Eurocentric, triumphalist history of colonization in the Americas. Despite this, 
much work remains in decoding the rhetoric of colonization. This is true in all cases where the 
colonizers’ version of events is the dominant narrative. This dissertation is an effort to decode 
that rhetoric and unravel the mythology surrounding the California missions. These missions 
remain a powerful cultural force in twenty-first century California. That influence, filtered 
through the fantasies of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century journalists, architects, and 
capitalists as it may be, is still alive and well. Yet, there is another group that remains. The 
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descendants of baptized California Indians. If the practice of believing Indigenous histories of 
the missions and critiquing Franciscan versions offers us any enlightenment, it is that the 
California missions and the continued civic veneration of them are a constant reminder of 
historical trauma for those descendants. The California missions forever altered Indigenous 
languages, traditions, religions, and people. Perhaps it is time to honor that past, rather than a 
romanticized fantasy that renders the painful truth invisible.  
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